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Abstract 
 
This dissertation, tracks the interrelationship between citizenship, kinship, and economy 
through the lens of claims made by poor South African women for resources to support their 
children. It is based on 18 months of fieldwork in South Africa that included extended 
ethnography in the inner-city Point neighborhood of Durban, interviews in isiZulu and English, 
oral histories, and archival research with court and welfare case files of neighborhood residents. 
The dissertation demonstrates how the content of citizenship is created and negotiated at the 
micro-political scale of interpersonal relationship through the everyday processes by which 
people seek to fashion a secure existence. By detailing women’s labors to garner resources for 
their families and themselves, this dissertation argues that poor women are shaping the character 
of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa and forging new relations between citizens and the 
state.  
The critical backdrop to this research is the dramatic transformation of South Africa’s 
political economy between 1960 and 2015. Alongside a transition that extended democratic 
citizenship for all, new forms of insecurity and exclusion framed by race, class, and gender, have 
emerged. The collapse of the waged labor system has made formalizing marriages all but 
impossible and family life increasingly tenuous, the burdens of which are predominantly 
shouldered by women who continue to be the primary caregivers of children. This dissertation 
takes a historical anthropological approach to analyzing the meaning of these political economic 
shifts by chronicling poor mothers’ livelihood strategies across this period. A key aspect of these 
strategies is social protection and the political recognition it conveyed. The apartheid-era State 
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Maintenance Grant that once robustly supported a minority of white mothers has been replaced 
by a radical Child Support Grant (CSG) that now reaches 60% of all South Africa’s children at a 
total cost of 3.5% of the national budget. However, the CSG targets children, not their 
caregivers, requiring mothers to look elsewhere for support and recognition. Crucially, women 
are building resource networks across families, friends, and communities that enable alternative 
conditions of debt and dependence in ways increasingly independent of marriage. Via this 
“kinshipping” labor, or the fostering of relations of dependence, this dissertation argues, women 
are redefining obligations between men and women, persons and communities, citizens and state. 
 This dissertation contributes to scholarship on kinship and citizenship. It shows how 
projects of social reproduction constitute contingent economic and political relationships that 
structure people’s lives far more than any totalizing logic. By providing a robust account for how 
unequal capital accumulation and political power are brought about through the production and 
maintenance of kinship, this analysis contributes to longstanding discussions within both feminist 
and kinship theory about the inseparability of the domestic, economic, and political domains. 
Further, this research challenges geopolitical paradigms that separate the global north from 
south. South Africa’s state social assistance programs generate issues mirrored in Canada, the 
US, and Europe, while at the same time unemployment and the postcolonial legacy link it to 
challenges faced across the African continent and beyond. 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Why do you want to move to town?” I asked the young nursing assistant, Phumzile. She 
replied in a voice barely audible, covering her mouth and further obscuring her words, “In the 
townships, they eat your money. In town, you eat for yourself.” Her bashful demeanor, steeped 
in the Zulu tradition of hlonipha—patterns of speech and comportment to demonstrate respect— 
belied or, more aptly, arose from the boldness of her statement. She continued to explain that in 
the townships, where she lived on the outskirts of Durban, “we live with our family. In town, you 
live alone. [Now] If I have money, I have to buy something for them every time I get money. I 
don’t get things that I want because I have to take care of them.” In her framing, to leave the 
family home in the townships and move “to town”, meaning closer to the city center, would 
enable her to sever or at least stretch the bonds of familial obligation around resource sharing. As 
one of the only income earners in her household and as a young woman, Phumzile was expected 
to turn over her weekly earnings to her grandmother in order to help support all the members of 
the household: herself, her grandmother, one uncle, two sisters, one brother and 5 young 
children, one of whom was Phumzile’s daughter.  
Phumzile bristled that her daughter went to school in a uniform with holes in it—a source 
of great shame to her—even though her mother had a “good job”. Phumzile bemoaned the lack 
of control she had over the money she earned and resented the fact that her brother’s car got new 
parts while her daughter’s school fees went unpaid. For her, a move to town would free her from 
the obligation to support a family of 11 and allow her to focus her resources on herself and her 
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daughter. In town, she imagined, they would find a quieter house, better schools, and the 
opportunity to “eat nicely.” 
Many of the residents I knew who lived “in town” in the inner-city Point neighborhood, 
had motivations much like Phumzile’s. They came seeking a “better life” in one form or another 
– better schooling, more employment opportunities, “proper” housing. Some moved in an 
attempt to manage the kinship obligations that—like Phumzile—they chafed against. The smaller 
flats and limited visitation policies of the inner-city buildings meant that family could not 
descend unannounced or en masse to make demands that were difficult to refuse. Others came 
from poorer areas with the vision of obtaining a job and sending remittances home. Confronted 
with the realities of scarce employment they cut family ties out of shame. Still others were 
running from a toxic home life riddled with the abuse and neglect that often goes hand and hand 
with poverty. Regardless of the motivation, those seeking independence were much 
disappointed. Much to their dismay, many of them found that they substituted one form of 
obligation for another. As one resident put it, town was a place where you, “left behind one 
family to make another.”  
In some respects, the pervasiveness of obligation is not surprising. Multiple ties of debt 
and dependency are at the heart of how social personhood is defined in South Africa, most 
especially for black Africans, the race group to which Phumzile identified. Though desires like 
Phumzile’s to escape others’ claims on her resources were by no means uncommon, to voice 
such desires, was. The very suggestion that someone wished to “eat for oneself” was considered 
not only stingy but antisocial and provoked suspicions of nefarious actions such as witchcraft. 
Furthermore, as a young woman, to go against the gendered and generational expectations that 
elders and males should have greater control over her earnings posed a threat to carefully 
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guarded familial hierarchies and could incite violent retaliation. More and more people in South 
Africa today are surviving based on claims they are making upon a shrinking pool of wage-
earners such as Phumzile.  
However, Phumzile’s longing for independence also arose out of a current political 
economic context in which jobs such as her nursing assistantship were increasingly scarce. Of 
the six adults in Phumzile’s household, she was the only one who earned a wage. The other 
income came from government support in the form of her grandmother’s pension, and Child 
Support Grants for 4 of the 5 children. It was only through practices of sharing and redistribution 
that all the members of Phumzile’s household—and those of her neighboring households—were 
able to survive.  
Though unfortunate, Phumzile’s story is not unique to South Africa. Access to arable 
land or waged employment is less and less available to larger segments of the global population. 
In some contexts, in the global south—e.g. Brazil or Zambia—new forms of government 
assistance have stepped in to attempt to fill a part of the gap left by a dramatically shifting 
economy. Though such interventions are critical both for their recipients and for the new forms 
of governmentality they portend, the reality is that a diversity of livelihood strategies have 
become necessary for survival. These overwhelmingly involve claims of dependence, grounded 
in ideologies of kinship, upon persons, communities, and states that, in turn, are reshaping 
economies and political belonging across the globe.   
 I consider this global phenomenon from the perspective of poor women living a 
heterogeneous, inner-city neighborhood. Far from the freedom that Phumzile envisioned, life in 
town for poor women like herself, necessitated complex webs of obligation and accountability, 
the terms of which were not always clearly defined. Women found themselves forging 
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relationships of debt and dependency across divides of race, language, and nationality. As these 
relationships were formed, the forms of obligation they entailed also had to be negotiated.  
This dissertation argues that poor women’s ongoing labors to secure resources for their 
families and themselves not only respond to, but actively construct the gendered and racial 
economy of the country and remake the meaning of citizenship. The critical backdrop to this 
research is South Africa’s radical child support grant, which reaches 60% of children but 
allocates no money for their caregivers. These grants reflect the post-apartheid reality where 
many South Africans lack access to traditional forms of political recognition—marriage and 
wage work—that also enabled social reproduction. Impoverished mothers have experienced their 
political support and recognition move from a social protection system that bolstered white 
motherhood to a democratic one that assists all needy children, but erases their caregivers.  
Using archival and ethnographic research, I track the livelihood strategies of poor 
mothers living under these two regimes. My work reveals that women responded to men’s 
declining ability to earn a family wage by cultivating new relations of obligation and 
dependency. I show how women built resource networks across families, friends, and 
communities that outlined alternative conditions of debt and duty not grounded in either a marital 
contract or relations of affinity. In the process, I argue, women redefined obligations between 
men and women, persons and communities, citizens and the state. 
Why Child Support 
This dissertation considers issues of citizenship, kinship, and economy through the lens 
of child support. In the United States and Europe, the term child support overwhelmingly evokes 
the idea of cash payments made between parents who no longer financially collaborate in the 
raising of their child(ren). Such payments are distinctive because they are oftentimes mediated 
 5 
by formal institutions such as a court or a welfare office. My use of the term here is much more 
capacious. I continue to use the term child support because I am concerned with court-mandated 
cash payments between parents— referred to in the South African context as maintenance—and 
state grants for the support of children— South Africa’s State Maintenance Grant and Child 
Support Grant. Use of the term child support helps retain the important socio-legal meaning 
given to these payments. However, I also include other resources such as clothing, food, 
bedding, cell phone minutes, school fees, or child care that are sought, shared, or exchanged as 
part of the larger effort of child rearing. These resources are less commonly considered part of 
the purview of the formal category of child support, yet my informants specifically enumerated 
such things as critical to providing for the needs of their children. While any item on this list 
could be secured through a cash payment, in the context of poverty where cash is often 
challenging to access, these resources were often sought in their own right as in-kind exchanges. 
Furthermore, their distribution and re-distribution were managed by extra-legal systems of 
exchange and reciprocity through which people articulated their understandings of obligation and 
dependence.  
Child support in this broader sense offers a useful analytic lens because it sits at the 
intersection of state, community, and interpersonal obligation. Through debates about who 
should provide what sorts of resources to children and why, the state’s obligations to its citizens, 
a community’s obligation to its members, and people’s obligations to one another are negotiated 
and defined. My examination of child support seeking reveals these processes.  
In addition to its analytic purchase, the support of children has critical resonance to my 
historic actors—the mothers and fathers working to raise children in South Africa between 1958 
and 2014, the social workers acting as gatekeepers to resources, and the policymakers outlining 
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the contours of their nations. In present- day South Africa, the financial security of children qua 
families is the metric by which both citizens and that state evaluate the success of the democratic 
project. While this reflects a shifting emphasis on children following the 1979 United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the financial welfare of children held significance in 
earlier decades, albeit with different meaning.  
At various points throughout history, the notion of a crisis of the family has been invoked 
as a means of displacing social and political anxieties and giving name to their emotional 
intensity. Concerns about these crises have centered around how “the family” goes about caring 
for its child(ren). While oftentimes such discourses bespoke a socio-economic shift in which care 
for children in ways that were previously relied upon were no longer possible—in the case of 
black South Africans, such shifts were frequently brought about by racial rule—they also served 
to both reify a singular normative version of family (often nuclear) and obscure the incredible 
flexibility of families to weather change. For black South Africans, invocations of crisis 
punctuated changes such as rapid urbanization (Hunter [Wilson] 1936; Krige 1936), the 
migratory labor system’s spatial stretching of family bonds (Schapera 1947; Mager 1999; Delius 
and Glaser 2002), and the era of wageless life (Hunter 2006 & 2010, Ferguson 2016). Concerns 
about white families centered more on the problems improper child support caused for continued 
white dominance of the country. This might be an issue of white poverty and improper child 
rearing (Posel 1991); a decline in the white birthrate (Report on Committee of inquiry into 
Family Allowances 1961) or a change in family composition with the rise of women’s rights, 
employment, and divorce (Report on the Congress of the Family Year 1961).  South African 
citizens, most often women, also took up the discourse of family crisis in order to make political 
claims about state policies that were making life untenable by grounding them in the morally 
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resonant language of the needs of children (for whites see du Toit for black Africans see Healey-
Clancy 2017). 
Since democratic transition, women often speak of an inability to support their children 
as a means of critiquing a state that has failed in its revolutionary promises and to articulate a 
crisis in social reproduction that characterizes the post-apartheid moment. During the recession 
of the mid-1970s, the South African economy made an important shift from one of labor 
shortage to one of labor surplus and accompanying unemployment. The viability of the rural 
apartheid homelands, which had been in decline for decades, finally collapsed with the loss of 
migrant remittances. Women flocked to the industrial sector to offset these losses. As the 
apartheid policies were slowly undone, it was hoped that newly available credit, freedom of 
movement, and political inclusion would rejuvenate the flagging economy. Democratic transition 
was to initiate South Africa’s integration into a new global age of prosperity.  
However, this radical transformation had rather unfortunate timing. A “better life for all”, 
the promise of the new regime was not to be brought about through a redistributionist revolution 
as many of the anti-apartheid activists had hoped it would be. Instead, in keeping with the times, 
South Africa embarked on a “homegrown” structural adjustment program where massive 
deregulation and privatization was to foster a more “business friendly” environment that would 
usher in economic growth and job creation (Bond 2005:6). These jobs were envisioned to rectify 
the radical socioeconomic inequality of the past and bring about a virtuous democratic citizenry. 
Unfortunately, though South Africa’s economy did grow, the net effect was a shedding, not 
accumulation of jobs (Seekings and Nattrass 200)5. This has led to a rising number of 
unemployed who cannot and likely will not be able to enter the waged labor market. Hunter 
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sums up the generational shift that took place “from mostly men earning a living and supporting 
a wife to many men and women making a living in multifarious ways” (2012: 3)  
In 2014, when I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork, the national expanded 
unemployment rate was 35% and the numbers were even starker when accounting for race, 
gender, or geographic location (STATSSA 2014).1 Women faced disproportionately high levels 
of formal unemployment (39% for women, 22% for men) and black African women had the 
highest unemployment rate in the country (46%).2  For KwaZulu-Natal, the province in which 
Durban is located, the expanded unemployment rate in 2014 was 39.5% (STATSSA 2014). The 
lack of formal jobs had a number of effects that are detailed throughout this dissertation. For the 
purposes of this section, the critical effect in the context of child support was the impact on 
marriage as the dominant social institution regulating parental support of children. Notably, 
scarcity of income hindered the ability of black Africans to formalize marriage through the 
exchange of ilobolo or bride wealth and the other gifts associated with the marriage process. 
Poverty’s impact on white and coloured families led to an increase in the divorce rate and signle-
parent families. 
As discussed throughout this dissertation, moral panics over changes in rates of 
formalized marriage have a long history in South Africa and the tenor of these panics was shaped 
by prevailing racial ideologies. Here, I simply consider the numbers. Though marriage rates 
fluctuate year to year, formal marriage rates have declined overall since the 1960s, most 
dramatically among the black population (Budlender and Lund 2011; Posel et al. 2011).3 Using 
                                               
1 The expanded definition of unemployment includes those who are unemployed and who are available to work, whether or not 
they have taken active steps to find employment. 
2 In 2015, expanded unemployment rates by racial group and sex: black African women 46%, black African men 35%, colored 
women 39%, colored men 32%, Indian women 34%, Indian men 22%, white women 22%, white men 14%. 
3 Though records of formal marriage rates have been gathered in South Africa for over a century (Breckenridge 2012) their 
reliability and analytic use require contextualization. Formal marriage rates are imprecise measures of marital status among black 
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census data, Budlender and Lund found that “in 1960, 2.9 per cent of African women aged 50 
years and above were reported as never married, while in 1996 the percentage stood at 19 per 
cent and in 2001 at 17 per cent” (2011).4 By 2010, only 25 percent of all black women were 
married, compared to 60 percent of white women (Hall and Posel 2012:46). The pattern suggests 
that there was not only an increase in the age of first marriage, but that increasing numbers of 
women will never be married in their lifetime.  
These trends were despite widespread desire and support for marriage as an institution.5 
Though it was widely acknowledged that the high cost of bride wealth and nuptial gift exchange 
limited marriage to the wealthy, many argued that doing away with or modifying the gift 
amounts would negatively affect the symbolic value of the exchange (Rudwick and Posel 2014 
and 2015, Yarbrough 2017). While some couples substituted cohabitation for marriage, for 
many, notably black women, cohabitation was considered undesirable either due to social stigma 
or due to an unwillingness to perform the expected domestic labor for a (likely unemployed) man 
without the status change that marriage would bring (Posel and Rudwick 2014; Walker 2013).6 
Though couples infrequently married or cohabited, many had children together, in part due to the 
                                               
South Africans, for whom marriage is a multiyear process and not a single event (Comaroff 1980). Furthermore, in more recent 
censuses, there is no attempt to differentiate between marital states and cohabitation arrangements despite that fact that they have 
very different social meanings (Budlender et al. 2004; Hosegood et al. 2009) 
4 Scholarship on Africa in the 1980s on census data and fertility trends revealed that there were changes in fertility and nuptiality 
across the content. However, even in these decades, South African marriage patterns were already exceptional (Harwood-Lejeune 
2000; Lesthaeghe & Jolly 1995; Van de Walle 1993). The mean age of marriage for men (28.0 years) was higher than all other 
regions in Africa, and that of women (23.2 years) was one of the highest (Locoh 1988). Much of this difference is attributed to 
the social reorganization wrought by apartheid policies. 
5 In addition to my informants consistently articulating a desire for marriage, see also Posel, Rudwick, and Casale who analyzed 
attitudinal data collected in a nationally representative survey of adults in South Africa found that almost 90% of black African 
unmarried adults (20 to 39 years) reported that they wanted to be married someday (2011). 
6 Household survey data from 1995 and 2008 suggest that while marriage rates have been on the decline among Africans, rates of 
cohabitation have trebled from about 5% to 15% (Posel and Casale 2013). Nonetheless, Posel and Casale used data from the 
SASAS (2005) to suggest that cohabitation rates have not increased more because a majority of unmarried African men and 
women (64% of those 20 to 39 years) do not view cohabitation as an acceptable alternative to marriage (2013). 
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social value given to children and the act of childbearing.7 In their ethnographic research on 
fertility, Preston-Whyte and Zondi noted: 
There is a sense in which the value placed upon children is so high for many 
people that marriage is, in some contexts, quite irrelevant to the bearing of a child. 
This is not to suggest that in general marriage is not regarded as the appropriate 
arena for birth. It is. But failing marriage, children have a value in themselves 
which cannot be gainsaid (1992).  
 
Their findings from the 1980s and 1990s are in keeping with what I found in 2011. 
Indeed, in the past three decades, fertility has not differed much by marital status (Moultrie and 
Timæus 2001).8  
For the issue of child support, the key point is that overwhelmingly the care burden for 
raising those children who are born falls on the shoulders of women and, most dramatically, 
black women.9 In 2012, 69 percent of black African children lived with a female caregiver, 
without their fathers (Hall, Meintjes, and Sambu 2014).10 While a century of labor migration in 
South Africa ensured that many generations of black African children have had infrequent 
physical contact with their male kin, what is different in the post-apartheid moment is that back 
men are also financially absent. Scholars of the African family have tracked over the past 60 
years how masculine and paternal gender roles increasingly emphasized economic contributions 
                                               
7 Notably, fertility in South Africa has also declined over the past 40 years (Moultrie and Timæus 2003). While fertility data for 
Africans in KwaZulu-Natal are not available for the 1970s or 1980s, by the time of the 1996 census, fertility among Africans in 
KwaZulu-Natal was 3.7 children per woman. Five years later, in 2001, fertility in the same group was 3.2 children per woman 
(Moultrie and Dorrington 2004). Scholars suggest, the decline is primarily due to long birth intervals and high rates (at least by 
regional standards) of contraceptive use and, surprisingly not due to HIV (Hosegood, McGrath, and Moultrie 2009). 
8 The Department of Social Development White Paper on Families quoted a study that found that 58% of births were to 
unmarried parents (Nzimande, cited in Department of Social Development 2012). 
9 Though quite common, single motherhood remains quite stigmatized, especially among black Africans (Sennott et. al. 2016). 
Furthermore, there has been an efflorescence of research into the detrimental social and health consequences of extra marital 
birth for women and their children that has undergirded policy. These focus on the impact on education (Madhavan and Thomas 
2005; Marteleto, Lam, and Ranchod 2008; and Grant and Hallman 2008); reduced earnings for women (Lloyd 2005) and elevated 
risks of poor health (Gage 1997) and death (Clark and Hamplová 2013) for children. Ethnographic research shows that South 
Africans are aware of these consequences thus suggesting their choices are based on other considerations (Harrison and 
O’Sullivan 2010; Madhavan, Harrison and Sennott 2013; Zwang and Garonne 2008). 
10 Hall, Meintjes, and Sambu found that in 2012 just over a quarter (27%) of all African children do not live with either parent 
and a further 42% of African children live with their mothers but without their fathers (2014). 
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of men over other forms of care (Campbell 1992; Casale and Posel 2010; Denis and Ntsimane 
2006; Hunter 2004, 2010; Walker 2005a, 2005b). In the present moment, high unemployment 
and infrequent cohabitation has meant that black African fathers provide little financial support 
and caregiving labor to their children.11 Women presently must find the resources to raise 
children in a context where once reliable means (e.g., work, husbands, husbands’ family) are 
now unavailable. It is not surprising, then, that child support, in my expanded sense, is one of 
women’s primary concerns.  
Child support, as an issue closely tied to child welfare, has also been an abiding concern 
of successive South African governments. As I cover in greater detail in Chapter 3, apartheid 
governments debated and experimented with a variety of policies to ensure that children had 
sufficient resources to grow into the proscribed roles for their racial group. At the crudest level, 
the concern for white children was that they receive sufficient education to be leaders of the 
nation and that they learn to cultivate a habitus that maintained racial distinction. Children in 
other racial categories required the resources to ensure that they be productive laborers (albeit in 
different categories of occupation) and not dependent on state resources. One of the most notable 
policies was a State Maintenance Grant (SMG) that was available since the early 1930s to single, 
mainly white, mothers to enable them to raise their children without working outside the home.12 
The amounts of the grant differed by racial category, with white/Europeans receiving the highest 
amounts and payments decreasing for coloureds and Indians respectively with Africans receiving 
                                               
11 Comparing time use surveys Budlender and Lund found that South African men spend unusually low amounts of time on care 
for their children as compared to their counterparts in other developing countries (2011). 
12 The SMG was modeled around a presumed nuclear family with the father as the primary breadwinner. Mothers were only 
eligible if they were widowed or separated; had been deserted by their spouse for more than 6 months; had a spouse who received 
a social grant; or had a spouse who had been in prison, a drug treatment centre for more than 6 months. It was only extended to 
non-married women in later years. Applicants had to prove that they had attempted, but were unsuccessful in obtaining, private 
maintenance from the other parent (Lund 2008). 
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the smallest allotment. Overwhelmingly the grants were used by white mothers as bureaucratic 
obstacles made them very challenging to access for other racial groups (Lund 1992).  
At the time of democratic transition in 1994, the South African social security system 
was already notably well developed, if highly inequitable, for a middle-income country (Lund 
2008; Woolard et al. 2011). After democratic transition, in 1998, the SMG was due to be cut 
because of critiques that it was an expensive and racist apartheid-era policy.13  However, the 
welfare of children was a guiding principal of the new dispensation. Mandela had signed the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and children’s rights to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic health care services and social services were enshrined in the new constitution.14 
Early in Mandela’s term, the slogan ‘First Call for Children’ was the public name for an 
interdepartmental National Programme of Action for Children in which each ministry was 
articulate goals to improve the well-being of children (Lund 2008). It was in this context that the 
Lund Committee on Child and Family Support, which had taken on the task of researching the 
potential effect of eradicating the SMG, was successful in campaigning for the introduction of a 
new grant designed to reach poor children, what became the Child Support Grant. 
Introduction of the CSG took place in 1996 in a political climate of contestation over the 
values and visions of the new democracy and how to bring them into action. This was also a time 
when the new government was tempering some of its redistributive electoral promises and 
turning toward a more conservative macroeconomic policy. In a context of limited time, limited 
funds, and the necessity of governmental buy in the Lund Committee outlined a cash transfer that 
                                               
13 At transition, the reached only 200,000 women and a similar number of children but made up 12% of the country’s total 
spending on social assistance for the 1995/1996 year (Lund 2008). One study found that in 1990, only 0.2% of black African 
children received the SMG (Kuper 1998 cited in Patel and Plagerson 2016). 
14 Section 28 of the Constitution specifies a set of fundamental rights for children. These include the right to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic health care services and social services; the right to protection from abuse and neglect; and the right to family or 
parental care, or appropriate alternative care when removed from their family environment. Section 28 also states that a child’s 
best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 
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would reach the largest number of poor children possible and would leave the door open for 
future advocacy efforts to shape it (Lund 2008). 
 The final form of the grant differed substantially from the Lund Committee’s 
recommendations and from the SMG. As opposed to a universal benefit for all children, as the 
committee recommended, it became a means-tested grant. However, an important component 
was retained, namely, in acknowledgement of the flexibility of family forms in South Africa, any 
caregiver of the child—father, mother, auntie, grandmother or non-kin—could claim the grant. 
To enable the broadest eligibility, payment amounts were kept low (R100 per month) but, as 
anticipated, they increased through advocacy. In addition to new payment amounts and eligibility 
criteria, the CSG also has a very different target. Unlike the SMG which contained a payment for 
the applicant mother and a payment for each qualifying child, the Child Support Grant contains 
only a payment for the child. The caregiver is a custodian of the funds, but the funds belong to 
the child. As will be elaborated upon throughout this dissertation, this fiscally necessary change 
had important effects on the social meaning of the grant monies.15 
 
Figure 1.1: Child Support Grant (Children’s Institute 2016) 
                                               
15 In 1995, the SMG consisted of a parent allowance of R410 and a child allowance of R127 for each child. The expense of 
extending the SMG to all racial groups equally was deemed unaffordable at an estimated cost of R12 billion, which was 
equivalent to the total social assistance budget in 1995/1996 (Lund 2008). The Lund Committee for Child and Family Support 
was appointed by the Minister for Welfare in 1996 to advise policymakers on equitable alternatives. 
 14 
 
Government grants form the backbone of South Africa’s poverty alleviation successes in 
the years since democratic transition (Delany et al. 2016; DSD et al. 2012; Hall and Wright 
2010; Leibbrandt at al. 2010; Van der Berg, Siebrits, and Lekezwa 2010; Woolard and 
Leibbrandt 2010). Economists found that social grants helped to raise the income of the poorest 
segment of the population by 10 times and reduced income inequality by a quarter (Grinspun 
2016; Woolard et al. 2015; World Bank 2014). In 1998, the percentage of the population 
benefitting from a social grant was 9.8 whereas by 2015, that percentage had grown to 30 
(General Household survey 2015).16 The bulk of that growth comes from uptake of the CSG 
which increased from 150,336 recipients in 1999/2000 to almost 12 million in 2016 (See Figure 
1.1 STATSSA 2016).17 At the time of my fieldwork, 60 percent of South African children 
received a CSG (Hall, Meintjes, and Sambu 2014). As the largest grant in terms of population 
reach, the CSG is attributed with numerous positive effects. An efflorescence of research has 
sprung up alongside the grants and the CSG has consistently been shown to improve child 
nutrition, health, and schooling outcomes by enabling caregivers to buy food and school 
necessities (Agüero, Carter, and Woolard 2009; DSD et al 2012; Grinspun 2016; Woolard and 
Leibbrandt 2010). Longer term, there is evidence that it is associated with a reduction in risky 
behavior among adolescents, increased household resilience to emergencies and supports 
caregiver work-seeking efforts and long-term investments (DSD et al 2012; Grinspun 2016). 
Because the CSG is predominantly collected by women for the children in their care, research 
                                               
16 Uptake differs greatly by racial group with close to a third of black Africans and coloureds receiving a grant in 2015 More 
than one-third of black African individuals (33,5% and 27% respectively) as compared to 12% of Indian/Asian individuals and 
6,3% of the white population (General Household survey 2015). These numbers are based on individuals actively apply for 
grants, not the government identifying them as needing such. 
17 Importantly, these numbers do not reflect the total number of eligible recipients. Instead, these are the number of people who 
applied for a received a grant. Much of this increase is due to removal of administrative barriers to access and gradual changes in 
eligibility criteria such as a raising of the eligibility age of the child to 18. 
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has found that it enhances women’s power and control in household decision-making and 
financial management (Patel et al 2012). In addition to national recognition of the positive 
effects of the CSG, it has also been praised by international researchers such as the World Bank 
and has been used as a model for poverty alleviation elsewhere (Patel 2011, World Bank 2014).  
Despite the widespread acknowledgment of the success of social grants, the state 
consistently has been ambivalent at best about these policies. This was demonstrated in recent 
years with the ANCs willingness to use the future administration of the grants system as a 
political football to curry favors at the risk of millions of beneficiaries (de Vos 2017). The grants 
represent an enormous cost to the government with the child support grant alone taking up 3.5% 
of the national budget in 2015 (RSA 2015). They also fly in the face of a historically worker-
oriented model of citizenship and an increasingly developmentalist approach to social welfare 
(see Chapter 3) Part of the unique design of the CSG is its unconditionality, meaning that 
recipients do not have to perform any required actions in order to collect the grant. Continued 
eligibility is solely based on income being below a threshold amount. Despite research that 
overwhelmingly contradict such claims, critics of the grants maintain that they disincentivize 
labor market participation and foster a culture of "dependency" on government aid. The CSG is 
especially rankling to such critics because though it targets children, those who predominantly 
collect the grant are healthy persons of working age—African women under age 35. The 
majority (96%) of beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant are women and 90 per cent are black 
(de Koker et al. 2006). Notably, these critiques do not operate in the same way as the villainized 
welfare queen of the United States. For as much as there are concern about women’s work-
seeking efforts, their spending habits, or their reproductive choices that might ring as familiar to 
an American audience, black women in South Africa are largely still thought of as the hard-
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working self-sacrificing backbone of the African family. Instead, the blame for the poverty of 
black children is frequently laid on the shoulders of black African men who have abdicated their 
paternal responsibilities (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). An often-cited concern is that the CSG 
will cause fathers to feel absolved of their paternal obligations.   
Debate over the CSG is just one part of a larger maelstrom of ideological views about 
how the state is to best tackle social welfare and development. The ANC, the ruling party since 
transition, came into power emphasizing redistribution as the best means for redressing racial 
inequalities. At the same time, many party leaders hold deep-seated antipathies to expanding 
welfare provisions on the basis that they promote dependency and under-development. In this 
way, debates over who is obligated to support children and in what ways are not simply an issue 
of policy and fiscal conservatism, but are a “site of contestation ... about the values and 
expectations in the ‘new’ South Africa” (Lund 2008:ix). 
Despite the CSG’s laudable efficacy in reducing poverty and attendant poverty indicators, 
the small size of the monthly payment (appx $100 in 2014) left a widely recognized shortfall of 
support (Neves et al. 2009; DSD, SASSA, and UNICEF 2012; Ferguson 2015). The questions 
remained as to how families were functioning in this era without waged work and how grants to 
children, as the most reliable form of household income, were reconfiguring relationships within 
the household, among neighbors, and with the state. This dissertation addresses these questions.  
Situating Interventions 
  As previously discussed, what took place in the period from 1960-2014 was a dramatic 
shift in the political economy of South Africa that profoundly shaped intimate relationships, the 
availability of waged labor, gendered and generational hierarchies, and the category of 
citizenship. In order to capture the intersection of these multiple issues, this dissertation 
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considers the changing methods by which caregivers—overwhelmingly women—secured 
sufficient resources to support themselves and their children. I use the umbrella term livelihood 
strategies to describe the multiplicity of ways in which people garnered resources. My research 
subjects—caregivers living in the Point neighborhood of Durban—while highly differentiated, 
have in common a shared poverty at the time of my encounters with them. While some moved in 
and out of arrangements where they received a wage for their labor, even for those subjects 
living in more prosperous times, waged work was never the sole or even the primary source of 
resources. Instead, this dissertation tracked the varied processes—the relationships cultivated, the 
tasks performed, the emotions managed—by which people assembled networks of support from 
a variety of sources.  
 My analytic framing around livelihood strategies has two important implications. First, in 
keeping with other scholars, I seek to avoid the dichotomy between the formal and informal 
sectors that I find unhelpful for my analysis (Ferguson 2015; Meagher 2010). Scholars of 
Southern Africa have long acknowledged that the types of livelihoods attributed to each sector 
are not clearly distinguished and that the two economies are often integrated in important ways 
(see Du Toit and Neves 2007; Hansen and Vaa 2004; Hull and James 2012; Valodia and Devey 
2012; van der Waal and Sharp 1988). In the case of the Point neighborhood, Callebert 
documented how waged work on the docks enabled petty trade of discarded or pilfered goods 
that was a critical supplement to migrant’s livelihoods (2017). Furthermore, the very founder of 
the term informal sector, Keith Hart has recognized that present economic conditions lessen the 
descriptive benefits of the term. As he noted, “When most of the economy is ‘informal’, the 
usefulness of the category becomes questionable” (2007, 28 see also Guyer 2004). Instead of 
distinguishing along the lines of purported formality, I am more concerned with the meanings 
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given to different income generating activities—e.g. within a moral hierarchy—and the 
relationships they inevitably entail.  
As a second implication, and for very similar reasons, in describing my data, I 
analytically do not distinguish productive from reproductive labor. Since the rise of the service 
economy, the distinction between these two categories has not been neat. In my case, a large 
category of employment for black South Africans historically—men and women alike—has been 
ensuring the reproduction of white households. Secondly, with a decrease in the availability of 
waged work, an increasing number of people survive through practices of distribution that do not 
map cleanly onto either side (Ferguson 2015; Mosoetsa 2003). These practices form the heart of 
my data. This said, I do acknowledge the critical importance of these categories for a long line of 
scholars—most notably for me, Marxist feminists—in addressing the very different kinds of 
value and remuneration given to each. When engaging with literature, I will make clear how the 
terms are being used and what they are describing.  
In keeping with Von Holdt and Webster, I distinguish between earning a living (as in 
regular paid employment) and making a living (as in creating one’s own income or subsistence) 
(2005: 5). This distinction more clearly reflects the comparisons my interlocutors make between 
work that is reliably remunerative and the assemblage of practices that, hopefully add up to 
sufficient resources for survival. In vernacular terms, this is reflected in the contrast between 
having a “proper job” and simply ukuphanda or “coping”.18 Practices of making a living most 
frequently are unreliable, insecure, and are often physically and/or psychologically harmful. 
                                               
18As discussed later in this introduction, the verb ukuphanda retains a great deal of moral ambiguity. From a Zulu-
English/English-Zulu dictionary, ukuphanda translates to “scratch up” or to “dig by scratching.” A secondary translation is to 
“sound for information” or to “pump” (Doke et al 2008:645; Margaretten 2015:70; Wojcicki 2002:356). However, the 
connotation is often associated with criminal activity. At the June 16th ANC rally, organizers would not allow Arthur Mafokate to 
play his well-known kwaito song “Amajents ayaphanda” because it was seen as glorifying crime. This censorship nearly caused a 
riot (Ashforth pers comm).  
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Even more than the amount of payment, the security of earning a living afforded the employee a 
high status and respectability and—for better or worse—attracted attention and demands from 
those around him or her.19  
Kinship and Dependence 
Like Phumzile, whose statements opened this chapter, people with any kind of available 
income—from government grants to government salaries—are subject to a wide array of 
insistent and morally binding demands on that cash.20 These might include requests for medicine 
for a sick relative, school fees for a sister’s child, or funds for a neighbor to print a CV for a job 
application. Claim-making is an integral and expected part of the social fabric of South African 
life. As Ferguson summarized well, an answer to the persistent question of how people with no 
visible income support themselves is that “a great deal of the day-to-day activity in the region’s 
low-income communities is related to making, negotiating, contesting, and sometimes evading 
the social and affective claims that can be made on the meager streams of income and sources of 
wealth that such communities contain” (2015:96). Such claims, though most frequently in 
asymmetrical relationships, do entail reciprocity such that giver and recipient remain bound 
together in obligation (Mauss [1924] 2000). Parker Shipton reminds us, that loan or gift can just 
as easily “be made to help or to exploit—or maybe to do both at once” (2007:8). 
                                               
19 A number of scholars discuss the important gendered implications of the different moral evaluations given to earning a living 
versus making a living (Barcheiesi 2011; Ferguson 2015; Hunter 2010; James 2014). Because of the way the migrant labor 
economy was organized, black women in South Africa were excluded from earning a living and thus have a longer history of 
making a living. In contrast, black male success, as measured by the ability to marry, build and support a rural homestead, was 
predicated on the ability to earn a living. In the post-apartheid era, earning a living became ideologically tied to citizenship status. 
20 Recent scholarship has come out documenting that while South Africa’s “new middle class” are often understood to have 
succeeded, their relative wealth also makes them quite vulnerable to exploitative lending practices and requests for support from 
a host of less fortunate relatives (Barchiesi 2011; James 2014; Southall 2004; Standing 2014). It has been found that their 
extensive borrowing and frequent inability to keep up with repayments has been detrimental to their “financial wellness” (Cash 
1996, cited in Bahri 2008; Crous 2008) and has resulted in psycho-social ills such as a deep sense of helplessness, divorce, 
homelessness, and even suicide (Niehaus 2012: 337–38). 
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Phumzile’s desire to escape these claims speaks to their forceful nature. Indeed, a large 
body of ethnographic work on Africa documents enduring and widespread practices of 
distribution and dependence (Barnes [1967]1986; Bayart 1993; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; 
Ekwensi 1987; James 2014; Smith 2003; Tibandebage and MacIntosh 2005; Vansina 1990; 
Weinreb 2001). To be sure, such practices help solidify different kinds of social relationships 
such as those between kin, those between lovers, those between neighbors, and those between 
patrons and clients. But, more broadly, they can be understood as both redistributing resources 
(Polanyi [1944] 2001) and investing in “ties of dependence” (Swidler and Watkins 2007: 150) in 
a political economy where power and prestige are acquired through "wealth in people”, or 
dependents (Barnes [1967]1986; Guyer 1993; Kopytoff and Miers 1977; Miers and Kopytoff 
1977; Vansina 1990; Smith 2004). 
Such ties of dependence sit at the heart of politics, economy, and social personhood in 
South Africa. Though the collapse of the migrant labor system has shrunk the pool of wage 
earners and the sums of reliable income, practices of claim-making and distribution are no less 
ubiquitous or critical. Their import in the current context has led some researchers to name them 
a system of “informal social protection” (du Toit and Neves 2009). While few women in Point 
would say they had friends, they did talk about having people: 
 Z:  Do you have someone who helps you if you need something? 
 M: Yes, there is someone. She is my ears. 
 B:  How so? 
 M: She calls me when she knows a place that needs workers; she helps me with things  
like that.21  
 
                                               
21 This was an interview in which both I and Zandile were present and thus moved between English and Xhosa.  
Z: Ngubani umntu oncedana naye xa kukhona izinto ozidingayo?  
M: Ewe sisi ukhona. Lindelebe zam.  
B: Kanjani?  
M: Yandibiza xa ezwile apho kuzoqashwa khona, izinto ezinjalo. 
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  Not only do ties of dependence offer resources in the present, they are also durable and 
allow people to mitigate social and economic insecurity by preserving the potential for resources 
and care in the future. Thus, every dependent cultivates links to multiple patrons to call upon for 
support. Patrons, in turn assemble a collection of clients to afford him or her social dominance, 
moral rectitude, and future insurance. Ties of dependence also travel up and down the social 
hierarchy with every patron also acting as a dependent and dependents distributing resourced to 
those below them. The centrality of these ties of dependence has led some observers to note that, 
"[t]he truly destitute are those without patrons" and “the truly insignificant are those without 
clients” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:42; Swidler and Watkins 2007:151). 
 At stake in cultivating ties of dependence was also the status of one’s moral personhood. 
Hoarding resources or stinginess— “to eat for oneself”—was seen as not only selfish and rude, 
but a refusal to participate in the very social practices that makes one fully human. Miserly 
persons were indeed the subject of envy and resentment—as implied by Phumzile’s statement—
but also derided and condemned. Such antisocial behavior was seen to arise from nefarious 
motivations and frequently attracted accusations of witchcraft (Ashforth 2005; Chabal and Daloz 
1999). None of this is to suggest that every claim on resources went answered. However, people 
went to great lengths to refute or evade claims by more indirect means that could not be 
attributed to them directly. In Point, though many people bemoaned the rules that many of the 
buildings had on restricting visitors and overnight guests, they were also grateful that they had a 
good reason to keep away extended family who might try to stay with them.  
Though dependence has long been a status reviled by welfare critics in South Africa and 
beyond, I am concerned with dependence not as a condition, but as “a mode of action,” one 
which a person strives to embody (Bayart 2000, 218). Mauss reminds us that sharing is always a 
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generous and a self-interested action ([1924] 2000). In this way, ties of dependence are made up 
of a fraught mixture of egoism, self-sacrifice, competition, collaboration, antagonism and 
agreement that are coordinated through the mode of exchange. Affect is also integral to these 
relationships as sentiments, passions, caring, and solidarity are bound up with the multiplicity of 
conflicting motives. The emphasis on labor in important for two reasons. First, to highlight that 
dependence is not passively or easily attained but is the result of continuous and careful effort 
into building social relationships. Second, is to afford these efforts the same dignity and moral 
status more often associated with productive labor.22  
This dissertation focuses on what Ferguson terms “distributive labor” or the claim 
making processes by which people seek to “transfer of resources from those who have them, to 
those who don’t” through fostering ties of dependence (2015:100). I am particularly concerned 
with the process of pressing a claim of dependence, the forms of obligation and entrustment that 
are mobilized, and the varying success of such claims. Here I focus on a subset of the larger 
category of distributive labor, that of kinshipping, or the formation and solidification of 
relationships expressed in a kinship idiom.23 My focus on kinshipping is at once theoretical and 
empirical. For the former, anthropology has a long history of scholarship on kinship as a 
political, and more recently, an economic institution for shaping social relations. Kinship 
relations are frequently the referential backdrop and the model for ties of dependence. When 
analyzing how bonds of obligation are formed on bases not necessarily tied to amity, kinship is 
paradigmatic. For the latter, my interlocutors also spoke about kinship relationships as exemplar 
                                               
22 To be clear, I am not joining a group of writers who, albeit with laudable intentions, emphasize the productive and 
entrepreneurial components of the labors of the urban poor. To do so, I find, continues to reify only productive labor as valuable 
and misses the opportunity to recognize the value of labor not immediately identifiable as “productive”. My goal is not to recast 
different kinds of labor as productive but to instead re-locate value in different domains. 
23 I am indebted to Gillian Feeley-Harnik for the verbs kinshipping and kinchopping to describe the processual and contingent 
nature of kinship bonds. Other names for these processes include kinning and de-kinning (Howell 2003). 
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bonds of social obligation. For example, the notion of the paternalistic state was very powerful 
and critiques of state governance were made in the language of a failed parent—always an 
assumed father—who provided insufficient care of his progeny.24 Further, my emphasis on child 
support and the care of children also led kinship relations to be foregrounded by my 
interlocutors, though often not in ways I expected.  
Throughout my research, when women talked about their daily needs and hardships, they 
emphasized the labor involved in childrearing and the resources required to do so. This emphasis 
came about for two reasons. The first is, plainly, the sizable amount of labor and resources 
required for childrearing. South Africa remains a very heteronormative society and household 
labor continues to be divided along gendered lines. While men living with women might cook 
the occasional meal or watch the children now and again, such labors were infrequent and always 
framed as an exceptional act of sacrifice or generosity on the man’s part. Women’s household 
tasks were numerous. In addition to childcare these included washing, ironing, procuring food, 
cooking, sweeping, assisting with homework, and many more. The simple enumeration of these 
tasks does not fully convey the labor involved in completing each one. 
Take for example the laundry which in a household with school-age children usually had 
to be done at least every other day to ensure clean uniforms. For those women who lived in a 
building with shared bathing facilities, this meant hauling water from the central tap to a basin on 
the floor of their room—often with curious toddlers underfoot. These basins could only 
accommodate 5-6 garments at a time, so women washed in shifts, piling the soapy clothes on a 
                                               
24 Similarly, in a 2008 survey conducted by Afrobarometer, South Africans were offered a number of statements that reflected 
different understandings of state power such as “Government is like an employee” or “the people should be the bosses who 
control the government.” Overwhelmingly, South Africans chose the phrase, “People are like children, the government should 
take care of them like a parent” (Afrobarometer 2009, 4). While this is a source of great frustration for those who emphasize a 
rights-based liberal democracy, scholars like Englund remind us that such kinship-based understandings can offer power forms of 
critique and claim making (2008). Further, it is not only citizens who make such claims, politicians too use the idiom of 
parenthood (again, frequently fatherhood) and the nurturance it implies to legitimize their political roles (Schatzberg 2001). 
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clean towel before hauling another 3-4 basins of clean water for rinsing. Because everything was 
line dried, all the washing was doused a second time in a fabric-softener rinse. Once dry, all of 
the items were ironed both out of decorum—schoolchildren could receive detention for un-
ironed clothes—and to kill any possible insects. Given the amount of labor required, it was no 
surprise that those women who possessed automatic washing machines—which still had to be 
manually filled with water—could charge a hefty price for a load to be washed or simply to be 
spun so that the clothes would dry faster. 
A second reason is the higher level of legitimacy given to the needs of children over other 
those of other actors. Although women were expected to translate resources into proper social 
reproduction, and indeed their ability to do so was consistently assessed by others, women 
themselves were not regarded as legitimate recipients of aid in their own right. At every level of 
assistance—from aid agencies to neighbors—children were the only subjects seen as deserving 
beneficiaries. Women could only access resources by mobilizing their relationship to the child, 
most often as mothers. Therefore, though childrearing came with a host of labor and resource 
requirements, it also give women an important claim-making vocabulary and a new mode for 
procuring getting resources via kinshipping.   
This kinshipping labor took various forms that will be explored in more detail throughout 
this dissertation. In brief, it might involve claiming a Child Support Grant from the government 
to support the care of a child. It might involve giving a child the father’s surname—isibongo in 
Zulu—to firmly locate the child in that lineage and enable claim making on the father’s family 
even when the father was absent. It might include chronicling one’s stellar caregiving on the 
body of a child through cleanliness, well-ironed clothes, warm hats, and full cheeks. Or, it might 
involve making connections with others, via a child. For example, though relations between 
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neighbors were immensely important for my interlocutors, they could easily live next door to 
someone and never “know them,” meaning have a connection and enabled exchange. Mere 
proximity was insufficient to instigate relationships. Instead, it was through their children that 
many women built relationships of trust and mutuality with their neighbors. Sithembile said: 
“I know her because we stay in the same flat in the same floor. We both have 
children from the same age group. I came to trust her because we started by being 
friends and then you can see a person, you sit with somebody, you see what their 
character is like. You can see if the person is not right. You can see by the way 
she treats her children whether she knows how to treat people. When I am sitting 
with her and my children, she does not treat my children differently than her 
children.”25  
 
Furthermore, while ties of kinship are bonds that enable claims, they are also means by which 
people can manage requests without incurring community opprobrium. Kinship provides the 
legitimization for what Ashforth calls “discriminating entitlement” or an argument that limited 
resources must be directed certain people (e.g. kin) first and not, say, to neighbors. The sanctity 
of the kinship bond is what enables people to refuse obligation while still maintaining friendly 
relationships.  
 A primary argument of this dissertation is that kinshipping be understood as a livelihood 
strategy that enables both ties of dependence and claim making on different categories of 
persons. In doing so, I firmly locate kinship within the realm of political economy as shaped by, 
and more important, shaping, the economic context and women’s sense of national belonging. 
The past five decades have seen dramatic shifts in the political economy, notably the decline in 
demand for low-skilled and manual labor across the region such that waged work is no longer a 
primary source of income (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Over the past twenty years, survival 
                                               
25 Sithembile: Ngahlangana naye ngoba sihlala kwi building eyi one and sihlala kwi floor eyi one. Futhi sinengane ezicishe 
zilingane ngeminyaka. Ukuze ngize ngimthembe saqala saba ngabangane then uyambona umntu umangabe uhleli naye ukuba 
character yakhe Injani. Uyakwazi ukumbona mangabe engekho right. Futhi uyakwazi ukumbona ngendlela a treat ingane zakhe 
ngayo ukuthi uzi treat kanjani. Noma futhi mangabe kukhona inagne zami sihleli nazo aka treat different than ingane zakhe. 
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economies have instead been built around small but regular infusions of cash such as from 
government grants and networks of distribution and enterprise defined by kin connections (du 
Toit and Neves 2009). In the current context of economic and social uncertainty, the ability to 
make claims upon kin for resources or resource access—claims that will be honored—is just as 
much the stuff of survival and economic innovation as remunerated labor, and often more 
reliable.  
Once again, I emphasize relationships as requiring labor. Kinship is something that one 
does, not something that one has (Ferguson 2015; Franklin, McKinnon 2001)). However, the 
terms by which kinship is done are not natural and given, but subject to debate and contestation 
(McKinnon and Cannell 2013). Arguments about how to “do kinship” draw upon complex 
ideologies concerning hierarchy; reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations; material support; and 
sentimental connection (Carsten 2004:19). Kinship claims can be disputed or denied. Thus, the 
process of kinshipping not only produces relationships, it also requires them. “Categories are 
filled with meaning by all the partners concerned” (Howell 2003:468). However, differences in 
power mean that not all partners participate equally.  
Within the heterogeneity of kinship ideologies, is a longstanding anthropological tenet 
that kinship relations entail reciprocal obligations. The meeting of those obligations is the very 
process by which kinship ties are solidified. Such exchanges require resources. Much recent 
scholarship has documented how the decline in the availability of waged labor has not only made 
meeting the basic material needs of survival more challenging, but has also strained people’s 
ability to meet their kinship obligations of exchange (e.g. Han 2012; James 2014; Schuster 2015; 
Seekings and Nattrass 2005; Weeks 2011). These strains have thrown into stark relief the ways 
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in which kinship obligations are not given, but are actively produced over time (Leinaweaver 
2013; Rapp and Ginsburg 2011; Stout 2012; Van Vleet 2008).  
My use of the term kinshipping calls attention to the fact that kinship is not simply the 
result of shared substance, shared space, or even marriage, but requires the persistent labor of 
building social ties and defining and meeting reciprocal of obligation. The dissertation considers 
the various ways in which the production of kinship—e.g. the making and meeting of 
obligations—is embedded in and shaped by its particular political economic context. I contend 
that kinshipping labor can neither be understood as an economic appropriation or 
instrumentalization of intimate relations nor as the domestication of economic logic (e.g. 
Constable 2009). Instead, I align with a lineage, inspired by Mauss, that intimate relationships 
are always already marked by generosity, obligation and self-interest that is inherently economic 
([1924] 2000; Bloch & Parry 1989, Comaroff 1979, Zelizer 2000 & 2005). However, I take up 
Caroline Schuster’s call to not simply stop at that axiom, but to consider “how and for whom 
social reciprocity takes hold and the uneven ways the social units of debt are created” (2015: 17). 
As such, this dissertation reveals how moral relations of care, generosity, dependence, and 
obligation are intertwined with the tactical concerns of livelihood strategies under conditions of 
economic and social insecurity. 
I consider kin relationship as being in motion and thus focus on kinship in process. Here, 
I attend to people’s work to both mobilize certain kinds of obligations on which claims could be 
based and their efforts to position themselves as particular kind of persons—trustworthy, 
responsible, and advancing—who might eventually reciprocate.26 Each step of this process—the 
                                               
26 In part because such relationships are frequently asymmetric, this second part of kinshipping is often ignored. But, research 
has revealed the symbolic import that the potential for reciprocity, though not in kind, has in shaping which kinship claims will 
be honored or evaded (see du Toit and Neves 2007 & 2009 Neves and du Toit 2012; Seekings 2008b; Turner 2005). 
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naming and activating the relationally-appropriate form of obligation, the self-fashioning as a 
worthy beneficiary, and the reception of a patron—involves a contextual web of emotions, 
power, knowledge, and history that shape whether a claim to dependence will be honored or not. 
For as much as such relationships are a kind of social insurance, they are nonetheless quite 
contingent and this uncertainty is an important part of the process. By tracking these complex 
processes, this dissertation reveals how both livelihoods and kin relations as simultaneously 
produced through the work of becoming and enacting social personhood. 
 The empirical data of this dissertation is organized around a series of questions: 
 
•  What forms of obligation and entrustment do people mobilize when pressing a 
claim of dependence?  
• How do these differ based on the political, economic, social, and relational context?  
• How do people position themselves as deserving beneficiaries?  
• How are such claims received?  
 
The answers to these questions and the resulting analysis, I suggest, has theoretical implications 
for our understanding of kinship, economy, and citizenship more broadly. Though intertwined, I 
address these interventions in turn.  
Kinship and Economy 
 This dissertation contributes to classical and contemporary theory on kinship to in its 
exploration of the relationship between domestic (kin) and political and economic relations. In 
anthropology, an analytic separation persists between the domains of kinship and politics, as 
supposedly involving fundamentally different (and often gendered) types of social relations 
(Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940). The transition from ‘premodern’ to ‘modern’ society was 
thought to entail a shift from political organization on the basis of kinship to organization on the 
basis of rationalized contract and law (Fortes 1969; Maine 1970 [1861]), thus stripping kinship 
of its political organizing force and relegating it to the domestic domain (Parsons and Bales 
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1955; see all McKinnon and Cannell 2013). In Africa, the absence of kinship in political 
processes became the mark of a modern social order (Douglas and Kaberry 1971; Mitchell and 
Epstein 1959; Powdermaker 1962).  
 In the context of economy, there is a longstanding Euro-American myth that “the world 
of the household, kinship, and ‘non-capitalist’ institutions are radically different in their forms of 
sociality from the world of the market” that has been stubbornly difficult to dislodge (Bear et al. 
2015:2). The pervasiveness of this orientation is due to the ways in which cultural 
understandings of kinship are intertwined with core (though culturally specific) paradigms that 
order our world: hierarchies of race, gender, and nationhood; the boundaries between nature and 
culture; and epistemologies of science, politics, and economy (Franklin and McKinnon 2001). 
The forms of sociality that became associated with each sphere—instrumental and rational for 
the economic and affective and impassioned for the domestic and kinship domain—were not 
only bifurcated, but were separated into “hostile worlds” where any suggestion of their 
intermingling promoted a great deal of anxiety, suspicion, and even outrage (Parsons and Bales 
1955; Rosaldo1984; Zelizer 2005).27 I consider as part of this the present anxiety that the 
degrading effects of flexible accumulation and globalized capital are manifest in an incursion of 
market or commodity logic into the affective domain of kinship. Such claims discount abundant 
evidence in the historic and anthropological record of uses and reworking of kinship relations for 
various emotional, political, economic, and sexual ends that defy tidy categorization (Hirsch and 
Wardlow 2006).  
                                               
27 Yanikasako traces the evolution of a “bourgeois theory of human motivation” in which “interest” was stripped of it previously 
constitutive elements of passion and affect and subsequently emotions were rendered as suspicious (and always feminine) 
motivators of economic action (2002:9). 
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 This dissertation is part of a long history of anthropologists and feminist scholars who 
critique the persistence of this analytic separation (Constable 2003; Comaroff 1987; Freeman 
2007; Friedman 2005; Gough 1971; Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; McKinnon 1999; Richards 1941; 
Rosaldo 1974; Yanagisako and Collier 1987). A primary mode of critique, which I also employ, 
is an empirical demonstration of the interrelatedness of domestic kin relations and public 
political and economic relations (Carsten 2000; McKinnon and Cannell 2013; Rebhun 1999; 
Swidler and Watkins 2007; Zelizer 2005). However, what many of this important scholarship 
relied on was a demonstration of an interconnectedness rather than a demonstration of a mutual 
co-constitution. In this regard, this dissertation is part of a more recent strain of scholarship who 
show how kinship processes are not structured by but themselves produce and reproduce the very 
structure of the economy (Bear et al. 2015; Schuster 2015; Stout 2012; Yanagisako 2002). 
In this dissertation, I track how women responded to men’s declining ability to earn a 
family wage by cultivating new relations of obligation and dependency—a process I call 
kinshipping. I show how women built resource networks across families, friends, and 
communities that outlined alternative conditions of debt and duty not grounded in either a marital 
contract or relations of affinity. In the process, I argue, women redefined obligations between 
men and women, persons and communities, citizens and the state.  
My analysis shows how projects of social reproduction constitute contingent economic 
and political relationships that structure people’s lives far more than any totalizing logic. By 
providing a robust account for how unequal capital accumulation and political power are brought 
about through the production and maintenance of kinship, my analysis contributes to 
longstanding discussions within both feminist and kinship theory about the inseparability of the 
domestic, economic, and political domains.  
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Kinship and Citizenship 
 My contributions to scholarship on citizenship rest on an answer to the question of how it 
is that following democratic transition, when the majority of black South African’s gained 
citizenship for the first time, this same group of persons increasingly protests that they have been 
excluded from the body politic. What definition of citizenship is in operation such that a host of 
rights, social assistance, and representation do not engender political belonging? The answer, or, 
really, answers, I suggest lie in the linkages between livelihoods, kinship, and citizenship as part 
of a contested field of political signification in South Africa today. These linkages are certainly 
not unique to South Africa, but the country’s particular history render them more visible.  
As I use it, citizenship means not solely legal enfranchisement, though that is certainly a 
component of the term. Instead, I use citizenship to include a broader sense of national belonging 
and social personhood. I locate myself in the communitarian tradition that takes the nation state 
to be one in many nested and overlapping layers of belonging that may include space-based, 
local communities, ethnic or racial identity groups, or supra-national groupings all of which 
comprise citizenship (Avineri and Shalit 1992; Daly 1993; Marshall 1950; Phillips 1993). This 
has been part of a broader move in feminist scholarship to incorporate gendered and non-
Western centric visions of belonging by de-centering the nation state from conversations about 
citizenship ( e.g. Pateman 1988; Vogel 1991; Walby 1994; Jones1997; Yuval Davis 1999). 
Critically, though they may be durable, none of these “communities” or “groups” are given, 
natural units (Yuval- Davis 1997). These are ideological and material constructions, whose 
boundaries, structures and norms are a result of constant struggles and negotiations, negotiations 
such as what this chapter consider (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Within this framework, 
citizenship is understood as “multi-layered” or constituted and negotiated vertically and 
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horizontally within these various spheres or layers, each within their own context (Yuval-Davis 
1999).  
 I include concepts of belonging within citizenship because since the earliest 
anthropological scholarship on kinship, relatedness and belonging have always been understood 
as deeply intertwined. This helps bring to light the ways in which various scales of belonging can 
construct, often in contradictory ways, what women seen as their moral duty as citizens as well 
as what is available to them to meet those obligations. I use belonging as Feldman does to 
encompass “relatedness based on 1) social location 2) emotional attachment through self-
identifications and 3) institutional, legal, and regulatory definitions that simultaneously grant 
recognition to and maintain boundaries between socially defined places and groups” (2016:8). 
Alongside the multilayered definition of citizenship above, this reveals how belonging is 
assembled and reassembled through a collection of immutable (gender, race, nationality) and 
mutable (class, language) characteristics; caregiving actions (caring for elderly kin or sending 
nieces and nephews to school); and regulatory categories. 
Much of the carework that underlies the kinshipping labor I focus on here is enabled by 
resources that, historically, were obtained through work. However, resources are not the only 
issue at stake. The link between work and citizenship—what Barchiesi terms the “work-
citizenship nexus” was foundational for the imagination of the modern nation state (Barchiesi 
2011: 13). Historically, in segregationist and apartheid South Africa, this took a specifically 
gendered and racialize form whereby black African men were granted what little political 
recognition was afforded to black Africans, solely on the basis of their status as laborers. It was 
through their work status that African men encountered all the trappings of national belonging: 
identification documents, legal housing in the cities, heath care, welfare provisions, taxation, 
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and, importantly, a wage. Yet this national belonging was in the context of racial oppression such 
that these provisions were either part of the state technologies of control or the experiences of 
exploitation, violence, inequality, and humiliation that accompanied waged work. For better or 
worse, in contrast, until the late 1970s, African women were only recognized as spouses to a 
laboring man. Their labor—in the rural reserves and, later, in the township house—was widely 
recognized as essential to supporting and stabilizing the household to which the African man was 
to return, though his wages were always insufficient to entirely support. However, African 
women could only gain legal representation, legal entry into the city, and rights to a house 
through her attachment to a man.28  
 The scholarship on the gendered and racialized contours of apartheid citizenship is vast 
and this is by no means meant as an overview. Instead, I wish to call attention to the historic 
import of waged work and marriage for national belonging for the purposes of marking shifts in 
the political economy between the 1960s and the 2010s. Most critically for this discussion was 
that as new forms of political inclusion were expanding—labor unions recognized, social 
provisions introduced and representation broadened—older forms such as waged labor and 
marriage were declining. This decline took on a particular signification because both work and 
marriage were linked to a utopian vision of what democratic transition would bring.  
 In the case of work, having shaken off the indignities, violations, and inequities of the 
past, new jobs were to enable South African citizens to work their way out of poverty and 
inequality and to build an emancipated and self-sufficient nation. In what has been termed 
                                               
28 Prior to 1998, a woman in a customary marriage was considered to be a legal minor and subject to her husband’s authority. 
Black African women could not own property, access credit, enter into contracts, or seek access to courts. This was enshrined for 
urban women in the Act 11(3) of the Repeal of the Black Administration Act (BAA) and for women living under the traditional 
authority of the homelands, in the Natal Code of Zulu Law of 1985. Different tribal authorities attempted to amend these 
provisions such that, for example, widows could retain a township house, but the results were uneven and in some cases the gains 
that women obtained (e.g. major status at the age of 21) could be lost upon marriage (Hunter 2010). 
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“aspirational Fordism”, the vision was of a social order of mass inclusion and citizenship brought 
about through labor (White 2012). “Work, in brief, promised to infuse democratic citizenship in 
the new south Africa with unprecedented social and ethical qualities” (Barchiesi 2011:4). 
Engagement in fair labor was to transform ungovernable anti-apartheid activists into constructive 
citizens.  
 In the case of marriage, there were two components. First, critiques of apartheid policies 
were also made in the register of familial degradation. Protests against municipal beer halls, the 
migrant labor system, pass laws, racial categorization, or the Group Areas Act were framed as 
weakening marital bonds and crippling social reproduction. The repeal of these laws and the 
theoretical reunification of a conjugal couple in the same physical space was envisioned to pave 
the way to more harmonious unions in the democratic era. Second, a key component of the 
transition was to improve the position of women. In regards to marriage more specifically, an 
early piece of legislation, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998, sought to 
eliminate laws that discriminated against customary marriages and to grant women the status of 
legal majors in the context of marriage—able to own property, acquire credit, inherit land, 
instigate a divorce. The legislative vision was that women be afforded political recognition 
regardless of their marital status and that, in the event of marriage, they retain the power to 
negotiate the union on equal footing with men.29  
The rather unfortunate timing of South Africa’s democratic transition meant that the 
ambitious dreams of substantive citizenship, social rights, and non-discrimination for all had to 
contend with the harsh reality of economic liberalization and the quite “counter-utopian” 
                                               
29 Like much of the democratic legislation, despite the laudable intentions, there have been a number of obstacles to realizing the 
emancipatory visions of the RCMA. The greatest has been the complicated relationship between the Constitution and customary 
law more generally. The RCMA reflects many inconsistencies and uncertainties with regards to the position of women in 
customary marriages verses the equality clause in terms of the Constitution (Kovacs, Ndashe, and Williams 2013). 
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conditions of market-driven globalization (Barchiesi 2011; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). In 
brief, jobs to conform revolutionaries into citizens or even to support daily needs were scarce. 
Women’s formalized rights felt hollow in a context where subsistence was increasingly 
challenging and marriage all but unavailable. Nokuthula, a consistently eloquent interlocutor, 
summarizes the feelings of betrayal and disillusionment well: 
In 1994, we got our democracy but, up until now…Like, lets take for instance for 
me, I am a qualified educator. And I finished my degree in 2015, but I am still not 
working. And there are some areas where, like in an economy side, we don’t have 
that democracy which they are talking about. We have just been told we are all 
citizens by being given those green ID books…And now, its what they have, like, 
brain washed us, we have citizenship. So a democracy is just a content, an 
ideology for certain people that it works for them, but it is not working for all of 
us….If we saying we are citizens, what rights do we deserve of our country now, 
as citizens? Because the only thing they push down to throats—that they busy 
showing us—is that we got democracy. You find other people they still got anger 
out of like they don’t know how to express themselves because now they got 
democracy but they are still living to an old era which they were living before 
democracy. They find themselves, like, they want to show that they are also equal 
to the other groups that were dominating the country but the life that they are 
living or the lifestyle that they are living is still below those groups which were 
having that democracy before.  
 
At the heart of Nokuthula’s statement was not solely a concern about poverty or unemployment. 
Indeed, these phenomena are not new to South Africans. Instead, her bitterness arises from a 
change in the meaning of these conditions following democratic transition. Newly acquired 
citizenship was imagined to protect people from these challenges.  For those who continued to 
suffer, their citizenship felt incomplete, “an ideology” but little more.  
Though the state was initially envisioned to be a protector of robustly articulated rights, 
in the new political economy the obligation in the state-citizenship relationship took on a 
decidedly different form. In the absence of work, more and more of the population looked to the 
government as a direct provider of “basic needs”. This was not without precedent given that 
second-generation substantive rights—to housing, to education, to health care—were enshrined 
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in the new Constitution. People developed new repertoires of claim making—court challenges, 
service delivery protests, grant applications—to various forms of social assistance, not on the 
basis of their labor, but on the basis that the state had an obligation to people as citizens, as 
bearers of certain identities, as residents of particular spaces, or as supporters of the ruling party 
(Alexander 2010; Ferguson 2015). The successes of these claims were highly uneven. However, 
government grants represent a large domain in which the government upholds the obligation to 
act as a provider of support in the form of direct cash transfers, but only to certain categories of 
the population.  
My analysis is concerned with which categories of persons can make such claims. I 
contend that, as Ferguson projected, the positive content of citizenship rests on people’s abilities 
to fashion themselves as “rightful and deserving dependent[s] of the state” (2015: 162). For 
women, this still involves a great deal of kinshipping labor. Much has been made about the 
positive effects of the Child Support Grant on women’s political and financial empowerment. 
However, my research offers an important corrective. I agree that in the context of economic 
insecurity it is profoundly meaningful that women have access to regular, albeit small, infusions 
of cash. Yet the distinction is often made that able-bodied men have the least claim to 
citizenship-as-dependence because there is no grants category that accommodates them. This is a 
misreading and an overstatement.  
First, gender is not an eligibility condition for receipt of the CSG. Importantly, 
recognizing the diversity of family forms, the state designed the CSG to “follow the child,” 
enabling any caregiver—mother, father, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, or non-kin—to access 
the grant for the child (Lund 2008: 53). Male caregivers of eligible children can and do receive 
grants. Men that don’t receive the CSG are not left out because they are men or because they 
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aren’t laboring, they are ineligible because they choose not to engage in the labor of caregiving. 
Second, despite the fact the 98% of CSG recipients are women, it is not a women’s grant (Case 
et al. 2005). Women as individuals are no more viable dependents of the state than men. While 
there is historic precedence to understand women as dependents—of husbands or of the state 
supported by the State Maintenance Grant—the mother’s portion is no longer a part of the grant. 
In the case of the CSG, the object of state intervention—the child—is a legal subject that cannot 
represent itself and requires a caregiver to hold the child’s rights and interests in trust (Ruddick 
2008). Importantly, children are the bearers of the right to state support. Adult caregivers are 
only the mediators. Notably, the framework of the CSG relies on the uncompensated labor of 
caregivers to translate grant funds into proper child care in a context where the monies are 
insufficient to support one let alone two people.    
My distinction that the child support grant is a children’s grant is critical in terms of 
substantive citizenship. Poor women cannot access state resources or recognition except in 
relation to a child. It is only by framing themselves not as a universal citizen, but as a particular 
kind of citizen-caregiver for a rights-bearing child, that women can claim a tie of dependence. 
However, this recognition is limited as women can only make claims for the child, not directly 
for themselves. This has empirical and theoretical implications. Empirically, though they hold 
the grant money and control how it is spent, women consistently acknowledge and describe that 
cash as “the children’s money.” Many have a clearly enumerated list of what it can and cannot be 
spent on. In part, this arises from widespread critique of women’s mis-spending—makeup and 
hair being the greatest violations. Yet such critiques are not solely part of a persistent moral 
evaluation of motherhood, they also articulate the boundaries of women’s control over grant 
monies.  
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At the level of theory, this has important implications for the scholarship on citizenship 
that has arisen out of Taylor’s “politics of recognition” (1994). Scholars have noted how in the 
face of diminishing state resources, rights and obligations are no longer universally available and 
citizens must become certain kinds of subjects to make claims on the state (e.g., Ong 2003; in 
Africa, Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004). Entitlement to state resources is tied to an increasingly 
specific subject (Brown 1995; Fassin 2007; Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Petryna 2002; Redfield 
2005; Ticktin 2006). In many ways, this is in keeping with the South Africa context. However, 
these scholars focus on how people must mark themselves as vulnerable to access state support. 
In contrast, my focus on kinshipping as a livelihood strategy considers how caregivers mobilize a 
relationship—here to a child—to enable state recognition and resources.  
Substantive citizenship based in a relational identity is in many ways more in keeping 
with a relational personhood that has long been recognized as operating throughout Africa 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2001; Englund 2006; Ferguson 2013; Guyer & Belinga 1995; Jackson & 
Karp 1990; La Fontaine 1985; Nyamnjoh 2002;  Rice 2017; Riesman 1986). At the same time, 
while not dealing with the same object, Western feminist literature offers an important 
cautionary caveat in discussion about when the state framing of the child/fetus as an 
independent, rights-bearing subject relegates mothers to a secondary, less politically represented, 
status (Berlant 1997; Condit 1995; Mitchell 2001). Women face a double bind in defining 
themselves in terms of their relationship to a child: they may gain certain recognition, but their 
needs must be subsumed to those of the child (Fineman and Karpin 1995; Heriot 1996; Morgan 
and Michaels 1999). Such reservations are important for those some who might not have 
children or for whom their relationship with a child is not a primary one. However, such 
discussions have an orientation that understand a relationship as a means to support and 
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recognition, but not as an end goal. Instead, for many of my informants, they expressed that 
providing for the needs of their child(ren) was their goal. In the case of Nokuthula who is quoted 
above, her unemployment was a problem because of her inability to pay school fees or to buy 
new uniforms for her children. Her citizenship felt denuded because she was blocked in her 
ability to invest in the relationships that were important to her—here, her children. I do not see 
these, as some might, as conservative goals of an unliberated feminist. In contrast, I understand 
my interlocutors to have different endpoint in mind—one in which social reproduction, with an 
emphasis on the social—is possible.  
A reevaluation of this end goal returns us to the concept of relational personhood. If we 
understand full personhood in this context as being “attained in direct proportion as one 
participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s 
stations”, then livelihood takes on a different meaning vis a vis kinship and citizenship 
(Menkiti1984: 176). On the one hand, women’s kinshipping labor enables only a partial 
recognition the state. On the other, this partial recognition comes with (limited) resources that 
further the project of social embeddedness—itself constitutive of relational personhood and 
relational citizenship. Thus, it might be more apt to speak in terms of understanding kinshipping 
as a livelihood strategy that enables citizenship. 
Outline of Chapters 
Following the introduction, Chapter 2 - Working Motherhood: Fieldsite and Methods 
provides a more grounded introduction to the fieldsite, the Point, and how its history and social 
geography shape the kinshipping labors of poor women. The particularities of the neighborhood 
also affected the methodology used to obtain the data for this dissertation and the historical and 
anthropological methods employed are discussed in depth. The presentation of data begins in 
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Chapter 3 “We have done everything right by our children”: Public Motherhood as Precarious 
Claim-Making in 1960s Durban,” which examines how women of varying races use public 
motherhood to make claims upon the 1960s welfare state. It outlines the terms under which 
motherhood was a valuable status with political potency, but whose meaning was difficult to 
control. It traces the history of South Africa’s welfare state as a system designed capacitate and 
reform poor white families whose problematic domestic life was seen as muddying apartheid-era 
racial distinction.  
Chapter 4, “Multiple Maternities: Maternal Repertoires and Support Seeking,” takes a 
narrower focus on one form of kinshipping labor. Following democratic transition, the robust 
welfare state that whites had previously enjoyed, as discussed in Chapter 3, was largely 
dismantled as the new government sought to extend services to all race groups. In the process, 
state recognition and support for poor women was eliminated. The chapter argues that, in 
response, women engaged in kinshipping labor that took the form of performances of 
motherhood in order to make themselves legible to the state and to garner support. Such 
performances required skilled management of semiotic repertoires and audience expectations 
that reveal the labor and expertise involved in kinshipping.  
Underlying this discussion is also a methodological argument about the study of 
motherhood more broadly- here I am not concerned with “identity” and indeed don’t have access 
to an unmotivated notion of what women think of themselves as mothers. Instead I consider 
motherhood as a repertoire of words and practices. 
Chapter 5, “Problematic Paters: Race, Class and Fatherhood,” turns the lens on paternal 
performances to explore how moral panics over the role of purportedly deviant fathers form a 
component part of anxieties about the future of the South African nation—both under “high 
 41 
apartheid” and twenty years after democracy. This chapter argues that masculinities seen as both 
the hegemonic ideal and the stereotypes of male deviance impact the support given to men’s 
projects of caring for children. The chapter analyzes the effects of these moral panics on support 
for poor fathers’ projects of child rearing, attending to the particular racialized and gendered 
nature of this support. 
Chapter 6, “The “Maintenance” of Family: Mediating Relationships in the South African 
Maintenance Court,” considers the role of the Maintenance Court in disciplining the deviant 
fathers discussed in the previous chapter and in empowering the women imagined to be their 
victims. Created in the 1930s, the historic function of the Maintenance Court was to extract 
payments from errant men to support their children. Today it has taken on new national meaning 
as a way to relieve the current state’s welfare burden by inculcating men into the culture of 
payment befitting proper citizenship. However, its effectiveness requires the labors of women to 
press a case. This chapter situates the Maintenance Court as one tool among a range of strategies 
that women draw upon for assembling a network of kin, friends, and lovers in an attempt to 
constitute a supportive family for themselves and their children. It argues that the logic of 
obligation used in the court undermines women’s ability to mobilize different forms of 
obligation created through transactional sex—often leading women to eschew the very institution 
set up to “empower” them in favor of the more volatile strategies detailed in the rest of the 
dissertation. Women must balance a host of competing obligations in their larger efforts to 
achieve economic stability, affective commitment for themselves and their children, and sexual 
intimacy. By tracing these decision-making processes, the chapter situates maintenance 
payments within larger economies of intimacy involving exchanges of money, affection, labor, 
and sex. In these economies, success in the court—an order that mandates maintenance 
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payments—can create a sexual debt that complicates women’s relationships with the father and 
new lovers.  
The final chapter, Chapter 7- “They come to take our women and our jobs”: Migrants, 
Marriage, and National Belonging,” considers the experiences of a group of South African 
women who have married immigrant men. Since South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994, 
the country has shifted from producing to receiving refugees, most of whom hail from the rest of 
the African continent. The scale of the influx is significant. From 2006-2012, the new democracy 
received the highest number of asylum seekers of any country in the world. Not surprisingly, 
amidst high unemployment levels and deepening inequality, foreigners have become scapegoats 
for the economic and political ills of the country. Violent attacks on migrants in 2008 and 2015 
were flash points amid persistent tensions manifested in daily acts of discrimination and a 
repeated refrain that foreigners “come to steal our women and our jobs.” In a context where 
poverty thwarts socially coveted marital unions, non-nationals’ employment and marriage to 
South African women is a clear source of frustration and jealousy. However, more is at issue 
than simply work and weddings. Rather, this chapter considers why women are willing to 
tolerate derision and submit their intimate lives to the threats of violence to enter into these 
transnational marriages. I argue, unions with foreign men afford South African women the status 
of full social adulthood and national belonging unavailable in domestic couplings and to which 
indigenous men have no alternative avenue. Thus, counter-intuitively, South African women are 
marrying foreigner men to gain a fuller form of citizenship than their male counterparts. Thus, as 
women rework the meaning and access to these various spheres of belonging through their 
intimate relationships, they also serve to rework the very definition of citizenship in South Africa 
today. In short, the intimate domains of sex and reproduction are, today, a key site where 
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political belonging is constituted. Nonetheless, the security and status change women gain in 
these marriages comes at the price of other forms of marginalization and insecurity. This chapter 
details the experiences of South African women “stolen” by foreigners and the ways in which 
their relationships illuminate the intertwining of intimacy and national belonging in South 
Africa. 
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Chapter 2 - Working Motherhood: Fieldsite and Methods 
What is the Point? 
 
Figure 2.1: The Point in geographic context 
This analysis is enabled by a very specific geographic location namely, the Point 
neighborhood in South Africa’s third largest city, Durban. While a unique urban space in South 
Africa, it is a microcosm for unemployment, xenophobia, poverty, and familial reorganization 
experienced across the country. Only 20 blocks long and 5 blocks wide (See Figure 2.1) the 
dense urban space of the Point requires consideration from various vantage points to grasp the 
impact of its geography on its inhabitants.  
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The Port 
 
Figure 2.2:The Toyota factory lot and cranes of the harbor 
The peninsula of the Point embraces Durban’s harbor, which is the largest port in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Until its relocation, South Africa’s first rail line extended into the Point, making 
it a hub of economic activity. The port has a number of implications for residents. Since the 
nineteenth century, the port and the railway (both run by the parastatal South African Railways 
and Harbors) has been a large source of jobs and, later, housing. Between 1912 and the 1970s 
when containerization reshaped the shipping industry, the south west portion of the Point was 
dominated by housing for stevedores, shore men, and rail workers (Callebert 2017). Until as late 
as the 1980s, many were employed in handling of break-bulk cargo, or cargo that is neither 
containerized nor bulk packaged and thus needs to be loaded and unloaded piece by piece 
(Callebert 2017). African migrant laborers provided the hands and the backs that did this work 
while other race groups acted as lift operators, truck drivers, coal shovelers, switchboard 
operators, or the many many other occupations required to make the port run.  
Though the neighborhood was deemed a white’s only area under apartheid, due to its 
proximity to the city center, the presence of the port ensured it was always a nationally and 
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racially heterogenous space. Ship captains, Rail Foreman, engineers, and their families who were 
all overwhelmingly white lived in the single family houses on Camperdown while blocks away 
over 8000 predominantly Zulu migrant men lived in the labor compounds and municipal 
barracks on Bell Street (Callebert 2017).1 In addition to the South Africans, sailors and soldiers 
from China, the Philippines, Norway, Greece, Portugal, Italy and many others came for extended 
shore leaves bringing their languages, cultural preferences, and their wages with them. Though 
Durban, unlike Cape Town or Johannesburg has never been known as a cosmopolitan city, the 
peninsula of the Point has a long-established leisure industry that caters to a variety of 
preferences. This diversity gave the neighborhood a reputation of licentiousness, a place where 
boundaries of all kinds could be transgressed. In some cases, this operated as a form of titillation 
such as with the notorious nightclub Smugglers Inn or “Smudges” which attracted white middle-
class voyeurs in the 1960s and 1970s looking for an opportunity to drink and dance with drag 
queens, strippers, seamen, and even coloured people. In other cases, such transgressions were 
used to authorize the forced removal of a mixed community in the name slum clearance. 
Along with jobs, the port brought money and resources into the neighborhood. Though 
dock work was dangerous, grueling, and unpredictable labor, Callebert found that his African 
informants had long careers of twenty or thirty years on the Durban docks because of the relative 
economic opportunities it brought (2017). Dock workers were not only laborers, they were also 
consumers and a host of petty traders, canteen cooks, barbers, legal and illegal liquor 
distributors, prostitutes, and washwomen made a living by servicing the labor force. Cargo that 
                                               
1 The uneven nature of the shipping industry was such that it required a ready supply of casual labor available to work on-
demand. Until 1959 African workers were employed on a togt or day to day basis. Even after 1959 when they were hired on a 
weekly retaining, fee their work schedule changed day to day. Laborers were expected to present themselves to be considered for 
a job by 6:30am and if they worked over time (as many were required to do) they would not leave work until 11pm. These hours 
made residing in places other than the point very challenging and many Africans subjected themselves to the unpleasant 
regulations and squalor of the compounds out of this convenience (Callebert 2017). 
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was damaged and recycled or pilfered directly supported a large secondary trade industry both in 
the Point and in Durban’s townships (Callebert 2017). In 2014, my respondants obtained a 
variety of goods—everything from new televisions to children’s snorkels in bulk—from 
similarly “damaged” containers to resell throughout the neighborhood. 
Like many other ports, the intermingling of many different kinds of people, goods, and 
economies gave the area a sense of lawlessness. At one level, the neighborhood had one of the 
most complicated property ownership schemes in the country making for a great deal of 
uncertainty as to what entity was responsible for managing which part of the street.2 At another 
level, the neighborhood had long been associated with crime and deviance either from the 
numerous drinking establishments and robust vice economy or from the circulation of 
contraband brought by ships (Leggett 2001). People took advantage of the ambiguity wrought by 
heterogeneity such as the case of one of my respondents, an elder Greek gentleman who led a 
gang of young men from Spain, Italy, and Greece in the 1960s. Lacking a shared tongue, they 
developed their own language, unintelligible to those they sought to rob, who never saw them 
coming. While the aging whites of Durban argue that the crime of Point’s past was tame 
compared to what is perpetrated by the overwhelmingly black population of today, my research 
found that the Point’s unsavory reputation has been remarkably durable over time. From the 
residents in the 1950s to my respondents in 2013, crime, safety, and the neighborhood’s negative 
influence on their children have been abiding concerns.  
                                               
2 The western strip along the harbor belongs to the national government and is leased by shipping companies or managed by 
South African Railways and Harbors. The land on which Addington Hospital sits belongs to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, but 
not the nurses’ quarters adjacent to the hospital. Much to its chagrin, Durban Municipality owns pockets of sub-economic 
housing that dot the neighborhood and frequently wage court battles over who is responsible for derelict buildings. The 
southernmost tip is owned by a Malaysian development conglomerate attempting to create a luxury residential and commercial 
site. From Bell street south, this section has its own water, electricity, and police. 
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A climate of suspicion was further produced by the widespread transience of the 
neighborhood’s population. While shore leaves could be multiple weeks in the early days, new 
populations of sailors and soldiers were constantly circulating. As an urban place where money 
could be made, the Point was often the first site of entry for people coming to the city from the 
countryside or other countries. Part of the “better life” these people sought was put these 
earnings towards lives elsewhere (as in the case of the African migrant workers) or to earn 
enough to move away from the neighborhood’s crime and cramped quarters, especially if they 
had children. Thus, those who could, quickly left the neighborhood. For those who couldn’t, 
leaving often remained their ultimate goal and precluded close ties to neighbor’s. Even for those 
who lived for 20 years in the Point, it was never described as a community to which they 
belonged as much as a stopover on the way to a different life.  
The Beachfront 
 
Figure 2.3: An aerial view of Durban's iconic beachfront. Point is on the left (southernmost) portion 
In contrast to the workaday grittiness of the Port, the Point’s second face, the beachfront, 
presented an image of carefree leisure. A line of art deco style high rises painted in bright pastels 
abutted the white sand dotted with palm trees and colorful kiosks selling everything from 
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“traditional” Zulu beadwork to inner-tubes. Though this southern end of Durban’s beachfront 
was never the destination for the well-heeled, it has always attracted droves of less prosperous 
visitors looking to holiday next to the vivid blue waters of the ever-warm Indian ocean. Durban 
is a primary destination for South African’s seeking relief from the summer heat during the 
Christmas and New Year’s holidays. As such, over the years various businesses have sprung up 
over the years to entertain and amaze Durban’s holiday makers. Those often remembered include 
the trampoline park, the kiddie pools, the Mermaid Lido with its “homosexualist” organ grinder, 
Mini-town, the Snake Park, the Surf and Rescue Club, and Little Top.3 Prior to the 1980s when 
the beaches were racially integrated, many of these diversions trafficked in the consumption of 
exotified racial difference such as the Indian snake charmers, the Zulu gumboot dancing 
competitions, or the extravagantly dressed rickshaw drivers that have become Durban icons.  
The beachfront’s daytime amusements had after-dark counterparts in the bars, restaurants, 
and night clubs that line the neighborhood’s streets. It was also the place where extra-legal 
indulgences could be bought such as drugs, hard liquor, or sex. Whether it be the delight of a flea 
circus or the companionship of a prostitute, the Point was a well-known locale for the 
gratification of various pleasures. For the neighborhood residents, this had a number of important 
effects. The pleasure economy was a large source of revenue. A number of my respondents had at 
some point worked as waitresses in a neighborhood bar or night club. Sales of trinkets or 
panhandling on the beachfront was a reliable quick source of cash as was participation in 
transactional companionship or sex. The constant presence of holiday makers also enabled other 
                                               
3 Throughout my research it was a challenge to find long time current or former Point residents who were willing to speak with 
me about daily life in the Point prior to the 1980s. Much of this is because of the stigma and poverty associated with the 
neighborhood that was felt acutely by this white population. However, there is a genre of speech and writing that involves the 
nostalgic remembrance of the Point as a place of carefree leisure and diversion. In this genre, the Point is characterized as a 
child’s wonderland filled with innocent amusement and, importantly, very safe. Such portrayals act as not-so-subtle racial 
critiques when people contrast these remembrances to the dangerous environment of criminality they argue exists today. 
Numerous examples of this genre can be found on the website Facts About Durban (www.fad.co.za). 
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forms of income generation such as the re-selling of pilfered cameras or ready marks for 
counterfeit schemes. This economy additionally offered many temptations such that a day’s 
earnings could quickly be spent on readily available consumables. The neighborhood’s 
atmosphere of carefree hedonism contributed to a devil-may-care attitude that many inhabitants 
shared. What residents termed a “fast life,” was reinforced by a political economy in which 
future planning was often thwarted. 
The Street 
 
Figure 2.4: Kombi taxis rush by on one of the Point's major intersections 
The vision of the neighborhood from the street offers an important third perspective. 
Residents living in Point referred to it as living “in town” in contrast to either the townships (also 
known as locations) created under apartheid for the Indian, coloured, and African racial groups 
or the suburbs that ring the downtown which remained overwhelmingly white. Point is a short 
distance from the city center making the city’s commercial and financial services as well as the 
employment opportunities a short but ride away. The small middle and working class that lived 
in Point were civil servants, bank clerks, or office cleaners looking to save on transportation 
costs by living closer to downtown.  
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Partly due to its proximity to Durban’s commercial hub and partly due to its historical 
status as one of the first places of white settlement in the city, the neighborhood was very well 
resourced. In addition to the natural asset of the sea, on the east end stood both the large state-run 
Addington hospital, and, next door, the Durban Children’s Hospital which grew to international 
prominence midcentury for its exceptional care (Burns 2011).4  Bearing the same name was the 
neighborhood’s primary school whose historic Afrikaans and English language curriculum was 
expanded in recent years to include a Madrasa that served the growing immigrant population 
from other African nations. Point residents had the unusual privilege of quality medical care and 
primary education within walking distance. In contrast, rural or township residents had to arrive 
at the hospital before 6am to attempt to access same-day services. Similarly, many sent their 
children to informal boarding houses where twenty or more children live in a neighborhood flat, 
cared for by a housemother, in order to access Addington school. Furthermore, residents enjoyed 
the presence of 3 large supermarkets within the neighborhood such that they could comparison 
shop as they walked their children to school. 
Despite the presence of a small middle class and a few clusters of holiday flats, long-term 
residents in the Point have historically been poor. The neighborhood’s reputation and industrial 
sector prevented the gentrification that many city planners imagined for such a centrally-located 
neighborhood.5 Until the 1980s, various undesirable elements of urban infrastructure were 
located in the Point’s southern tip such as the sewage plant, a small jail, and a “Zulu hospital” for 
                                               
4 Addington Hospital historically served the white and colored race groups until 1995, but the Children’s Hospital had a mandate 
to serve children of all races, a thorn in the side of the apartheid government that led it the hospital’s closure in 1985 (Burns 
2011). A large municipal and community task-force succeeded in reviving the Children’s hospital and the teen sexual health 
drop-in center opened in 2012, while the larger outpatient facility opened during my fieldwork in 2014. 
5 The most recent incantation of this is the luxury development that was constructed at the southern tip prior to the world cup in 
2010 by a Malaysian and South African development partnership. The old railway houses were converted into R4million single 
family homes and a yacht harbor was built. The five luxury high rises stand mostly empty, though some restaurants and activities 
such as the evening farmer’s market have sprung up there. 
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injured migrant workers. This made for inexpensive yet accessible land for the city’s 
construction of various sub economic schemes. The most notable is Elwyn Court, a monolithic 
block of 140 flats that spans a full city block. Built in the 1940s to house poor white families 
who paid heavily subsidized rent, the building was municipally run until 2001 when the 
individual flats were sold off to their owners at a nominal cost. Since then, growing debt and the 
poor management of the building has plagued the municipal government. Horror stories of 
residents trapped on the seventh floor because of elevators that have not worked in a decade crop 
up every few years in the local papers (e.g. See Rondganger 2015).6 In the more successful 
schemes, begun after 1999, the municipality refurbished old holiday flats and charged well-
vetted occupants close to market rent. Serving a different population, the Association for the 
Aged (TAFTA) runs three large buildings for low-income senior care across the street from 
where the native beerhall once stood.    
Alongside this relatively stable population was a much larger transient population—
sometimes including people who had been there for years—that circulated through the 
neighborhood. Such transience in many places is associated with social deviance and Point was 
no exception. Known as a place where fast cash could be made, the neighborhood attracted 
persons described by others as vagrants or street children who were constant targets of cleanup 
efforts by the city. The bulk of work opportunities were contingent jobs subject to daily or 
sometime hourly changes in demand. From the 1950s-1970s, much of the neighborhood was 
made up of short term boardinghouses or “hotels” to house a mobile work force. Durban’s 
temperate climate also enabled workers looking to save more of their wages to sleep out on the 
                                               
6 In 2001, residents were given the opportunity to buy their flats under a scheme called sectional title but were not counseled that 
under this scheme they would be responsible for an increasing monthly levy in addition to utilities, and the shared cost of 
building maintenance. As a result, many are heavily in debt and under the law could be evicted from their homes (Rondganger 
2015). 
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beachfront or on the verandas of dockside sheds (Callebert 2016). In 2014, boardinghouses had 
become bachelor flats that could be rented by the week or the month or the lodges and “shelters” 
that served those who could not pay in advance. 
The presence of so many persons, and notably children, living in poverty and purportedly 
“improper” circumstances prompted some of Durban’s early elite women to target the Point as a 
site for improving child welfare (Burns 2011). Between the 1920s and the 1930s, their activism 
created the Durban Child and Family Welfare Society, whose first initiative was to create crèches 
or daycares in the neighborhood. Later they formed the Child Family and Community Care 
center of Durban that employed social workers throughout the neighborhood to work directly 
with poor families. The legacy of these women persists today in a robust, though disaggregated, 
network of aid institutions. Churches throughout the neighborhood run a weekly feeding scheme 
and other organizations distribute food and occasionally toiletries on the beachfront. The Point is 
a manageable target for individuals or institutions looking to serve South Africa’s poor and/or 
save wayward souls because of its accessibility contra the townships and its population of poor 
people who include enough white faces to calm the nerves of skittish white liberals. Some started 
informal prayer groups that also distribute goods, others set up a more established outreach and 
counseling center in Addignton school. For a handful of years, the University of South Africa ran 
an experience learning program for fourth-year social work students in the Point. The large 
concentration of poverty relief efforts is yet another resource the neighborhood offers.  
Though the majority of people living in Point sought to eventually leave the 
neighborhood, many found it challenging to do so because living there was quite expensive. 
Because the available work was so unreliable and so low paying, unless they already had a 
family home elsewhere—as in the case of migrant workers—it was challenging for people to 
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save enough cash to move away.7 Very few people owned their home in Point and even those that 
did had to pay monthly levies and utility costs. For those who rented, rent for a single room-or 
even a month at the shelter—was consistently ten times what a similar space would be in one of 
the townships.8 There was no greenspace so food must be purchased instead of grown and 
children could not simply play in the yard or the street, but had to be watched by a neighbor who 
inevitably demanded remuneration for her services. Often residents became trapped in cycles of 
debt where they were constantly owing back rent or interest to loan sharks who funded last 
month’s costs, leading one resident to say “In Point, everything is money.” 
                                               
7 In 2014, I encountered a handful of black Africans who had been allocated a government (RDP) house in the townships or 
outskirts of the city. While they would have preferred to live there, without regular jobs, many chose to remain in the city, citing 
that were they to leave, they would be sitting, hungry, in an empty house far from any opportunities for money making (see also 
Mbili 2016). 
8 Shelter cost appxR950/mo (R38/day) 
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The Vibe 
 
Figure 2.5: Women trade washing-watching duties in a Point alleyway 
Photos do not easily capture a final valuable perspective on the neighborhood, namely its 
social atmosphere, or what South Africans call, the vibe. It is challenging to argue that anything 
is shared across all Point residents, other than geographic space, but during my fieldwork, there 
were understandings about the neighborhood and how it operated that were collectively held by 
many I encountered.  
A unique feature of the neighborhood that shaped social life there was the high 
concentration of multi-story apartment buildings, the density of which was seen in only a handful 
of other places in South Africa. Thus, what residents termed “flat life”—referencing an 
apartment—occurred in small rooms or apartments and their adjacent hallways, in contrast to the 
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stand-alone houses surrounded by a yard that have long been the norm in South Africa. As 
mentioned before, occupants and their children did not have access to an outdoor extension of 
domestic space, a condition that many found unnatural and confining. They were also subject to 
the nuisances of sharing intimate space with non-family. “We are up in each other’s shit,” one 
woman joked when describing a fight taking place on her floor because one sick neighbor had 
blocked the communal toilet. Neighbors’ proximity also invited and supported a great deal of 
surveillance. Building managers, neighbors, or their guests could all view what parcels are 
brought home from the shops, what furniture is visible through always-open front doors; hear 
arguments or cries of passion; and smell what is for dinner or whose rubbish has been left out. 
This public visibility of intimate domestic life led many to say, “In town, you can never be free,” 
indicating a feeling of claustrophobia in which every decision was subject to public scrutiny.   
The identities of the other persons with whom people shared space were important. Long-
time white residents attributed a rise in the crime and degradation of the Point to the arrival of 
black South Africans following the repeal of the Group Areas Act in the late 1980s. Black South 
Africans, in turn blamed the influx of “foreigners” from the African continent after South Africa 
opened its boarders in 1994. Yet race is only one category of different in Point’s diversity.  
As one woman noted, “Everyone comes from all over.” Indeed, a single hallway could 
contain white Afrikaans families who had lived in the neighborhood for years, black immigrants 
from Tanzania and Congo, coloured South Africans born in a Durban township, black South 
Africans from deep Zululand, aging white Greek immigrants who had come in the 1960s, and 
third generation Durban Indians. For some, this fostered a valuable cross-cultural education such 
as one Zulu woman married to a Burundian immigrant who said, “In town, it is easy to meet 
different people and learn different languages. If the children were to stay at the farm and only be 
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amongst people there, their mind won’t open up and won’t be wise. They will be suspicious. To 
learn another language is to understand.” For others, diversity produced a great deal of 
turbulence.  Because there were few shared norms of greeting or of sharing, people frequently 
offended or aggravated one another. Whether items exchanged were gifts or loans was a question 
of constant debate as well as the terms of reciprocation or compensation.  
As part of this diversity of origins, a sense of rootlessness pervaded Point’s occupants. 
Most people came to the city on their own, seeking a better life and new opportunities. Even if 
they had children in Point, their larger kin networks often remained elsewhere and thus unknown 
and inaccessible to other Point residents. Furthermore, the inability to amass wealth often 
strained relationships with kin living outside of the neighborhood. People often broke ties with 
family when they tired of the constant requests for money that they could not meet. Naomi 
summed up a common misperception, “When you live in town, life is fast so they think since 
you staying in town they assume you have money, all those things”.9 
 The expense of the neighborhood also precluded relationships within Point. People were 
constantly “shifting” as they called it, running from debts or seeking a less expensive place to 
live. One respondent, Zandi encapsulated it well, “In flats, people are coming and moving. You 
don’t know who your neighbors are. Someone can do something and just disappear.” She 
compared it to an idealized vision of a township community saying, “In location, if they run 
away you can find them because they will come back. Their family is there… In the flat [in 
Point] you only bring your bag. [In the township] Even if they lie, you’ve still got their family.”  
By contrasting “family” to “a bag,” Zandi highlighted not only a difference in social personhood, 
                                               
9 In isiZulu and English: Like besengishilo uma uhlala drobheni mpilo iyashesha basuke becabanga kuthi unayo imali ngoba 
uhlala drobheni all those things. 
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but also the lack of social accountability and durable connections that characterized relationships 
in Point. This sense of disconnection between residents manifested pervasive mistrust.  
This lack of trust was based on profound social and epistemological concerns. Without 
extended kin or long-term connections to ground them, people felt they could not dependably 
know their neighbors.  They worried that their neighbors may not be what they seem or may 
have questionable intentions. While I observed that my respondents had closer relationships with 
some people as opposed to others, all resisted the suggestion that they had friends. When asked 
who their friends were, a common response was “I do not have friends; I do not believe in 
friends at all…because I know what they’re capable of,” implying betrayal.10 The implied danger 
was betrayal either through gossip or action, which many had experienced.11 They were vexed 
that it was so challenging to “know someone’s heart.” While this is a concern in South Africa 
more broadly and certainly beyond the Point’s climate of deception contributed to that worry 
(Ashforth 2005). Most people supported or supplemented their livelihood through forms of 
panhandling that involved various degrees of duplicitousness. One might beg on the street, which 
often involved highlighting characteristic that attracted more resources (e.g. a physical disability 
or care of children) that may or may not correspond to that person’s daily life. Others sold 
amagwinya (cakes) cooked in their kitchen or goods pilfered from the docks. Zulu speakers 
retain a moral ambiguity about such activities by describing them as ukuphanda which, 
depending on context, translated to begging, stealing, or, more vaguely, making things happen.12 
Likewise, English speakers used either the more passive terms “coping” and “getting by” or the 
                                               
10 In isiZulu and English: Actually anginabo abangani. I do not believe in friends’ anginabo abangani nje at all…ngoba ngiyazi 
ukuthi ba capable of. 
11 There is a Zulu idiom that captures this well “Imiphanda ibulalwa yizakhelani” which quite literally translates to “pots are 
broken by neighbors” but more broadly means “the worst harm is done by one’s friends” (Doke et al.2008: 645) 
12 Many thanks to Molly Margaretten who helped me understand how this verb was being used. “Besishoda, yabo. So ngihamba 
ngiyophanda” [We were short/lacking (e.g. hungry), you see. So, I went and made things happen]. From a Zulu-English/English-
Zulu dictionary, ukuphanda translates to “scratch up” or to “dig by scratching.” (Doke et al 2008:645; Margaretten 2015:70). 
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active verb “to hustle” to similarly thread an ethical needle. While those with whom I spoke set 
apart their own, and often those of their closest confidants, actions as morally vindicated, anyone 
else’s behavior was highly questionable.  
The context of chicanery produced a deep sense of insecurity in Point residents. They 
were concerned that children would be snatched by nameless criminals who could disappear or 
that they would be unknowingly sold drug-laced food that would turn them into addicts. 
However, the most pervasive fear was that their neighbors would lie to them or about them—or, 
perhaps even more worrying, that their neighbors would tell the truth about them to someone 
else. Their vulnerability was heightened by the fact that people in the neighborhood were 
tremendously dependent on one another for survival. Neighbors loaned money or cooking oil 
when you were short. They told you when people were distributing food on the beachfront or 
where one could get donated clothes. They also bore witness to your daily activities and were 
privy to extensive information about one’s intimate life which they could choose to share with 
others. There was little space for the management of one’s image in Point and because of the 
density, the repercussions for malicious talk were high. 
Research in a Context of Mistrust 
 This dissertation is informed by over 17 years of engagement with South Africa. The bulk 
of data were collected during a three-month visit in 2011, a year of fieldwork in 2013-2014, and 
follow up visits in 2015 and 2018.  In May 2011, I traveled to Durban to conduct preliminary 
research on women’s livelihood strategies. The phenomenon of unemployed women who were 
raising children with little help from the fathers was widespread, but I sought a field site where 
the specificities of place shaped the particular contours of this pervasive social condition. I also 
sought to work against the bifurcation of scholarship on South African life into rural and urban—
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even among scholars arguing for their interconnection. At the suggestion of Catherine Burns, I 
began looking into the history of the Point neighborhood as a very different sort of social space. 
It was neither the insular township on the edges of the city, nor was it a suburb. It could not be 
understood as a cosmopolitan haven of racial mixing such as Cato Manor in Durban or 
Alexandria in Johannesburg. It was segregated yet heterogenous; interdependent yet discordant; 
and poor yet rich in resources. The neighborhood offered a different side of the story of 
apartheid. Further, I believe, it is a harbinger of South Africa’s future.  
 I moved to Durban in 2013 with my husband and 6-month old daughter in tow. I had a 
20-block neighborhood to focus in on and a network of contacts, but this was very different from 
achieving access to and legitimacy with the residents whose experiences I sought to learn. 
Furthermore, the very real insecurities of the neighborhood meant it was not prudent for any 
outsider—let alone a young-looking, white American woman—to traverse the streets without a 
clear destination. So as to not contribute to the outrageous rent inflation taking place in the Point 
and to distance myself and my family somewhat from the neighborhood arguments into which I 
would inevitably be drawn, I lived a short distance away, arriving each morning by minibus taxi 
after all the children had been dropped at school.   
 Initially, I established myself with volunteer activities at sites across the neighborhood 
that put me in contact with Point parents, most often mothers. In one storefront ministry, I helped 
peel potatoes and dish plates for the twice-daily feeding scheme, organized clothing and toiletry 
donations, and occasionally taught computer skills. Those women who lingered and helped with 
the clean-up—aware they would receive additional resources—took our quieter time together to 
interrogate me about what brought me to Point and why. Was I a missionary? A social worker? A 
spy? Realizing that these were the intelligible categories for someone with my presentation, I 
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identified myself as a student wishing to learn enough to write a book that explained to 
Americans “how mothers in South Africa coped.” This became my introductory line when I went 
to churches to attend the women’s ministry meetings or outreach events, on home visits where I 
acted as an isiZulu translator for the community aid worker from a development agency run out 
of Addington Primary School, or when I sat for hours at the maintenance court amusing bored 
toddlers and keeping anxious women company as they waited for their case to be heard. 
 My recognizability in the neighborhood also derived from my friendship with important 
gatekeepers who had developed the trust of residents. Val Jenkins or “Jenks” had retired after 30 
years of service in the HIV ward of the Durban Children’s hospital and, later, Addington 
Hospital. A taciturn coloured woman with a quick wit, Jenks was a walking kinship map. She 
knew every mother, granny, sibling, and cousin who came to the hospital, whether they took their 
meds, and how often the children went to school. I accompanied her on her days volunteering in 
the inner-city drop-in clinic, holding babies and chatting with parents before and after their 
appointments.  
Nora Saneka, the principal of the formerly white Clare Ellis Brown Pre-primary school in 
Point, had worked in the neighborhood for decades and was a longtime activist for the 
neighborhood residents, especially the children. At her invitation, I volunteered at the school, 
assisting with events like sports day or after care activities. She introduced me to parents, former 
pupils, and former teachers and was a tremendous resource for oral history contacts as well as 
present-day stakeholders. A seemingly endless font of passion and vision, Nora was working to 
establish an Early Childhood Development (ECD) Forum of childcare centers to help improve 
the care these under resourced, under-staffed and often illegal centers provided. The Forum 
brought members together to share resources and knowledge (how to make toys out of recycled 
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materials or to talk to parents about nutrition) and to advocate for municipal policies to enhance 
ECD. I assisted with a project to map the landscape of child care centers in Point, developing a 
questionnaire about their staffing, hours, fee scale and demographics of the families they served. 
Data from the questionnaire help support a successful advocacy effort to obtain municipal 
support of subsidized breakfasts in the centers. Those data also appear in this dissertation.  
 From 2011-2016, the University of South Africa (UNISA) Department of Social Work 
ran a service-learning center in Point. The vision of the center was to integrate social science 
research and community engagement with the practical training of fourth year social work 
students. Supervised by Barbara McLean, the students undertook internships at sites or with 
groups throughout the neighborhood (e.g. at the refugee center or with the cardboard collectors). 
As part of their internships, students were expected to develop, implement, and assess an 
outreach project that met the needs of that community. During my time there, I offered guidance 
on qualitative research methods and accompanied students to their sites. Through the students’ 
work, I attained a much broader understanding of the various communities within the Point and 
their very specific circumstances.  
 Barbara introduced me to an essential contact in my research, Ntombizandile Krakra, or 
Zandi, who had graduated from her UNISA program. A Point resident herself, Zandi was a keen 
observer and a tenacious researcher who, with two children at home, had spent 6 months 
integrating herself into the world of Point’s cardboard collectors, understanding their rhythms, 
the internal dynamics of the group, and the challenges they faced. Zandi’s initial role was to put 
me in contact with women in the neighborhood and she introduced me to many mothers scattered 
in buildings throughout Point, the most notable being a growing group of South African women 
married to foreigner men who I would never have encountered otherwise. In addition, Zandi 
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became an invaluable assistant and eventual collaborator. She provided isiZulu or isiXhosa 
translation when my skills were insufficient, translated and contextualized slang terms specific to 
Point, acted as a sounding board for me to check my understandings and interpretations, and 
revised my interview questions to better reflect the conceptual categories of Point residents. After 
I returned to the United States, Zandi continued to conduct interviews, as we had done together, 
focusing on South African/foreigner couples and their specific circumstances. She also 
transcribes the interview recordings and we talk regularly to discuss the transcripts, my writing, 
and the ongoing questions they provoke. Across my visits, I conducted over 220 semi-structured 
interviews during which I asked questions about household composition, where women garnered 
resources and why, and neighborhood relationships. Interviews were conducted primarily in a 
mixture of English and isiZulu. Zandi provided translation for Swahili and isiXhosa speakers.  
   The above has primarily outlined how I made contacts and conducted semi-structured 
interviews. But, that is only part of my methodology. The broad uptake of the Child Support 
Grant has fostered an abundance of scholarship of the effects of the CSG on women and 
children. Research methods have primarily included surveys, focus groups, and interviews. Such 
research has importantly refuted inaccurate critiques and retained the import of the grants in 
governmental discourse. However, research has not captured how the grants figure into broader 
terrains of social life. Through ethnography and particularly participant observation in an urban 
context where the grants are a critical but highly insufficient source of income, I was able to 
situate the grants within larger questions about how caregivers (predominantly women) garner 
enough resources to support children. I identified a sub-group of 24 women as key informants 
and I spent extended time with them throughout the day, both observing them in their carework 
at home and following them as they traversed the neighborhood building networks of support. I 
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observed how they negotiated with neighbors, social workers, or church employees, what kinds 
of claims they made, how they defined obligation or dependency, and how they worked to 
construct their relationship to the source. Public knowledge of the child support grant—how 
much was paid, when it was paid, how it was presumably spent--shaped women’s interactions 
with multiple parties in ways that aren’t visible in a single interaction. However, by following 
women throughout their networks and by triangulating that observational data with interviews I 
was able to discern how child support claims impacted larger systems of kinship, gender 
relations, racial tensions and, finally, national belonging. 
 As others have noted, participant observation offers a particularly potent methodology for 
accessing data that cannot or would not be meta-narrated: the rhythms of a woman’s day, the 
ways she responds to a neighbor’s request, how a room is organized and children are dressed. 
These quotidian minutiae are the meat of social scientific analysis. They are also the data that 
Point women most carefully guarded. As a young white woman asking questions about the 
raising of children, I was frequently interpreted to be a social worker or an aid worker. For those 
women who didn’t outright avoid me due to this interpretation, it was an understood practice that 
I would ask a serious of questions about their lives and their household and they would offer 
well-rehearsed answers in exchange for immediate or future resources. Indeed, this is the format 
to which many of my first interviews conformed. To those who seemed most open, I would ask if 
I could come and visit them, which occasionally led to some very awkward cups of tea and clear 
cues that I was not welcome to linger. 
 One day, I had a visit scheduled with a woman, Lolita, who had been eyeing me 
cautiously for several weeks. I had visited her neighbor—with whom I later learned she had 
turbulent relations—as part of a home visit with the community aid worker, but I had never 
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received more than a polite greeting from her. It was a terribly day for a visit, my daughter, then 
eight months old, had not slept well the night before and we had no child care. I was exhausted 
and my postpartum back pain had flared up, making standing—the only thing that kept the baby 
from fussing—a challenge. With no means to contact Lolita, I took my daughter along, expecting 
the interaction to be short and that we could return home after another guarded tea-drinking 
session. Oftentimes children, and especially babies are greeted, in South Africa with squeals of 
delight and showered with affection. I knew such a reaction was possible, but Lolita, after an 
initial lukewarm cuddle, passed the baby back and turned to prepping the tea. The baby began to 
fuss and I wincingly stood to rock her. I fumbled through polite conversation, distracted by the 
baby, fatigue, pain, and Lolita’s piercing gaze. She interrupted me with an abrupt, “feed the baby 
and give her to me.” Startled, I sat down and complied. “Did you have a cesar?” Lolita, asked 
pointedly, using the colloquial term for a cesarean section. “No,” I replied, but Lolita spoke over 
me. “I did with my second and my back was not right for years. It still pains when the weather 
changes,” said taking the baby. As she rocked, she grilled me about my diet, my sleeping, my sex 
life. Hours later, when the baby woke up, she sent me home with brusque instructions about what 
I needed to do differently. She also invited me back.  
 In relaying this event, I don’t mean to suggest Lolita and I shared some universal 
experience of femininity or motherhood. At the most basic level, I had given birth in a well-
funded hospital in the United States and had already seen a host of specialists about my back 
pain. I also had a husband with a flexible schedule who took on most of the physical labor of 
childcare in those early years. Lolita had a cesarean section in a government hospital during 
medication shortages and did not get the full dose of painkillers. Her husband could not take time 
away from his invaluable hourly job, nor did his vision of paternal responsibility include 
 66 
childcare. Instead, she was left to care for an infant and toddler on her own. Instead, I highlight 
this interaction because it marks a shift in authority that was important to my building trust in the 
Point. I was experiencing difficulties about which Lolita had more knowledge and expertise. She 
chose to counsel me and to embrace the relative position of power that enabled. This shift did not 
undo the fact that I was a white, well-resourced, American in a context that valorized all of these 
attributes. However, it did recast me as also an inexperienced first-time mother, another identity 
that was intelligible to Point women, and one they found acceptable for continued engagement.  
 As such, much of my initial participant observation was made up of collective teasing 
about my incompetence and foolishness: I was useless in the kitchen, I was a walking target for 
neighborhood crime, and clearly did not know what and what not to worry about with 
childrearing (of great concern was warm clothes, lesser was what non-food item went in the 
mouth). Many days were spent in one smaller building built in 1924 as a boardinghouse that 
contained single rooms and shared baths and toilets. These cramped quarters meant that many 
people used the passageways—open to the sky—as leisure space. We would gather, leaning on 
the balcony railing or sitting on the small stoop next to the street and talk. When mocking me 
waned, the women would complain about the building manager, other neighbors who were safely 
out of earshot, men, or the politics of distribution of the various resource sites. This was often a 
time for me to ask clarifying questions about what I had seen when I had accompanied one 
woman or another to the feeding scheme, a prayer meeting, or the school aid center Undoubtedly 
such questions initiated another round of taunting, but the playful banter over how to describe an 
event revealed the terrain of concerns that women identified as important. 
 My goal is that my analysis will make long term contributions to the lives of my 
respondents. I also sought to make more immediate, though consistently insufficient, 
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reciprocation for the tremendous access that my respondents granted me. I provided a great deal 
of childcare so women could run errands unconcerned that they would be disciplined by the 
police or “the welfare” for leaving their children unattended. I acted as a guard for laundry hung 
on the line, for rooms that could not be locked, for a pile of foraged blankets. I hauled water for 
laundry or baths, held babies, washed dishes, and helped compose testimonies. Yet in the end, I 
believe my greatest contribution was diversion. For as much labor as Point women were 
constantly performing, many found their days quite tedious. Teasing me, teaching me, arguing 
with me, offered a small, low-stakes distraction. Point women were also quite adamant that their 
experiences and opinions be accurately captured and conveyed. At their request, I have retained 
many of their names and have indicated when I use pseudonyms.  
 Overwhelmingly my data are about the experiences of women. I do not see this as a 
limitation. Like the post-apartheid Child Support Grant (CSG), my research “follows the child” 
so as not to impose any preconceived notion of family onto my data. I was concerned with who 
was providing care, the resources and relationships the caregiver(s) drew upon, and the terms of 
the exchanges in which they participated. Men figure in my data to the extent that they appear in 
these negotiations. There is excellent scholarship that had been done in the past two decades 
about how masculinity and particularly black masculinity is being reworked in the context of 
virtually nonexistent marriage and waged work. Cognizant that masculinities and femininities are 
always reciprocally co-producing one another, my research provides another perspective.  
To say that my ethnographic subjects were also historical actors is not to name something unique 
to Point residents, but historicity featured in their lives in two quite specific ways. First, South 
Africa’s socio-political context produced a certain orientation to the past. The recency of the 
democratic transition provided an important colloquial periodization that people used to evaluate 
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the present.  Most of my interlocutors were thirty years old or older meaning that either they 
remembered well the apartheid period or they had parents who experienced most of the arc of 
apartheid rule. There was a before and after transition and people were very clear with what 
should have marked the difference. People articulated their dissatisfaction with conditions in the 
present via both a nostalgic recalling of previous security and by grieving over a future that never 
came to pass.  
 There were also important historical continuities that people envisioned across the two 
regimes. As is seen throughout this dissertation the specter of “the welfare” haunts the post-
apartheid moment. Many of my interlocutors had personal experience with social workers and 
children’s homes under apartheid rule, but even in the late 1980s and early 1990s, state removals 
of children or the intense disciplinary work of state social workers was much less frequent than 
the previous two decades. Following transition, the children’s homes were filled with AIDS 
orphans and child protection social workers were stretched thin dealing with a much larger target 
population. And yet the threat of “the welfare” who would come and remove children loomed 
large in the imagination of Point women.  
 Second, and more specific to the Point, historical knowledge was both quite prized and 
highly elusive. Because so few people saw themselves as belonging in Point and kin were almost 
always elsewhere, the neighborhood was a space where people could write their own histories. 
This produced a great deal of freedom and anxiety, as mentioned before. Historical grounding is 
what gave a person moral legitimacy. Thus, people were often engaged in the projects of 
unearthing others’ histories while also disguising their own.  
Because the Point was a space of so much intervention, there are a number of records that 
attest to the management of the infrastructure and population in the Town Clerk files in Durban’s 
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municipal archive. These mostly focus on the municipal beerhall and migrant labor barracks, 
Elwyn Court and other sub-economic schemes for whites, issues of vagrancy and crime on the 
beachfront, and shipping concerns in the railway and port. The Killie Campbell Africana Library 
in Durban housed the archives of early women’s groups who worked in the Point, transcripts of 
interviews with dockworkers, and Durban newspapers. In Pretoria, I also accessed the public 
records of the central government to examine the management of the SMG in Durban. I traveled 
to Johannesburg to examine the Transnet archives for the parastatal South African Railways and 
Harbours.  
By reading these textual sources against the grain, I could glimpse fragments of the lives 
of people who lived in Point, but the fuller contours of their daily challenges remained shrouded. 
Fortunately, under apartheid, any form of governmental aid to a child (maintenance grant, 
grocery voucher, housing subsidy) had to be confirmed by the children’s court. These court 
records contain not only testimony by the social workers and clients, and reports by the social 
worker, they often included case file notes, letters to and from clients, and interviews with 
clients’ networks. I was able to access 150 case files of families living in Point seeking 
governmental or private support between 1960 and 1978. To find sources for the later years, I 
sought other repositories. When clients had children younger than 13 years, their case was 
handled by Durban Child Welfare. The agency provided me unlimited access to their library and 
archives, but a fire in 2002 and the merging of the segregated agencies of the apartheid era meant 
a great deal of material was lost. In one of the fortuitous moments historians dream about, 
through my contacts in the welfare system, I was able to gain temporary access to an abandoned 
government building where Durban Social Development files from 1978-1997 were lying in 
bureaucratic limbo. Donning masks and coveralls, my research assistant and I spent weeks 
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combing through the thousands of files amidst ashes from squatters’ fires and rat droppings. In 
the interest of efficiency, we prioritized only the files for the white race group on the topics of 
maintenance grants and aid to families. While we likely could have found Point residents among 
the other race groups, I was cognizant that for our health and safety, it was not advisable that we 
remain in that building too long. In total, we photographed over 243 case files.  
 I coupled this written data with oral histories of current and former Point residents, some 
of whose families feature in the case files, and social workers who worked in the area. When 
possible, I would bring segments of a case file to interviews with social worker in an effort to 
seek the background thinking to a files’ creation. I understand these interviews to be social texts 
as much as my archival sources. Their content and production are shaped by the social, cultural, 
economic, and political context. As with any text, I read them through a contextual lens and in 
critical comparison with my other available sources.   
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Chapter 3 - “We have done everything right by our children”: Public Motherhood as 
Precarious Claim-Making in 1960s Durban 
 
In the early 1960s, three women racially classified as white, black African, and coloured, 
struggled to raise their children under conditions of intense poverty in the Point neighborhood in 
the city of Durban. As part of these efforts, these women sought aid from various institutions, 
including from the Durban Child Welfare Society. Magdalena, the white woman, received some 
food, clothing, and housing assistance, but, despite her vehement protests, her children were 
eventually removed to state institutions. Grace, the black woman also received food and clothing, 
and her child, this time at her request, was eventually taken into foster care and subsequently 
adopted. Rosemary, a coloured woman, received extensive support of not only food and clothing, 
but also a maintenance grant and a township house. She fought with the Society social workers 
over the removal of her children, which occurred a number of times over the years. In her case, 
they were always returned within weeks of their removal.  
Across the cases, these women’s maternal status both enabled them to make claims for 
resources and attracted unwanted intervention for purportedly having “failed to realise [their] 
maternal role”. In this chapter, I consider the stakes of invoking motherhood for poor women of 
different races in apartheid South Africa, especially the insecurity caused by an ever-present 
danger of being seen to fail. Drawing on the ways in which motherhood as a particularly political 
identity has been linked to both activism and state control, I situate motherhood as both a 
multivalent and condensing term. By multivalent I mean that motherhood as a singular term can 
be used in many different settings to mean quite different things.  Motherhood, as it is invoked 
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and enacted by the women in this chapter, and as it is understood and enforced by surveilling 
authorities, capaciously draws bodily comportments, material and social practices, normative 
understandings of social reproduction and labor all under its moral umbrella. As it does so, it 
condenses the separate elements into a single concept, juxtaposing them such that they are 
rendered malleable and porous, open to slippery entanglements, misrecognitions, and elisions. 
As the women in this chapter came to realize, such a self-evident, yet changeable signifier had 
enormous, but often unwieldy political potential. Carefully crafted invocations of seemingly 
proper motherhood all too easily could get away from you. 
The context for this discussion is the early 1960s, a time of intense transformation for the 
ways in which motherhood was experienced, interpreted, and expressed in South Africa (Healy-
Clancy 2017). As has been deftly covered by feminist historians, cross-racially, women’s use of 
maternal discourses and strategies was an important part of overt activism against racist rule in 
both the segregationist and apartheid eras (Hassim 2006; Healy-Clancy 2017; Gasa 2007; Walker 
1991).1 This public motherhood was used to protest pass laws for black Africans in the 1910s, 
1930s, and 1950s; to challenge labor laws and the migrant labor system in beerhall protests in the 
1930s and 1950s; and to make claims upon the state for improved health care, welfare, and 
education for their children and themselves.2 Whether they had children or not, women drew 
                                               
1 Feminist scholars have long debated the transformative potential of public motherhood to alter the subordination of women. 
Some argued that public motherhood while effective were inherently conservative because they reproduced a sex-gender system 
in which women were equated with maternal caregiving and domestic responsibility (e.g. Wells 1998). Others contended that 
they instead were a radical attempt to overthrow both the gendered and racialized oppression of the apartheid state because it 
found its apex in the lives of black mothers (e.g. Gasa 2007; Magubane 2010). Healy- Clancy deftly traces the ways in which the 
meaning of public motherhood shifted in the context of precolonial, colonial, Christian dominated, and apartheid politics (2017). 
I concur with her that public motherhood cannot be easily read to invoke any given sex-gender system, but instead its 
multivalence needs to be translated in each interaction (Healy-Clancy 2017).  
2 I use the term public motherhood in contrast to maternalist politics because it retains the idea that motherhood is a symbolic 
identity that invokes power and responsibility in multiple spaces (Healy-Clancy 2017; Semley 2011, 2012; Stephens 2013). It 
need not be tied to Western assumptions of passivity, submission or that a woman’s identity as a mother is defined primarily with 
respect to her domestic responsibilities to biological children and their father (Oyewùmí 2000). Indeed, Healy-Clancy 
demonstrates that black African women, “as public mothers had long shaped precolonial “public policy.” Moreover, under 
colonialism and apartheid, public mothers often worked around oppressive states to advance political goals in ways that could 
prepare them to make demands on state officials” (2017:5). 
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upon a maternal identity as a position that was cross-racially deserving of respect in order to 
accomplish a variety of goals (Walker 1981). They leveraged motherism as a discourse to gain 
not just political citizenship but a national recognition for their gendered labor (Hassim 2005:7). 
In each case, the choice to foreground a maternal identity was neither random nor the inevitable 
result of the gendered division of labor. Instead, it reflected the strategic work of actors to 
attempt to forward their political projects in terms that were meaningful and effective.  
This chapter considers the mobilization of maternal identity from a different viewpoint. 
Instead of examining overt political activism, I examine the everyday efforts of women like 
Magdalena, Grace, and Rosemary, women attempting to care for children under conditions of 
poverty and racist rule. I focus on these quotidian processes in order to argue that the labor of 
‘getting by,’ of ensuring the reproduction of vital relations through daily activity, not only lays 
the foundation for more traditionally conceived forms of political mobilization but is, in itself, a 
form of political action. I contend that because the domestic and political domains are co-
constitutive, as feminist scholars have long espoused, women’s daily acts of survival are just as 
much the stuff of politics as mass protests. The personal is political, indeed. But when this 
theoretical realization is applied to a South African case, it reveals new contours to the nature of 
politics and domestic life—namely that making claims for domestic security are deeply political 
acts. Furthermore, when considering the 1960s, intersectionality is starkly evident; we see how 
racial ideology shapes both women’s gendered conditions of getting by and their political 
potential.  
Organizations such as the Daughters of Africa or the Federation of South African Women 
used public motherhood as a means to give women of diverse backgrounds and agendas a unified 
identity and a grounded moral legitimacy for their activism in formal politics (Healy-Clancy 
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2017). Yet, the salience of motherhood as a recognizable political category was more 
thoroughgoing and permeated multiple scales. Women like Magdalena, Grace, and Rosemary—
not activists or even community leaders—also relied on a maternal identity to make individual 
claims in their case for deserving support.  
Motherhood is conceptualized as both politically potent and strategically efficacious 
precisely because it is a multivalent term that condenses differing experiences into a unified 
conception. This condensation is possible, in part, because the indexical and symbolic 
assumptions about what motherhood means seem to have remarkable historical consistency in 
the English-speaking world. These assumptions make motherhood appear to be a seemingly self-
evident concept—the care of children—enabling the identity category to bridge differences of 
race or nationality in ways that are politically useful. Key to this efficacy is the moral authority 
motherhood affords to the projects that can be incorporated under its umbrella. The moral status 
of maternal care rests on a set of popular assumptions that can be summarized in three nested 
equivalencies: namely, caring for = caring about; good caregiving = feminine; carework = moral 
good.3 These equivalencies reach their apex in the social conception of the mother as the 
paradigmatic, selfless caregiver. Thus, women can imbue their actions and concerns with moral 
legitimacy if they can successfully subsume them under the heading of maternal care. For the 
                                               
3 I am concerned with popular assumptions that the care literature has been at pains to unsettle. Critical for my discussion, is the 
colloquial assumption—persistent in the English-speaking world—that the actions of caring for someone entails, or are best 
performed when undergirded by, feelings of caring about that person (Buch 2015, Tronto 1993, Ungerson 1990). This assumed 
relationship between care affect and action is also highly gendered wherein women are thought to perform better care because 
they are believed to have greater intersubjective skills—e.g. they feel more care (Abel 2000, Reverby 1987). Further, what is 
thought to distinguish caregiving actions from other kinds of acts, is the presence of a moral orientation where providing care 
involves an ethical act of seeking “the good” in that given context, or in other words, carework is equivocated with a moral good 
(Mol et al. 2010, p13; Stevenson 2014). Despite decades of work by feminist scholars and activists, there remains a persistent 
popular conception that mothers have a natural proclivity to engage in good care actions because they have such a profound 
emotional attachment to their children (to name a few critical scholars: Chodorow 1978; Roberts 1993; Spelman 1988). When 
mothers fail to demonstrate that presumed emotional attachment or when they engage in practices socially construed as 
undesirable, they receive the double castigation of being morally corrupt and psychologically pathological (LaChance Adams 
2014, Scheper-Hughes 1992). 
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women in my research, this meant narrating their needs—for food, for housing, for income—to 
social workers and judges as needs to support their maternal care. Even when their actions are 
readily evaluated as deviant, the women narrate those actions as maternal in hopes that the patina 
of the professed ideals of motherhood rubs off on them. However, as the experiences of 
Magdalena, Rosemary, and Grace reveal, the seeming moral unity of maternal care is precarious 
at best, vulnerable to its own capaciousness and the vagaries of an often-mercurial interpretation. 
Notably, the invocation of motherhood can quickly break down when that care is quite 
differently valued depending on race.  
I argue that as motherhood became increasingly politicized both in South African and on 
an international scale, women’s mobilization of maternal identity to make claims must be 
reconceptualized as more than identity politics, as a strategic discursive action of claims-
making—as an attempt to make motherhood work.4 By invoking motherhood, women drew upon 
a presumed unified concept to make themselves legible as social actors and to make arguments 
about their desert for assistance. However, the multivalence of motherhood as an interpretive 
concept also posed challenges. Women labored to retain control over the meaning and translation 
of ‘motherhood’ as they used it, and their relative power was constrained by their poverty, 
gender, and place within a racial hierarchy. Attending to the unpredictable interpretations of 
motherhood has important historiographic consequences as well. I show that the outcome of 
cases often sat at the intersection of legitimating ideologies handed down through Commissions 
                                               
4 Many of the women’s activist groups in South Africa during this time forged connections with transnational leftist feminist 
movements whose politics emphasized public engagement as an extension of private maternal responsibilities. One of the most 
notable groups was the Women’s International Democratic Federation, established in Paris in 2945, whose membership included 
women from the first, second, and third worlds. In 1955, representatives from Federation of South African Women attended 
the World Congress of Mothers in Lausanne and hosted a regional Congress of Mothers in Johannesburg later that year (Healey-
Clancy 2017).  
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of Inquiry, legislation, and social work education and the idiosyncratic proclivities of the social 
workers and judges that the women encountered (Ashforth 1990). By considering this work in 
the early 1960s, I contribute to the scholarship that seeks to track how apartheid became 
elaborated not through a grand ideological blueprint, but through an uneven and often 
contradictory evolution at the level of street level bureaucrats (Posel 1991; Roos 2015). 
Motherhood on File 
The women whose experiences populate this dissertation were classified according to the 
four apartheid racial categories: white (European); Indian (Asiatic); coloured; and African 
(native or Bantu). They shared a geographic location in the Point neighborhood of South Africa’s 
third largest city, Durban. Their lives entered the archival record because, by choice or by 
fortune, they interacted with South Africa’s child welfare system and their maternal caregiving 
was subject to evaluation by neighbors, landlords, teachers, social workers, and, finally, a 
magistrate. These social workers and court officials were not only gatekeepers to critical 
resources such as grocery vouchers, rent subsidies, or a monthly government grant, they also 
decided whether women’s maternal projects were worthy of support or required termination by 
removal of their children.  
The below discussion is drawn from a sampling of Children’s Court cases from 1949-
1998 in which the participants’ primary residence—or workplace in the case of black Africans—
was the Point. Under apartheid, the Point, like all urban centers, was considered a whites-only 
neighborhood. Despite the presence of black men laboring in the neighborhood’s railyard and 
shipyard, black women who cleaned the neighborhood buildings, Indian restaurant and shop 
owners, and the coloured nurses who staffed the neighborhood hospital, whites remained the 
legitimate face of the neighborhood. The majority of those whites living in the Point were either 
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poor or working class—a highly stigmatized social category in both mid-century and today—and 
many sought assistance from a social welfare infrastructure that had been created for their 
virtually sole benefit. 
Prior to 1998, in order for a caregiver to receive state funds, the child had to be 
declared “in need of care” by a Commissioner of Child Welfare, usually a magistrate. Records of 
these Children’s Court cases contain a host of documents that argue for or against a variety of 
interventions, from receipt of a maintenance grant (the predecessor to today’s Child Support 
Grant) to removal of the child to a state institution or foster care. The documents include reports 
and letters produced by social workers in the Durban office of the Department of Social Welfare 
and Pensions and Durban Child Welfare Society; transcripts of trial hearings that include 
testimony from social workers, parents, and neighbors or friends; and letters or statements 
composed by school principals, neighbors, and the parents or children themselves. As arguments, 
these documents can be read as evidence for what constituted normatively desirable (and 
undesirable) family life in various times. Further, the surveillance to which poor families’ lives 
were subjected produced abundant data—albeit through a particular lens—on the intimate life of 
families in the Point. 
I consider in depth three representative cases in which the clients differ by racial 
classification. This close reading reveals that while national discourse was uniformly concerned 
with reforming motherhood, the political meaning and political potential of that identity was 
sharply shaped by the racial ideologies of the 1960s. In each case, the women concerned 
mobilized their maternal status to further their individual goals. However, the interpretation of 
their maternal actions and the forms of support for which they were eligible were highly 
differentiated by race—a reality of which the women were well aware. Before turning to the case 
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files, I begin with the longer history of the development of the welfare system in South Africa 
and the ways in which it was both racialized and gendered. 
Families, Race, and the South African Welfare State 
The South African welfare state originated with the identification of a social problem—
the inherent threat poor whites pose to proper (read: white) social reproduction—and the social 
and political anxieties that adhered around this category of people who were considered to be 
falling short of the expectations of their race. Occupying the hearts and minds of both 
bureaucrats and citizens in the early part of the twentieth century, the ‘poor white’ question 
forged the ideological underpinnings for the welfare state, the system of racist rule that would be 
formalized through apartheid, and the tenuous coherence of whiteness as a popular and political 
category.5 The primary mechanism for addressing the ‘problem’ of poor whites was intervention 
into the white family. As the turn of the twentieth century marked a shift in the relationship 
between the family and the state, older arguments about the demoralizing effects of welfare 
provision fell away in favor of a state need to oversee the upbringing of the next generation of 
citizens (Davin 1978). Concern over the quantity and quality of white children prompted the 
elaboration of a state system to oversee their proper care.  
Both the state and citizens had adopted a domestic ideology that arose out of nineteenth 
century industrialization and was embraced by middle-class British and Americans, which 
espoused a nuclear family model with a male breadwinner, dependent full-time wife, and 
dependent children (Alexander 1976; Gaitskell 1983; Hall 1979; Malos 1980). Given that, within 
this paradigm, the proper care of the child took place within the institution of the family, families 
thus became the targets of reform efforts. Within the family, mothers were seen as most 
                                               
5 For a more elaborated discussion of this intertwining see: Roos 2003, Teppo 2004, Dubow 1995, and Lange 2003. 
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responsible for the bodily care and moral upbringing of the children and improper care became 
linked to maternal inadequacy. To target such issues, an ideology of proper white motherhood 
arose that would shape the lives of women for a century. 
 There is general consensus amongst scholars that South African’s colonial population 
experienced poverty as far back as the 18th century, though how that poverty was defined and 
conceptualized bypolitical leaders varies considerably (e.g. Bundy 1986; Bickford-Smith et al. 
1999; Freund 1992; Iliffe 1988). Prior to the British takeover of the Cape Colony in 1814, poor 
relief was provided through religious institutions, notably the Dutch Reform Church who opened 
the first orphanage in 1814, and the primary target of aid was the poor white farmers who were 
rendered indigent in those early years due to crop failure and diminishing land resources.6 In 
keeping with the new British Poor Laws of 1834, institutionalization became the primary state-
driven mode of addressing poverty, and the poor were associated with physical infirmity and an 
inability to work. A Department of Public Health was created in 1891 in part, to deal with the 
poor white problem and the “sanitation” concerns over the racial intermingling of poor whites 
and non-whites (Swanson 1977). The poor-law ethos that no able-bodied person should be 
destitute was knit together with a Calvinistic belief in the value of hard work as a spiritual and 
moral virtue thereby rendering the ‘fit needy’ as both social aberrations and moral deviants. This 
framing of poverty, in addition to its health-based overlay, would form the ideological basis of 
later welfare schemes. 
 The decades around the turn of the century would change the scale of the problem of 
poverty and thereby alter how it was to be understood and addressed. Agricultural productivity 
slumped from the combined effects of drought, locusts, rinderpest, and the destruction of the 
                                               
6 Brown and Neku (2005) argue that poor relief was for whites only whereas Iliffe (1988) and McKendrick (1987) suggest it 
included Africans as well. 
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South African War. Unskilled farmers flocked into the cities, but they were ill equipped to 
compete with overseas migrants or black Africans for the newly-created mining jobs. 
Additionally, the 1902 profitability crisis in the mines created a large multiracial population in 
need of poor relief (Roos 2003). Despite the ever-increasing flood of unemployed whites into the 
city from 1890-1910, poverty was still thought of as a temporary condition as a result of the war. 
But the war only intensified a larger economic depression (Lange 2003). 
How the colonial government understood this flood of persons into the city in terms of 
their needs and capacities was filtered through both the racial ideology and political economy of 
the time. The rural homesteads on which black Africans predominantly lived and practiced 
small-scale farming were still relatively self-sufficient. Few Africans were willing to submit 
themselves to the unpleasantries of waged work in an economy hungry for their labor (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1991). Instead, they were driven to the cities by a combination of taxation and 
settler land dispossession that diminished agricultural and cattle rearing capacity. This produced 
an increasing reliance on cash both for survival and for important ritual practices such as the 
payment of ilobolo to solidify a marriage. However, that “need” for work and wages was 
understood as categorically different from the situations of other race groups. Colonial officials 
considered African laborers to be “target” workers who sought employment for a particular 
financial goal, but not out of the necessity of reproduction. Instead, it was assumed that the 
“African extended family”—often idealized as steeped in a culture of communal support—
provided the labor and resources for social reproduction. In this framing then, when famine or 
disease resulted in the presence of destitute Africans in the city, the problem was not one of 
financial need, but of a breakdown” in the “traditional” family (Ferguson 2015; Hunt 1999; Iliffe 
1987; Moore and Vaughan 1994). This was a powerful fallacy that subsequent governments 
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would use to legitimize the exclusion of black Africans from welfare provisions.7 Yet, beginning 
with the 1913 Land Act, and even arguably before, life in the reserves became increasingly 
untenable and rural families grew increasingly dependent upon migrant laborer and less capable 
of acting the imagined role of the social safety net.  
In Durban, management of this influx of persons to the city took on a particular form. 
Prior to the 1920s, Durban’s economy was dominated by merchant capital and the port (Maylam 
1990). The economy’s need for large number of casual and seasonal workers as well as the city’s 
close proximity to African reserves, meant that Durban relied on a larger proportion of (male) 
migrant labor much earlier than other cities (Maylam 1995). Additionally, it had a much more 
robust infrastructure and legislature for managing and controlling this labor. As early as 1871, 
the Durban Town Council proposed separate locations for Indians predominantly out of a 
concern for the “Asiatic Menace,” the name given to the fact that Indians competed intensely 
with whites for both space and employment (Swanson 1983).8 In these years, segregation was 
less directed at black Africans as a racial group—as it would be in later years—as much as a 
concern for imposing controls and restrictions on what was a relatively free and mobile working 
class (Maylam 1990). This was achieved through the construction of single-sex hostels—also 
called compounds or barracks—to house black workers in close proximity to the places where 
their labor was needed and contain them when it was not.9 There were four such hostels on the 
Point, and they provided housing, meals, leisure clubs, and beerhalls at the cost of curfews, 
                                               
7 Far from a phenomenon of the segregationist or apartheid regimes, van der Merwe traces the origins of racially discriminatory 
social security provisions in south Africa to a 1705 decision in the Cape to cut previously equal poverty alleviation payments for 
Africans to half the payments made to whites. He argues, this “marks the start of a social security system that was to discriminate 
on the groups of race for almost three centuries” (van der Merwe 1997:97). 
8 Durban’s approach to the threat posed by Indians was threefold: residential segregation, political exclusion, and commercial 
suppression. While segregation efforts would not be successful for another few decades, limits on trade licenses and political 
representation were implemented early.  
9 The first hostel for dock-workers in Durban was built as early as 1878 (Hempson 1979). 
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overcrowding, and filthy facilities. In addition to control, these “services”, often referred to in 
Native Administration documents as “welfare,” served other purposes (Hempson 1979). Profits 
from the municipal beerhalls, which by 1909 held a monopoly over beer production in the city, 
funded any investments into welfare, housing, administration or services for the black African 
population. The architecture of this ‘Durban System’—which would later be replicated 
throughout the country—had a profound impact on the provision of welfare for black Africans in 
the following decades (la Hausse 1992; Swanson 1976). 
 White poverty was first formalized as a category of intervention in the Transvaal 
Indigency Commission of Enquiry of 1906-1908 (Transvaal Government 1908). The 
Commission drew upon broader intellectual tropes circulating in Britain in which social issues 
were explained through biological precedent (Jones 1980). Social Darwinism provided the 
Commission a moral universe that linked nature and society and in which “poverty was both a 
symptom of a sick society and a sickness in itself” to be cured and prevented (Lange 2003:145). 
The Commission created a classification of poverty that separated poor whites—those 
structurally lacking the necessities of life—from the (non-white) chronically poor who were, by 
nature, ignorant, lazy, and indigent. Within this poverty hierarchy, decreasingly ranked from the 
unemployed to the criminal, intervention was needed to ensure that poor whites did not "fall 
from the ranks of civilization," a status that was racially marked.10 But, biological explanations 
for poverty had to be handled carefully, lest the Commission alienate the rising Afrikaner 
nationalist movement by arguing that the predominance of Afrikaners amongst poor whites was 
due to inferior and irredeemable biology (Dubow 1995). Thus interventions had to be targeted at 
both an environmental and an individual level. Unemployment was to be addressed through job 
                                               
10 Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission, 1906-1908 (T.G. 13-08) para 7. 
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creation in the mines and railroads and moral and economic regeneration was to take place 
through state-based education and temporary charity.  
 Charity in the early twentieth century was to look very different from that of the 
nineteenth century and was based on quite different principals. During this time, Victorian 
reforms moved the basis of aid from one of sentiment to that of knowledge of the poor and what 
was best for them (Lange 2003). Prior to the Union of South Africa in 1910, poverty relief was 
provided mainly by churches and Afrikaans women’s groups on an individualized and piecemeal 
basis.11 With the union, the partnership between voluntary and state-based welfare was 
formalized and the work of private welfare organizations became more nationally coordinated. 
The poor whites thus became a categorized segment of the population about which knowledge 
was to be produced and tracked (Rose 1999). 
 Even with the creation of the category of ‘poor whites,’ the Transvaal Commission still 
understood white poverty to be a transitory, primarily rural, issue. But, between 1905 and 1910, 
high infant mortality rates recorded by the Cape Town Medical Officer of Health prompted the 
introduction of child protection legislation across the colonies that included the founding of a 
voluntary child welfare society and the provision of preventative health care units (Clark 1999). 
By 1913, the conditions in towns worsened, and the crisis of poverty became endemic. The 
danger of poor whites became the threat they posed to the tenuous hierarchy of race and class 
through their tendency to "sink into apathetic indigency and to fall below the level of the non-
European worker” (Merriman 1913: 10).12 Not only did poor whites embody a lower level of 
civilization than what was expected of their race, under the eugenic logic of the day, their social 
                                               
11 For more on these groups and their relationship to Afrikaner nationalism see Hofmeyr 1987, Butler 1989, and du Toit 2003. 
12 From the Report of the Select Committee on European Employment and Labour Conditions (S.C. 9-13) para 2. This language 
also reflects the larger colonial trend of investigations of white poverty being sites for the defense of middle-class European 
ideals. For more on this see Stoler 2002. 
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degradation was inheritable and could thus lead to the devolution of the entire white race (Lange 
2003). Poor whites were thoughts to have intermarried too much and had produced “weak 
minded people who, although technically responsible, had not developed their moral sense” 
(Lange 2003: 148). 
 Within this new framing, the solution was to control the reproduction of the entire class 
through a network of institutions: educational, penal, and centralized charity distribution as part 
of a larger “civilizing mission” (Stoler 1992). These institutions allowed for systematized 
observation and knowledge production about the poor driven by an overarching “scientification” 
of poverty in which the deployment of policy-relevant expertise and models of social 
engineering were used to respond to the crises (Breckenridge 2014; Swanson 1977; Dubow 
2006). Intervention became focused on childrearing and education because children with “poor” 
upbringing were seen as ill equipped for a future at the top of a racial hierarchy and thus posed a 
danger to the nation. The deficiencies of poor white families were to be compensated for by the 
school’s efforts to discipline children into the habits of hard work, temperance, and thrift as well 
as to solidify within them a notion of their superior white identity. The Prisons and 
Reformatories Act of 1910 solidified the relationship between penalization and education by 
placing the industrial schools under the administration of the prison. The Children’s Protection 
Act of 1913 put all children under the protection of the state and gave the state authority to 
intervene in their care, though in practice provision centered on non-black children (Bhorat 
1995). All births had to be reported to the state to ensure newborn health and medical inspections 
were brought into schools. Addington Primary school in the Point neighborhood began to keep 
regular records of children with recurring health-related attendance problems and started a free 
lunch program for its poorest pupils. While these reforms were designed to address the needs of 
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all vulnerable children, in practice, most provisions were limited to non-black children with very 
few black African beneficiaries (Bhorat 1995). 
 The onset of World War I temporarily reduced unemployment and turned state 
preoccupations elsewhere. But the mining profitability crisis, spike in unemployment, and 
growing social unrest that followed the war caused a dramatic shift in how poor whites were 
apprehended. What had been understood as a social and ideological problem was transformed in 
the 1921 Report of the Unemployment Commission into a national danger that could bring about 
political upheaval. These fears were affirmed when a series of violent mining strikes including 
the infamous Rand Revolt of 1922 demonstrated that workers were willing to seize arms 
(O’Meara 1983; Bozzoli 1978a&b). Racial mixing between poor whites and non-whites that had 
been previously labeled as immoral and a threat to racial purity now took on a more ominous 
tone in which the ultimate nightmare was a political union that crossed racial lines and upended 
the ruling class (Freund 1988). Extensive attempts were made to clear the racially integrated 
slums in the urban centers, but greater emphasis was placed on the removal of non-whites than 
providing housing for those whites already in the city and slum conditions persisted (Parnell 
1988).13 Increasing industrial development brought an influx of whites, mainly women, into the 
cities and when they could not afford the accommodation deemed suitable for their race, they 
rented rooms from coloureds and Indians, perpetuating problematic miscegenation (Brink 1978).  
The psychiatrist Louis Freed documented that, despite widespread prostitution and sexual 
diseases across all races during this time, responses were quite different (1949). Over the 
subsequent decades, white women and their progeny were pulled out of this sexual economy 
through a number of labor and welfare laws aimed at promoting poor white families and a 
                                               
13 In doing so, the government had to carefully negotiate a competing set of demands first from whites seeking protection of a 
desired standards of living and second from employers wanting cheap African labor (Davie 2005). 
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massive investment in white education that further promoted their preferential position in the 
labor market during the apartheid era. One such law was the 1921 Child Protection Amendment 
Act, which provided the foundations for what would later become the State Maintenance Grant 
to help support mothers and children who had lost their attachment to a wage-earning spouse 
(Mase 2013). Destitute mothers were given a “Mother’s Pension” in a bid to prevent the removal 
of a child whereas maintenance grants were given to for children placed with foster-parents 
under Children’s act 1921(Muirhead 2012). Women classified as Indian, coloured, or black 
African were largely excluded from this policy on the basis of “the 'civilised labour' view that 
people accustomed to modern lifestyles and consumption patterns [e.g. whites] had greater need 
of social protection” (van der Berg 1997:485). Instead, Indian and coloured single mothers—
often labeled as prostitutes regardless of their practices—were given counseling in moral reform 
whereas black African women were subject to increasing levels of governmental control and 
when apprehended, were sent back to the rural areas where they could be supported and 
reformed by their families.  
 To prevent the feared non-racial union of the working class, intervention had to be made 
not just at the physical level, but also at the ideological. Political movements, in their effort to 
capture the poor white vote, emphasized racial solidarity over class solidarity and laws such as 
the Civilised Labor Policy of 1924 that sought to substitute poor whites for unskilled blacks, all 
reaffirmed race as the crucial marker of difference.14 Education, too sought to indoctrinate white 
children as to their superior status. White upliftment became a nationalist project and part of the 
                                               
14 According to Freund and Parnell, the Civilised Labor Policy did little to increase the employment of poor whites at the lowest 
levels and served primarily to exacerbate the housing problem by making construction more expensive because it required the 
employment of poor whites (1988). 
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reconstruction of the post-war Afrikaner volk (Groenewald 1987).15 The Pact government, which 
began in 1924, expanded poverty relief in an effort to discipline poor whites into a productive 
and conformist working class (van Onslen 1982; Clynick 1996). In addition, as Seekings argues 
that the legislation that came out of the 8 years of Pact leadership laid the foundation for the 
welfare state through the work of the 1926 Pienaar Commission on Old Age Pensions and 
National Insurance that recommended the state enact non-contributory old-age pensions and 
disability grants and the 1928 Old Age Pensions Act (2007). At the same time, the landless, rural 
poor were placed in state settlements where they became wards of the state and were instilled 
with the values of hard work and ‘proper’ comportment (Davies et. al. 1976). 
 A critical part of enacting proper white citizenship was to embody the ideals of white 
motherhood. Both within the work camps and the urban centers, child-rearing practices were the 
site of intervention and were subject to extensive regulation (Roos 2003). This development fit 
the larger colonial trend of white poverty igniting concerns over “sexual, moral, and racial 
affronts to European identity" and the use of childrearing to police its boundary (Stoler 
2002:153). The ranks of child welfare societies swelled to over 100 by 1924.16 Social welfare 
reforms and protective legislation focused intense energy on the home as “the preparatory 
environment for civic responsibility” and mothers, in particular for their guiding role (Stoler 
1992:518). The newly formed position of social worker ensured that children were given formal 
education and that their upbringing was in accordance with the standards of the day. Their role 
was to address the overriding concerns with maternal inadequacy through both education and 
discipline. A variety of poverty relief cum social engineering programs—targeting primarily 
                                               
15 This is not to suggest that racist ideology was only imposed from above. Poor whites themselves did a great deal of interpretive 
work to differentiate themselves from other races and they often relied on the exploitation of other racial groups even poorer than 
themselves. See Freund and Morrell 1988. 
16 These would have been primarily non-state voluntary service organizations (Roos 2003). 
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white women—were initiated that included free meals for expectant mothers, summertime baby 
camps, dental clinics and mother-craft training (Berger 1983).17  Yet, even with these intensified 
interventions, the number of poor whites continued to grow, nearly tripling in the years between 
1916 and 1933 and demanding a new level of response (Parnell 1988:120).18 
The middle class white ideal was not reserved for that race group alone. For urban black 
African women, especially those among the mission-educated Christian elite, a reorientation of 
household labor and maternal duty towards a nuclear family model was an integral part of their 
conversion and progress towards a modern condition. Indeed, for these women, “Christianity 
was as much about a specific family form, of which they were the linchpin, as about a new faith 
in Christ” (Gaitskell 1983:242). Mission schools and church groups trained women in proper 
childcare practices, housework, and sexual modesty. However, this domestic ideology was 
fraught with contradictions for black women. First, housework training was as much about 
capacitating future housewives as it was about creating skilled domestic servants for white 
houses and ensuring a robust African workforce.19 Second, low wages for black Africans meant 
that “most African women could not afford to be full-time housewives and mothers, no matter 
how solid their marriage or devout their faith” (Gaitskell 1983:252). Temperance laws made 
navigating this contradiction all the more complicated for Christian women because beer 
brewing was one of the most lucrative work women could perform and it combined well with 
childcare and housework. Despite these challenges, many black women embraced the domestic 
ideology of the wife and mother as the linchpin of the family and guardian of virtue. As we saw 
                                               
17 As part of the larger colonial project an equivalent form of regulation of motherhood and domestic training also existed for 
Africans. In South Africa see Gaitskell 1983. 
18 Though difficult to measure, the number of government-defined “poor whites” nationally was recorded as 106,000 in 1916, 
120,000 in 1921, and 300,000 in 1933.  
19 Shockingly high infant mortality figures were recorded in Johannesburg in 1928 (705 deaths for every thousand African babies 
under one year versus 78 for whites) that, as Hunt has shown in other parts of the continent, produced enormous anxiety about the 
maintenance of a sufficient black labor force (1988,1999).   
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in the opening, claims to the right to live in families unbroken by migration and to care full-time 
for their children became a basis for struggle against a state that made such things impossible.20  
Thus, for both black and white women, mothering was not simply about social reproduction, but 
was tied to a larger obligation to uphold their respective races and, ultimately, their place in 
nation.  Their mothering became a right and a patriotic duty.  
 From 1929-1932, the state marshaled a veritable army of ‘experts’ to employ the latest in 
social scientific methods to address the poor white question in the first Carnegie Commission 
investigation.21 This massive project was the first to systematically map the supposed causes of 
white poverty and to significantly alter the living conditions of poor whites. Roos argues 
compellingly that the Commission’s landmark five-volume report on all areas of life provided 
what Ashforth calls, a "scheme of legitimation" for state welfare policy through to the 1980s 
(1990).22 But there is disagreement amongst scholars as to how the Commission framed the 
problem of white poverty and its solution. Seekings argues that while the Pact government put 
greater emphasis on changing the environment and opportunities of poor whites, the Carnegie 
Commission opposed measures such as protected employment and suggested the solution lay in 
‘rehabilitating’ poor whites through developing new personal and psychological qualities such as 
self-reliance and racial self-respect (Seekings 2008a). In contrast, Dubow and Davies suggest 
that though the Commission’s report was saturated with biological eugenic language, Malherbe, 
one of its primary authors and researchers eschewed biological determinism and believed instead 
in the power of the environment to shape human development (Davie 2005; Dubow 1995). 
                                               
20 Throughout this dissertation, I concur with Gaitskell that “Family life is and has long been for black women, something to 
struggle for, rather than against” (1983:254). 
21 Davie argues against much of the scholarship on the commission to suggest that its investigation was not the first use of more 
positivistic social science research methods, but instead reflected a blending of ethnography, interviewing, oral history, and 
survey instruments that included intelligence tests, questionnaires, and the collection of photographic evidence (2005). 
22 Ashforth defines this as: “sets of principals capable of explaining the problems faced by the state and justifying, by virtue of 
these explanations, the actions deemed necessary for the future of the state"(1990:3) see also Roos 2003:17. 
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 Regardless of theoretical debates over whether environmental or psychological factors 
were the motor of social change, economic reality shaped what kinds of interventions—or 
intervention recommendations—were possible. There was consensus in the report that though 
material support was needed for poor whites, such support would be ineffective to move poor 
whites out of their “degraded” state and “inferior mentality” unless they were compelled to 
internalize the right (i.e. middle-class) values (Malherbe 1932:xvii-xviii). In keeping with the 
larger European political shift of governance of the family to governance through the family, the 
Commission sought to use the family as the primary mechanism to reorganize social values 
across the class as a whole. The family thus became “an agent for transmitting the norms of the 
state into the private sphere” (Teppo 2004:37). The ideal was the economically self-sufficient 
family that solved its own problems and was not a ‘parasite to society.’ When families deviated 
from this ideal—as all poor whites did—they would be subject to surveillance and policing by a 
newly professionalized class of state agents: social workers (Donzelot 1979). 
 While the family as a unit was an object of concern to the Commission, motherhood and 
childrearing once again formed a primary focus. The investigation of the committee included a 
detailed study of mothers and daughters of poor whites and the transmission of maternal care 
practices (du Toit 1996). Mothers were framed as the ultimate caretakers of the home and the 
custodians of their children’s moral well-being. Upon them fell the responsibility to mold white 
children into god-fearing and productive exemplars of their race. The well-documented idealized 
figure of the volksmoeder (mother of the nation) celebrated a maternal piety that glorified 
women’s domestic duties and linked the health of the home to the health of the nation—
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conceived of as white Afrikanerdom—by laying the future of both on the shoulders of mothers.23 
The result was that in the years following the Commission, the government implemented many 
of the Commission’s recommendations including establishing a new Department of Social 
Welfare and Pensions in 1937 which, in addition to the 1937 Children’s Act, gave the 
government greater leeway over the management of poor white families and white mothers via 
the mechanism of welfare.24  
An important aspect of the Act was an increased focus on child grants that were much 
more targeted. In contrast to the “Mother’s Pensions” of the 1921 Act, there was much stricter 
regulation of the spending of the monies-specifically on childrearing necessities and no so-called 
“luxury goods” were allowed. Each grant recipient was allocated a supervisor to oversee how 
grants were spent and to ensure the grants did the work of rehabilitating families (Muirhead 
2012). This said, following reforms in 1942, grant amounts were adjusted to enable caregivers to 
live off of them without seeking employment outside the home (Patterson 1953). Though the 
grants were made available to women of all races with low incomes and large numbers of 
children, eligibility was difficult and payments were highly unequal (Clark 1999).25 A child with 
a father deemed capable of working was considered ineligible for the grant and children had to 
maintain school attendance to retail eligibility.26 All other avenues of support had to be 
exhausted before an application for a maintenance grant in respect of an urban Black child could 
                                               
23 There is sharp disagreement as to the role of women in the creation of the volksmoeder image. Those who argue it was 
primarily a male construction include: Gaitskell and E. Unterhalter (1989), Brink (1978), and Mc Clintock (1995). Those who 
emphasize women’s involvement in its production include Kruger (1991), Vincent (1999, 2000), and du Toit (2003). 
24 Wylie notes that, until an overhaul of the Department of Native Affairs post-1948, this department administered poor relief to 
both blacks and whites (2001). 
25 For example, in 1948 the monthly maximum for the maintenance grants were £23L for whites, £11,10s for coloureds, £9L for 
Indians and £4L for black Africans (Patterson 1953:119). In contrast to welfare regimes in the North which tend to be 
undergirded by a commitment to some form of egalitarianism, instead in South Africa, welfare was meant to support and 
maintain a racial hierarchy. The trend is quite visible in the ratio of pension payments for different race groups. In, 1944, the ratio 
of payment amounts for whites, coloureds and Indians, and black Africans was 12:6:1. In, 1965 the ratio was 11:4:1;1975, 7:3:1; 
1980 3:2:1; and 1992 1.2 :1.1 :1 (Devereux 2007:545-546). 
26 Maintenance grants were payable to mothers, stepmothers or grandmothers or grandmothers for the care of a child where an 
order by the Children’s court had been made committing the child to their care. 
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be made.27 Despite these barriers, by the end of 1942, 13,276 whites, 5,816 coloureds, 3,034 
Indians and 190 blacks Africans were receiving maintenance grants (Iliffe 1987). Furthermore, 
the high level of supervision the grants entailed required a considerable work force. 
The newly created Department of Social Welfare was unique in its structure as a separate 
body independent from the Department of Labor where welfare services had previously been 
located. This reflected a different vision for the role of social welfare as not simply addressing a 
problem of unemployment, but signaling “a desire and urge to solve the problem of poverty and 
consequent retardation amongst a large section of the European population” (van Schalwijk 
1950:1). " Such solutions were meant to arise out of a careful and ‘scientific’ study and diagnosis 
conducted by professional social workers. Voluntary organizations, which provided the bulk of 
direct welfare services, were encouraged to employ trained and qualified social workers through 
a 75% subsidy of social worker salaries from the Department of Social Welfare.28 The Children’s 
Act outlined the regulatory mechanisms for social workers protection of children from 
inappropriate care and the terms under which the state would offer monetary assistance. Thus the 
social workers acted as key mediators in the relationship between the state and poor white 
families. 
 The years between the Carnegie Commission and the Second World War saw a dramatic 
reduction in the number of government-recorded poor whites. There was rapid growth in 
manufacturing in South Africa's industrial centers such as Durban, and the war stimulated not 
only manufacturing of consumer goods and war resources, it also increased activity at the port.29 
                                               
27 Once again, exclusion of black Africans was made on the basis that under customary law, no child would be without support. 
Furthermore, there was a concern that cash allowances to Black women would lead to a flood of rural women to the towns 
(Report of the Social Security Committee 1944). 
28 From 1938-1948 the number of social worker posts would go from 77 to 929 (Van Schalwijk 1950:2). 
29 The gross output of Durban's secondary industry rose from £13,599,000 in 1934-35 to £23,734,000 in 1939-40 to £49,275,000 
in 1945-46 (University of Natal 1952:19). 
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Black semi-skilled labor was replaced with white labor, heightened tariffs allowed for the 
expansion of secondary industries, and the state massively expanded its relief work 
employment.30 Additionally, by the late 1930s South Africa had the basis of a surprisingly 
extensive welfare state in which from 1938-1939 20% of the budget (approximately £10 million) 
of the new Department of Social Welfare went to ‘services of an essentially social welfare 
nature’ such as pensions, aid to farmers, and child welfare (Seekings 2008a: 515). Prior to 1939, 
the welfare program consisted of various contributory social insurance schemes providing for ill 
health, disability, unemployment, and retirement for most white and coloured workers. There 
were also a series of non-contributory social assistance schemes that provided means tested old-
age pensions as well as disability grants for white and coloured people (Seekings 2005). 31 Not 
only were African and Indian people excluded from these schemes, but coverage was far from 
comprehensive even for white or colored people.  
In the years leading up to 1948, demands grew for a more comprehensive system for all 
race groups. Following a series of commissions of inquiry on the expansion of benefits, in 1944 
the non-contributory old-age pension and disability grants was extended to Africans and in 1945 
unemployment insurance followed suit (Seekings 2007). In 1947 family allowances were 
introduced for all races except black Africans (despite the Social Security Committee’s 
recommendation that urbanised Africans should receive them). Unlike the maintenance grants, 
these allowances were for intact nuclear families with three or more children where one or more 
people were employed.  Eligibility was based on a minimum income. They were intended to 
compensate for the insufficiency of wages to meet the needs of raising families (Patterson 
                                               
30 By 1939 the central government had 98,000 jobs and 59% of these were made up of relief work (Abedin and Standish 
1985:41). 
31 Meaning that eligibility was based on income being below a threshold amount.  
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1953:116).32 With the arrival of apartheid in 1948, the Nationalist Party swiftly reversed the 
reforms to unemployment insurance, subsequently excluding African workers for the next 25 
years, but never abolished the non-contributory old-age pensions or disability grants (Seekings 
2007). 
 The expansion of state-directed welfare was indicative of an ideological shift in the 
understanding of the relationship between the state and its citizenry. During the Second World 
War, the circulation of documents such as the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied 
Service produced a new concept of citizenship in which all people were guaranteed certain 
“rights,” including social entitlements, regardless of their level of ‘civilisation’ (Dubow 2005). A 
radical transformation arose from state officials and elites embracing the idea that the state had a 
responsibility for ensuring the welfare of its citizens (Seekings 2005). The enhanced notion of 
state responsibility was also linked to the expansion of state power and regulation of the family 
to ensure a normative familial life and preserve the social order (Posel 2005). In the context of 
growing criticism of the non-interventionist state and the failure of markets to offer viable 
solutions to social problems, the state became the biggest actor in social engineering. Roos 
argues this resulted in a re-negotiation of a ‘contract of whiteness’ between poor whites and the 
state in which whites agreed to support the government in return for a guarantee of privileged 
status (2003). The maintenance of this contract became a condition of office for successive white 
governments and led to an expansion of state support for poor whites for the next thirty years.33 
                                               
32 The maximum monthly allowances in 1948 were £2 for whites, £1 for coloureds, and 15s for Indians (discontinued at the end 
of 1948). From 1947-1948, the minimum monthly income necessary to qualify for an allowance was decreased from £7L to £5L 
for whites and increased from £3,10s to £4,5s for coloureds following complaints that coloureds and Indians in some cases could 
obtain allowances exceeding that for whites. 
33 From 1930-1950 the state supported poor whites with employment, free housing and free medical care, education, and labor 
legislation (Abedin and Standish 1985:41). 
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 As Iliffe suggests, following its election in 1948, the National Party went on, “to 
elaborate the most extensive welfare system in Africa, a system which, like the apartheid 
programme, was born of urbanization, inequality, state power, and rampant technocracy” 
(1987:142). However, unlike welfare states of the North which were premised on some form of 
equality, the basis of this welfare system was to support and maintain racial hierarchy. Even 
before 1948, the differential treatment of the four race groups had already begun to have 
profound social and economic effects. The pervasive ideology of the time—in many ways altered 
by apartheid policies—was that state spending on each race group should be directly linked to 
their direct tax contributions. This was meant to ensure that a black African majority would not 
become a burden on the white minority (Sagner 2000). However, this welfare dogma was 
retained in the context of both influx control that limited black Africans access to urban 
employment and a ‘civilized labour policy’ under which wages where hierarchically allocated 
according to racial categorization. Here I concur with economist Servaas van der Berg about the 
primary role of labor market inequality—as opposed to differentiated access to wealth or social 
power—in shaping the patters of economic stratification by race that the post-apartheid 
government is at pains to overturn (2011).34 In the city of Durban, labor—and by extension 
welfare—inequality was felt all the more starkly because of the municipal government’s dogged 
refusal to spend more than what the beerhalls generated on services for Africans.  
 A number of economic push and pull factors contributed to a large influx of black 
African migrant labor into Durban in the years between 1935 and 1955 (Maylam 1995). Life in 
the rural reserves was growing increasingly unsustainable and families there depended more and 
                                               
34 In this article, van der Berg makes two, related, arguments. First, for the labor market as setting the limits of redistribution in 
the democratic era and second for the historic import of labor and wage inequality that allows us to see how apartheid was only 
one instantiation of a longer history of unequal economic distribution that shaped racially differentiated development 
opportunities (2011). 
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more on the wages sent home from men who migrated to work in the city. Not only did more 
men migrate, but they were migrating for much longer time periods.35 By the late 1940s, 
physician Sidney Kark found that 90% of the men between the ages of 20 and 25 were 
temporarily absent from the rural area of Pholela in Natal (1950). This had profound impacts on 
life in the rural reserves where, in the absence of husbands, women gained greater freedom and 
authority, but this came at the cost of greater labor burdens and the emotional stress of 
maintaining a long-distance marriage (Kark 1950; Hunter 2010; Moore and Vaughan 1994).  
This rapid influx also strained municipal infrastructure. Though in 1937 the city of 
Durban had become a proclaimed area, meaning that all black Africans were required to live in 
designated townships, hostels or licensed servants’ quarters, there was massive housing 
shortage.36 The city was in a dispute with both the central government and the business 
community as to who was to bear the cost of housing for Africans and the government’s 
investments had been was woefully insufficient (Maylam 1988&1988).37 In 1949, the Native 
Administration Department Manager, estimated that 30,000 of the 90,000 African males 
registered to work in Durban were without formal accommodation, which didn’t account for the 
thousands of unregistered women and children also present in the city.38 While black African 
women in most cases did not migrate to the cities unless they were divorced, in search of 
absconded men, or looking to support children born outside of marriage, they were present and, 
                                               
35 A 1943 survey conducted by Durban's Native Administration Department showed that the number of Africans employed by 
twenty-five of the city's industrial establishments, selected at random, rose from 3,904 in 1939 to 14,985 in 1943. By 1945 the 
total number of African males registered in employment by the Native Administration Department had reached 71,210 (TBD, 
3DBN, Crime, Unauthorised Shacks, file 4. Memorandum by Mrs. Maytom 22 February 1948).  
36 City of Durban, Mayor's Minutes, 1937, p25.  
37 From the 1920s to the 1950s the central government constantly reprimanded the Durban local authority for not spending 
enough of its native revenue account funds on African housing, the effect of which would relieve the central state of this burden 
(Maylam 1988). The account was predominantly funded through the sale of beer which, while profitable, was entirely insufficient 
to meet the need for housing investments and the city adamantly refused to use tax income on African expenses (Maylam 1983). 
38 TBD, 3DBN, Crime, Unauthorised Shacks, file 5. Correspondence of Havemann to Town Clerk ,30 July 1949. Note that these 
numbers are in a context where the total population of Durban was roughly 400,000 (Kuper et al. 1958:50-51).  
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though illegal residents, could (until the mid-1950s) carve out lives for themselves in the cracks 
between municipal legislation (Hunter 2010).39 This huge population of unhoused people slept 
predominantly in back rooms, parks, or in the sprawling shack settlements that ringed the city. 
These areas, deemed “black belts,” were widely perceived as hotbeds of crime, vice, and disease, 
as presented in University of Natal’s Housing survey: "the most serious threat to Durban's health 
and racial harmony lies in her slums and vast shack settlement, the breeding grounds of disease, 
crime, and despair made more dangerous by ignorance and neglect.” (1952:34). Far greater that 
those articulated threats were the concerns that these were highly unregulated spaces in which a 
great deal of informal trade and interracial mixing took place in areas quite close to the (white) 
city center.40 In response, the municipal government launched a massive effort to construct the 
racially segregated townships for non-whites, "far afield, where they would be cheaply housed, 
physically controlled, and politically contained" (Bozzoli 1991:166). One of the primary 
technologies of control was the township house, allocated only to married men, as a means of 
disciplining the workforce and refocusing labor to support a nuclear family (Hunter 2010). 41 So 
it was that though social spending on non-white racial groups increased gradually over time—
                                               
39 There is huge regional variation to patterns of female migration shaped by geographic differences in agricultural productivity, 
access to transport, and the impact of schooling and Christianity. While some have revealed that young, unmarried women were 
the least likely to migrate to cities (Schapera 1940; Walker 1990) Bozolli’s research demonstrated that in Pondoland, migration to 
town was a precondition to marriage (1991). We do know that between 1936 and 1946 the female African population of Durban 
doubled from 14,234 to 28,523. (TBD, 3DBN, Crime, Unauthorised Shacks, file 4. Memorandum by Mrs. Maytom 22 February 
1948). 
40 I do not mean to suggest that shack settlements arose solely out of necessity. Despite their lack of sanitation and formal 
housing, they offered a number of advantages: inexpensive housing; proximity to jobs and municipal transport; relative freedom 
from the regulation of townships or hostels; and numerous opportunities for independent trade, most notably beer brewing 
(Maasdorp and Humphreys 1975; Maylam 1983). Despite raids by the police in illicit liquor-distribution, by the late 1940s Cato 
Manor, one of Durban’s most notorious informal settlements was a hub for weekend socializing for residents and non-residents 
alike (TBD, 3DBN, Crime, Unauthorised Shacks, file 5. Memorandum by K.J. Clarke, n.d.1949).  
41 Responses to the relocation to township houses was uneven and most often the moved benefitted well-employed men accepted 
the transition because it gave them an opportunity to claim section 10 rights for a better house or for a house at all. Men who 
relied more on the shantytown community for their trade were less enthusiastic. Women, whose primary economic activities were 
tied to an illegal economy suffered the transitions the most because the lost not only their livelihoods, but also their tenuous hold 
on urban residence, as they could not claim a house without attachment to a working man (Sambureni 1997). It is also important 
to note that companies on the dock preferred migrant male labor from distant rural areas rather than the stabilized workforce in 
the townships because migrants would tolerate lower wages, longer hours, and work schedules (e.g. early Monday shifts) that 
township men would not (Hempson 1979; Sambureni 1997).  
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such as through the building of townships in the late 1950s and early 1960s—the motivation was 
frequently less an inclusion of Indians, coloureds and black Africans into the social citizenry and 
more an effort to exert control or mitigate potential conflict (Sagner 2000). Unrest in Durban 
such as the 1946 march against the Ghetto Act, 1949 race riots, 1952 defiance campaign, 1959 
beerhall protests and dockworkers slowdown, and the 1960 riots in Cato Manor only increased 
the state’s investment in containing political activism.42 
By the late 1950s, the ‘poor white problem’ was largely thought to have been solved, but 
the nightmare of poor whites continued to loom large in the social imaginary. Throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, the number of whites in well-paid job categories increased dramatically, while 
the number of white unemployed and manual laborers decreased (O’Meara 1996). Though 
considered extinct, the specter of hordes of poor whites and the degeneration they were thought 
to beget were often mobilized as an argument for social policy or regulation. As apartheid 
became more entrenched and the boundaries of proper whiteness became more clearly defined, 
the more the remaining poor whites conflicted with the prevailing order and the more marginal 
and less respectable they became (Teppo 2004). The expansion of white affluence that marked 
the 50s and 60s led to increased expectations for white lifestyles and poor whites only fell further 
and further behind. As the ruling Nationalist Party ensured white employment in civil service, 
deviations from the norm of the hard-working white man became indefensible. Defying the very 
category of whiteness, Teppo suggests that poor whites “became anomalies in a social order that 
increasingly rejected the possibility of their existence” and were subject to ever-increasing 
stigmatization and regulation (2004:167 see also Hyslop 2000). So-called “work shy” men were 
                                               
42 This is by no means meant as an exhaustive list of the protests that took place between 1945 and 1960 as much as to say that, 
alongside the efflorescence of apartheid legislation, this was a time of fervent political action that shaped the domains in which 
the municipal and state government would invest, namely in the construction of townships and in police and surveillance 
equipment. 
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sent to labor camps and the extensive welfare system virtually ignored all other poor groups to 
ensure the eradication of this intolerable social category.  
 With apartheid, welfare provisions for whites became more expansive and redistributive 
whereas those for other racial groups became residual or phased out. The Population Registration 
Act of 1950 classified the population into four racial categories which determined not only 
differentiated access to voting rights, but also to welfare benefits. In 1949, the Department of 
Social Welfare spent the overwhelming majority of its budget on social assistance to whites who 
comprised 20% of the population—again, despite the fact that the poor white ‘problem’ was 
thought to not exist. Likewise, 75% of the voluntary organizations that provided the direct 
welfare services to the population catered to whites only.43 Whites had access to benefits such as 
free public education and public health care, subsidized housing, rent control, social grants, and 
community services such as luncheon clubs for the elderly, residential care, and rehabilitative 
social services (Patel 2011).  
In the early 1950s, the Department of Social Welfare transferred welfare responsibilities 
for African and coloured persons to the Departments of Bantu Administration and Coloured 
Affairs, respectively, with the Department of Indian Affairs being formed in 1961. The national 
government used its welfare subsidies to drive separation in the private welfare sector, 
mandating differences in salary, allocations of equipment and transport, and even diets for 
residents in welfare institutions on the basis of racial category. As one coloured social worker 
working in the Durban Child Welfare Society in the 1960s bitterly joked, “We worked in the 
same building doing the same things, but every last thing was separated. Even their [the white 
                                               
43 Department of Social Welfare spent £9,750,000 social assistance of which £8,300,000 went to whites, £800,00 to coloured and 
Indians and £600,000 to Africans. Whites were 20.9% of the population, coloureds and Indians 10.3%, and Africans 68% 
(Rheinalt-Jones 1949: 416). 
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employees] toilet paper was softer.” Government allocation for support in the welfare and 
education of children differed dramatically. In the case of maintenance grants, however, from the 
1960s onward, the largest number of beneficiaries were in the coloured and Indian race groups, 
though the amounts they received were far less than their white counterparts (see Figure 3.1).44  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of Maintenance Grants per thousand children aged 0-17 years (van der Berg quoted in Haarman 1998) 
 
Within the Indian and coloured populations, the dramatically smaller scale of welfare 
spending by the national government was compensated for in part by very active community and 
religious-based private welfare organizations, some of which were affiliated to the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) and the United Democratic Front (Lund 1996). While often poor, 
these long-established urban communities had robust family and neighbor networks that offered 
important support to residents. The construction of township housing did represent an investment 
in infrastructure and services for non-white populations. However, the forced removals and the 
relocation—and often separation—of communities to the townships on the peripheries of the city 
destroyed or disrupted this important informal welfare support. 
                                               
44 It is important to note why these differences existed. The size of the Indian and coloured populations were larger than the white 
population at this time and there were a greater proportion of families living in poverty. Numerically, the black African 
population was the largest and had the largest number of impoverished families, however barriers to access lowered the number 
of maintenance grants available to this race group.  
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There was widespread knowledge about the poor and deteriorating state of urban black 
Africans in the 1950s and 1960s. Surveys conducted on African incomes in the late 1950s and 
1960s clearly showed that average earnings for the majority of households were below any 
version of a poverty line.45 Notably, these surveys reveal that families’ spending exceeded 
earnings suggesting both income streams that were not disclosed to the researchers and the 
necessity of cycles of debt for subsistence (Watts and Lamond 1966). The impact of poverty took 
a particularly heavy toll on black African children who were found to have numerous poverty-
related health issues such as malnutrition and gastro-enteritis.46 Various groups such as Durban 
Municipal Welfare Clinics, Durban Bantu Child Welfare Creches, Kupugani, Our Daily Bread, 
and Cato Manor Welfare Huts provided a patchy network of aid in the form of childcare, 
subsidized milk powder to identified cases of malnourishment, feeding schemes, clinical care, 
relief rations and the more reliable old age pensions, disability grants, and maintenance grant. 
However, the amounts of the grant aid available to black Africans were also very low relative to 
other race groups, at levels consistently below the most conservative poverty data line.47 During 
this time, the grants also thwarted any attempts at accumulation—operating more like the welfare 
system in the United States post 1995 than South Africa’s current system.48 As one researcher 
pointedly stated: 
                                               
45 For example, a survey by the Department of Economics at the University of Natal estimated that a subsistence income for a 
family of five in Durban was £23-£24 per month in 1959. Workers living in Cato Manor/Umkhumbane were attempting to 
support their families on incomed of £11-£12 per month (University of Natal 1959). See also: Committee on Socio-Economic 
Surveys for Bantu Housing Research 1960 and Watts and Lamond 1966. 
46 In a 1966 survey of children in KwaMashu—thus the children of ostensibly better off, “stabilized” families living in township 
houses—90 percent were found to be living in poverty (Watts and Lamond 1966). 
47 On average, social assistance to black Africans totaled 14-24% of the poverty datum line, whereas the totals for Indians were 
more frequently at par or 1.5x the datum line, 2x for coloureds and 5x for whites (Watts and Lamond 1966).  
48 Grant recipients in this period had a maximum income they could not exceed that included both cash and the value of in kind 
payment such as food, clothing, and transport). Like the US welfare payments of 2000, income over this maximum amount 
would be deducted from the welfare payments. This system had particularly insidious effects in the case of maintenance grants, 
where the minimum was calculated regardless of the number of people in the household. For example, in 1966, the maximum 
income for a black African family receiving government grants was R10.50 per month and any additional income—even the 
disability grant of an incapacitated father—would be deducted. This income was 14% of the estimated poverty datum line for 
1966 (Watts and Lamond 1966). 
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 “in the case of Bantu families where the mother has to support her children on the 
basis of maintenance grant figures alone… her children would be ill or dead 
within a few months — the gap is too wide for even the most intelligent and the 
most competent housekeeper to even have the most remote chance of coping” 
(Watts and Lamond 1966: 123).49  
 
Further, as apartheid became more elaborated, many of the meagre services were cut: the 
1949 Bantu Education Act brought an end to school feeding schemes; black Africans were 
removed from eligibility for free milk in 1951, by 1960 all the Durban nursery schools had shut 
down due to lack of funding and training for teachers was eliminated. In a particularly cruel twist 
of fate, the beerhall protests in the early 1960s decreased the income to Durban’s native revenue 
account, resulting in deep cuts to welfare expenditures for black Africans in 1961 and 1962 
(Watts and Lamond 1966). 
Though unmarried motherhood in all racial groups was frowned upon both by state actors 
and by everyday citizens, it was an especially challenging lived reality for black African women 
such as Grace in the 1960s.50 Section 10 rules made it difficult for unmarried mothers to access 
housing, unless they did so through a job, which, in turn, often precluded care for a child. In the 
newly-constructed townships, there were fewer extended kin networks to help with childcare and 
frequently neighbors charged high rates (Watts and Lamond 1966). By the 1960s, the rural 
reserves were impoverished and unmarried women with children, who couldn’t otherwise expect 
to marry, often moved to town themselves.51 Some entered informal ‘kipita’ (ukukipita means ‘to 
                                               
49 Unlike the post-apartheid grants, the design of maintenance grants was to support a woman to stay at home and care for 
children without having to seek additional income.   
50 While there is little composite data on the incidence of single motherhood in Durban, the qualitative researchers conducting 
studies in the townships in the 1960s describe a situation where marriage was delayed for longer periods of time and growing 
infrequent and “[t]he incidence of pre-marital pregnancies amongst young Bantu girls in the towns is unfortunately fairly 
common” alongside a recognition of some of the economic environmental causes for this phenomenon: “[l]obola has been 
generally transformed into cash payments. However, given the low wage structure for Bantu workers, and the limited 
opportunities to save, this has resulted in the postponement of the age of marriage, and has contributed to a rise in the number of 
unmarried mothers” (Watts and Lamond 1966:288).  
51 Some industries, such as textile firms, preferred to hire black African women because they could pay them less than men 
(Sambureni 1997). Housing for these women would have been in single-sex hostels and productivity was maintained through 
mandatory contraceptive use to discourage childbearing (Westmore and Townsend 1979). The textile industry was a major 
source of Durban’s economic growth in the 1960s (Freund 1995). 
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keep’ in isiZulu) marriages in town with migrating men who were supporting a primary family in 
the reserves.52 While the terms of these marriages differed by couple—who paid for rent or food, 
duration of relationship, etc.—women frequently remained responsible for the children’s needs 
such as clothing and school fees but because of the relationship, would not be eligible for a 
maintenance grant.53  
 So it was that by the time Magdalena, Rosemary, and Grace encountered the social 
welfare system, it had become highly differentiated and fractured. In addition, the vision of 
welfare had moved from that of a human right to that of emergency relief in the context of 
assumed self-development. Indeed, as the former Deputy Secretary of Social Welfare said,  
“the responsibility of every citizen’s social security rests with the citizen himself. 
Only if his own efforts prove inadequate is the state prepared to step in with help 
and guidance. The independence of the individual, the family, and the community 
must be maintained and encouraged” (Quoted in Brummer 1964:3). 
 
Yet, the notion of “independence” in this statement belied the many form of intervention the 
state made to control the lives of non-whites and to shape the families of all races into particular 
kinds of social units. Critically, women’s maternal identity—how it was expressed and 
interpreted—sat at the nexus of “help and guidance” in the form of aid or discipline. 
 
The Making of Motherhood in Apartheid South Africa  
 Rosemary Dunn was a 32-year old single mother racially classified as “coloured”. She 
reached out to the Durban Child Welfare Society in April of 196254 a year after her husband, 
                                               
52 Because the children in these families were often not considered the primary responsibility of the wage-earning man, 
researchers identified children in these relationships as particularly vulnerable to poverty, malnourishment, or abandonment 
(Watts and Lamond 1966). 
53 Phillip Mayer provides a detailed account of how these relationships worked in East London in the same time period (1961).  
54 So-called voluntary organizations such as the Society provided the bulk of social service delivery at this time with subsidies for 
personnel and operating budgets coming from the national government. In Durban, the Durban Child Welfare Society provided 
casework for children 12 and under while the cases of older children were handled by the provincial branch of the Department of 
Social Welfare (Lund 2008). 
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Michael, had died, according to her report, and had left Rosemary, unemployed, with three 
young children: Christopher, approximately eight years old; Linda, four; and Ernest two.55 She 
was referred to the Department of Coloured Affairs to apply for public assistance and a 
maintenance grant, but never received the money because she did not provide the appropriate 
documentation for the children—i.e., their birth certificates—and moved before the application 
could be processed, leaving no forwarding address. She was a client of the Durban Child Welfare 
Society off and on from 1962-1970 working with two social workers, Mrs. Smith and Mrs. 
Walljee. Over the course of that time, her children were removed from her care and sent to a 
children’s home four times for the violation of abandonment. These removals occurred first, in 
1962, for leaving her children all day “without supervision and food” and in the care of the 
neighbors in order to work, the second in 1963 when she gave birth to an illegitimate son Peter, 
and again in 1964 and 1969 when she was imprisoned for theft and fraud for listing the Society 
as a guarantor for her purchase of furniture on credit.56  
 Despite these transgressions, and despite Rosemary’s non-compliance, often hiding the 
children from the social worker’s and refusing to produce necessary documentation, the Society 
offered Rosemary a great deal of support. The social workers frequently organized grocery 
donations and household furniture and arranged for Rosemary to receive a monthly maintenance 
grant. Upon her release from prison in 1962, the Society procured her a house in a newly created 
coloured township on the outskirts of the city57 and arranged for the rent paid by the local 
Catholic Church, even retaining the house for her when she was re-imprisoned in 1969. 
                                               
55 TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/280/63. Christopher’s birthdate is the subject of debate 
throughout the file as Rosemary is thought to have falsified birth records. In 1969, when according to the birthdate on the file, 
Christopher would have been 15, he was tried for car theft as a 20-year old. 
56 TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/280/63. 
57 In the 1960s this would have been predominantly people classified as coloured and Indian (Chari 2006). 
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Additionally, in each case, Rosemary’s children were returned to her custody within weeks of 
their removal.  
 Rosemary’s case reveals a complex relationship between the Durban Child Welfare 
Society and its clients. Rosemary was brought under case management because she transgressed 
from the ideal motherhood paradigm. But, the arguments made for the substantial support 
provided for by the society were done in the name of her actions as a good mother. It is worth 
considering what attributions of problematic and beneficial motherhood were called out by the 
social workers and how they were weighed against one another to legitimate intervention into 
Rosemary’s family life.  
 One of Rosemary’s primary transgressions was her inability to “maintain a proper home 
environment.” In the report from her first visit with Rosemary, Ms. Smith devoted a great deal of 
space to an evaluation of the housing conditions in which Rosemary was living. She described 
the room by saying, “[t]he room is maintained in a filthy condition and there is no furniture. The 
family sleeps on the floor—there are two threadbare, filthy blankets and four pillows. There are 
no cooking facilities and no pots or crockery…Communal toilet facilities of the pail system are 
provided.” Also, there was no garden for the children to play.  
 These critiques of Rosemary’s home arose out of a larger conflation of living space with 
social habits that characterized government intervention in South Africa in the 1960s.58 While 
single-family homes were thought to foster discipline and responsibility, apartments were seen as 
too “easy” and “spoiled” families by encouraging them to go out on the town instead of engaging 
in family activities at home.59 Apartments and their lack of outdoor recreation space were even 
                                               
58 For a discussion on how this paradigm functioned in government action around Africans, see Posel, 2006. 
59 Report of Committee of Inquiry into Family Allowances 1961:14. 
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cited by one government commission as a cause of inadequate care and upbringing of children.60 
Given these concerns, the social workers went to great length to restructure Rosemary’s home 
environment in terms of her housing. In contrast to her prior space, the housing that the Society 
found Rosemary included running water and flush-toilets. Ms. Smith noted, “The room is large 
and well-ventilated…[and is] maintained in a neat and clean manner.”61 Also, an outdoor space 
was available for the children to play. The refiguring of space was seen to have helped to 
discipline Rosemary into becoming a more ideal mother. 
 A second cause of Rosemary’s improper care of her children was her “inadequate 
spiritual care and the absence of positive religious convictions”.62 Ms. Smith was initially critical 
of the lack of involvement of religion in the life of the Dunn family. But, after intensive 
casework, Rosemary was reported to be going to church regularly—indeed, the same church that 
was paying her rent—and Ms. Smith continuously emphasized Rosemary’s re-invigorated 
religious spirit as evidence of the progress Rosemary was making. Ms. Smith used Rosemary’s 
realization of her “religious duties and moral obligations” as one of the key rationales for 
returning the children to their mother’s care.63   
 A third concern was that Rosemary initially attempted to work to support her children. As 
part of maintaining the imagined ideal home environment, women were not supposed to 
“needlessly” work and leave their children uncared for during the day. Indeed, it was because 
Rosemary left her children during the day with the neighbors that the Durban Child Welfare 
Society re-invigorated their relationship with the Dunn family. As a single mother, the 
proscription to stay at home was more complicated. The Society “assisted and encouraged” 
                                               
60 Ibid. p. 24. 
61 TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/280/6.3. 
62 Report of Committee of Inquiry into Family Allowances,1961: 23. 
63 TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/280/63. 
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Rosemary to find employment, but she was frequently listed as being unemployed. Instead, the 
Society arranged for groceries, rent payments, and furniture. At the close of the case, Rosemary 
was granted a Maintenance Grant, the amount of which would have been roughly equivalent to 
the salary of a menial job such as a hotel maid. It would not have been sufficient on its own to 
support the family without the help of the Society but it did allow Rosemary not to work. Indeed, 
as one commission report noted, “the main object of the introduction of maintenance grants was 
to enable mothers or foster-mothers to look after their children without being forced to seek 
employment away from home and in the open labour market.”64 In this way, with the Society 
acting in the role of the husband provider, Rosemary could maintain the proscribed gender role 
of the full-time mother. 
 One of Rosemary’s greatest successes as a mother was the affective bond she shared with 
her children. Following each of the times that the children were removed to a Children’s home, 
Ms. Smith noted that Rosemary “begged that the children be returned to her and the children 
were obviously anxious to return to her.”65 Despite the fact that Rosemary had deceived Ms. 
Smith by hiding the children before they could be removed, in her list of “positive factors” of 
Rosemary’s character, Ms. Smith included Rosemary’s “refusal to part with the children and her 
anxiety to have them returned to her” and “the strong bond of affection between mother and the 
children.” 66 This perceived bond formed an integral part of Ms. Smith’s argument that Rosemary 
be allowed to keep her children. It was effective, in part, because it resonated with prevailing 
beliefs that mothers should feel intense love and attachment to their children and that their good 
care as mothers would arise out of this emotional bond.67  
                                               
64 Ibid. p. 73. 
65 TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/280/63. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Report of the Family Congress, 1961:17. 
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 Despite her deviance from the maternal ideal, we see that the social worker’s used 
Rosemary’s successes to legitimate continued support and cast her as a woman capable of 
learning to be a competent mother. Such an argument was no small task. She was known to have 
abandoned her children without food and care during the day and had maintained a squalid 
home. On at least two occasions was imprisoned for theft and fraud, including using the Society 
as a guarantor for debts. In addition, she was continuously duplicitous in her dealings with the 
society. Yet, the social worker reframed her time in prison as a removal from the negative 
influence of friends and a form of rehabilitation. Her theft and fraud was labeled not as criminal, 
but as a problem of “living beyond her means”, fixable through further counseling. A change in 
her housing was noted to have brought about improvements in her housekeeping. And, critically, 
the emotional bond between her and her children was continuously emphasized. With these 
arguments in place, the social worker concluded:  
“The case history reveals the mother to be an unsatisfactory and unfit person to 
exercise control over her children. However, this does not mean that the children 
would benefit from removal from her custody...this mother can be helped to care 
for her children. Therefore, she should be given the opportunity to keep her 
children.” 68 
 
The social worker’s mobilization of Rosemary’s maternal successes to maintain the 
Society’s support were quite unique. To understand how, we must compare Rosemary’s case to 
others. 
In 1960, Magdalena Amos, a white Afrikaans mother, approached the Durban Child 
Welfare Society for assistance with food and clothing. Her husband, who was a casual laborer on 
the docks, had not brought home any money in a month, and Magdalena and her 4 children were 
desperate. Since 1947, Magdalena had had a long history of coming to the Society for assistance, 
                                               
68 TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children, unboxed, case number 33/2/4/280/63. 
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always at intervals spaced 6 months or more apart. This time, though the Society assisted her, 
they also began more intensive casework and were displeased with what their investigations 
revealed. The social workers levied critiques of money mismanagement and overindulgence in 
liquor alongside accusations of parental neglect. What began as a case to argue against further 
assistance for the family, ended with the children’s removal to state institutions. Across the case, 
in letters and court testimonies, Magdalena mobilized her maternal identity to simultaneously 
make a case for her need and defend against her children’s removal.  
Magdalena was well-versed in the welfare landscape of Durban and how best to frame 
her appeals for support. As a white, Afrikaans woman, she was able to seek aid from a number of 
different agencies such as the Benevolent Society, the Dutch Reformed Church, and the Railway 
Welfare, based on her husband’s job. For scheduled visits, social workers were sure to find a tidy 
home, with Madgalena present and presiding over the children. Often on days when the social 
worker had visited her home, Magdalena would visit the DCWS office unannounced to report 
another woman for a possible case of neglect. In one instance, she reportedly did this while 
drunk.69 In moments such as these, Magdalena positioned herself as the defender of child welfare 
and the arbiter of good motherhood, thereby attempting to remove herself from possible rebuke. 
Magdalena’s carefully calibrated relationship with the Society was disrupted when an 
intimate neighbor reported her as neglecting her children. The reporter was Agatha, a recent 
divorcee, whom Magdalena had taken in, along with her three children, as a subletter to help 
with the rent. The women shared and frequently fought over the childcare responsibilities and 
domestic labor. After a particularly raucous fight, even ending in blows, over whose 
responsibility it was to remove the washing from the bathtub, Agatha retaliated by calling two 
                                               
69 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59. 
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welfare agencies to report Magdalena for neglect. Not only did Agatha report Magdalena, but she 
testified at the Children’s Court hearing as to Magdalena’s inadequacy as mother.  In letters, 
testimony, and visits with the social worker, Magdalena worked diligently to translate her actions 
into a definition of motherhood that was acceptable to the state. Her inability to do so ultimately 
resulted in the court’s removal of the children to state institutions. 
A primary domain in which Magdalena’ conduct deviated from that of the ideal mother in 
1960 was in the social life she cultivated beyond the house. The primary place of maternal 
caregivers in the 1960s was in the home, taking care of the domestic duties of cooking, cleaning, 
and childrearing. A mother’s life was supposed to be an interiorly-oriented one to provide the 
basis of support for a man engaged in the public role of income generation. This housebound 
requirement was an especially difficult burden for poor women. Even in the case of Magdalena’s 
family, where there was a male breadwinner, at the lowest levels, wages often did not support all 
of a family’s needs. However, women’s work outside the home was still seen as unnecessary. 
For a woman to separate herself from her children to “needlessly” work was considered 
negligent (Clowes 1994). 
In her trial testimony, Agatha testified that Magdalena went out all day and sometimes 
part of the night while her children remained at home. She was accused of being “more 
interested in outside activities than her children”.70 These accusations brought up concerns both 
of maternal negligence and respectability. To suggest that Magdalena was out at night was to 
suggest that she was consorting with men who were not her husband and, because of the hour, 
served as a subtle hint that Magdalena might be engaging in prostitution. For the social worker, 
                                               
70 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59. Testimony by Mrs. 
Erander Smith. Children’s Court trial 17 January 1960. 
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Mrs. Glynn, Magdalena’ activities outside of the house were in opposition to her expected role as 
wife and mother. 
In her letters and testimony, Magdalena worked to bridge the discrepancies between the 
activities she engaged in outside of the home and the interiorly-oriented ideal of the wife and 
mother invoked by the social worker and Agatha. She argued that her activities outside were a 
critical part of her household duties and an extension of her maternal responsibilities, not neglect 
of them. She said she did not go out an “unnecessary” amount, but instead needed to go out to 
take care of shopping and to “see to business” to run the household.71 When she went out at 
night, Magdalena claimed, she was visiting her husband who worked on the docks—thereby 
reinscribing her potentially adulterous actions under the banner of matrimonial loyalty. 
Who provided care for the children while Magdalena was out of the house was also a 
domain in which Magdalena was critiqued. Agatha testified that Magdalena left her children 
“just in the care of native servants, who lay on the floor of the kitchen and went to sleep.”72 This 
criticism was a slippery one that speaks to the complex relationship between mistresses and 
domestic labor. On the one hand, there was a long tradition in South Africa of black men and 
women assisting in the childrearing and domestic labors in white homes. In 1959, the presence of 
such staff was seen as critical to reproducing racial hierarchies in which black labor, viewed as 
more suitable for “lower” level jobs, freed up white labor for high-level functioning and white 
mistresses were conscripted to educate black staff in the respectability of white domestic life 
(Cock 1989). Magdalena’s family, with their tenuous hold on working class status, would have 
felt the need for such racial distinction acutely. 
                                               
71 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59 Testimony by Mrs. 
Green. Children’s Court trial 22 March 1960. 
72 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59 Testimony by Mrs. 
Green. Children’s Court trial 10 March 1960. 
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On the other hand, black domestic caregivers were also seen as an insufficient and 
inappropriate substitute for white maternal care. Especially in the area of food preparation, as 
food was a symbol of maternal care and thereby was not supposed to be prepared by anyone 
except the mother. There was a great deal of social anxiety about the “damaging influence of the 
native nursemaid” on the health of white children, especially amongst poor whites who were 
seen as already too intimate with black lives (Stoler 2001: 850-851). Good white mothers, then, 
were to have help, but also were expected to closely supervise the contact between those 
domestic servants and their charges. In this way, Magdalena’ behavior was viewed as doubly 
problematic. First, she was inadequately asserting her racial superiority by failing to educate and 
chaperone her black staff. And, second, she left her children to the vagaries of what was seen as 
semi-civilized care. In response, Magdalena sought to do away with the complicated labor 
relations all together by arguing that her children were left in the care of her 19-year old 
daughter, Joanna. A white woman and elder kinswoman, there was little room to dispute about 
the acceptability about Joanna as a caregiver. 
Magdalena was also criticized for what was characterized as inadequate and unacceptable 
food provision. Agatha testified that the children were given “only milk and bread” and were 
regularly undernourished. She went on to say: 
“On several occasions, I had to give Magdalena’ children food when Mrs. 
Amos was away because she left no food in the house and the children were 
hungry. She often told me she had given her boy money to buy food for the 
children, but I don’t know what he did with it or if he ever got it…I was just 
renting part of the dining room...There was never any arrangement that I would 
look after Magdalena’ children during her absence.”73 
 
                                               
73 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59 Testimony by Mrs. 
Green. Children’s Court trial 10 March 1960.  
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This quotation reveals a trifecta of maternal critique. Magdalena spent time outside of the house. 
While she was away, where she purportedly should not have been, her children were hungry. To 
allow one’s children to go hungry was the ultimate maternal transgression. Magdalena attempted 
to turn this criticism into a testament of her own money management. She responded, “I pay all 
my household commodities as I can afford them. When I have money, I buy groceries. When I 
have no money, we don’t buy anything.” In this statement, Magdalena worked to position herself 
as a responsible money manager with well-aligned priorities, living under conditions of duress.  
Magdalena went on to deny that Agatha fed her children regularly and instead argued that 
she fed Agatha’s children. It is likely that both were true and common enough; however, by this 
point, Agatha held more power in the courtroom. Magdalena attempted to defend herself by 
reasserting herself as an attentive mother and by discrediting Agatha. She argued that she gave 
her children milk and bread because they preferred it—thereby setting herself up as more attuned 
to her children’s preferences—and that she regularly bought vegetables—signaling she knew 
about proper nutrition. Additionally, Magdalena continued, she not only cared for the welfare of 
her own children, but also ensured the welfare of Agatha’s children: 
“I would not have taken her [Agatha] in but for the sake of her children, for they 
were put out of a house and had nowhere to go, so I took them in though it was 
making the house crowded…. Agatha for one has such a lot to say about my home 
why couldn’t she keep her home together.”74 
 
Here Magdalena attempted to undercut Agatha as morally superior, saying that it was Magdalena 
who saved Agatha, a divorcee, and her children from a life on the street as a result of Agatha’s 
inability to maintain a nuptial home. 
                                               
74 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59 Letter from Mrs. Amos 
to the Commissioner of Child Welfare. 
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A final domain of Magdalena’s maternal failure was around the consumption of alcohol. 
Respectable, Christian mothers were expected to abstain from alcohol or only sip demurely on 
holidays or festive occasions. The evidence suggests that Agatha and Magdalena both drank a 
great deal, together and with mixed company in their house. While also pleasurable, such actions 
were often important in forging relationships with other men or women who could be called 
upon later for favors or resources. These parties would have reduced the social isolation that was 
common in poorer, more transient neighborhoods such as the Point and which left poor families 
more vulnerable (Gordon 1988). 
However, such conduct was highly frowned upon in the context of children and 
highlighted the disjuncture of Magdalena’ actions with those of a respectable mother. Through 
her testimony and her letters to the magistrate, Magdalena continuously argued that not only did 
she engage in many of the practices of the ideal mother, but that, when she did not, it was still in 
the service of good motherhood. Clearly Agatha also engaged in conduct deemed problematic, 
but the children’s court case was not an evaluation of her. By reporting Magdalena to the 
welfare, Agatha brought in a level of authoritative surveillance that not only confirmed the 
deviant practices of Magdalena, but also held the moral authority to condemn them. The end 
result was that Magdalena’ children were removed to institutions in 1962 until they aged (or 
married) out of the system. 
  From the data available in the case files, Rosemary and Magdalena appear to be quite 
similar women. The files, which are constructed to provide evidence for the evaluation of their 
characters show that both engaged in activities deemed irresponsible for women and mothers at 
the time. 75 Yet the responses to these indiscretions was markedly different. Both women were 
                                               
75 Women’s claim to political respect relied on an ideology that virtually beatified motherhood. For South Africa see du Toit 
2003; Gaitskell 1983; Gaitskell and Unterhalter 1989; and Vincent 2000. For America, see Boris 1993. 
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recorded as socializing with men who were not their husbands. Both women had children by 
multiple men in an out of marriage. Neither woman retained suitable housing for any length of 
time, and both left their children unattended. Rosemary committed theft and fraud—crimes for 
which she was jailed for a few months. Magdalena was known to drink, however she argued, 
 “In all the time that I stay down here the Point Police can verify that I have never 
been locked up for being drunk or that I have had to go to jail for causing a 
disturbance. I have never stolen anything from anybody. I have never committeed 
[sic] a murder. What did I do?”76 
 
Magdalena’s defensiveness is all the more poignant in a context where her actions prompted a 
great deal of moralizing language in contrast to those of Rosemary. Magdalena was characterized 
as a “disreputable woman” whose actions contributed to an “environment of drink and indecent 
living.”77 Her use of alcohol is important given that in the 1950s and early 1960s there was a 
national frenzy over white women’s alcohol use as an antecedent to moral degeneration and 
miscegenation.78 Rosemary’s race already evoked miscegenation and thus could not be saved 
from it. However, in contrast, Rosemary’s other transgressions receive little evaluation. In the 
case of Rosemary’s sexual relationship, this is especially surprising given, as others have 
suggested, the intense policing of coloured women’s sexuality that took place within the 
coloured community (Erasmus 2001).79 Under these conditions, it would have been likely that 
                                               
76 Many of claims were corroborated by reports, however the Point Police did issue a statement saying she had been involved in 
drunken brawls and various disturbances. 
77 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59 Testimony by Mrs. 
Green. Children’s Court trial 10 March 1960 and Letter from sister at St. Martin’s house to Commissioner of Child Welfare 11 
October 1960. 
78 According to Roos, the alcohol panic was driven by Geoffrey Cronje, a University of Pretoria sociologist who also trained the 
majority of social workers during this era. Further, studies such as that done by the Johannesburg branch of the Social Services 
Association found that the number of white women convicted for drunkenness in Johannesburg, had increased to nearly half of 
all white convictions for alcohol-related offences. This was worrisome because “[a] European woman under the influence of 
liquor solicits Natives for immoral purposes” (Johannesburg Social Services Association in Roos 2015). 
79 At both at the state and at the community level the coloured racial category was spoken about in ways that associated them 
with immorality, sexual promiscuity, impurity, and untrustworthiness. Because of this, any state interaction with the coloured 
community inherently involved the disciplining of sexual relations (Erasmus 2001). 
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Ms. Smith, herself classified as coloured, would have been very critical of Rosemary’s sexuality 
in ways that do not appear in the reports.  
The relative credibility that is afforded to Rosemary and Magdalena is also quite 
divergent. Like Rosemary, Magdalena withheld information from the social worker, and 
frequently made testimony that was later documented to be untrue. However, we know this 
because the social workers who handled Magdalena’s case sought out corroboration. They 
interviewed principals, neighbors, social workers from other institutions, sought court records 
and collected police reports. Very little of these investigative efforts were made on Rosemary’s 
case. Magdalena’s file is exceptional because of the amount of self-advocacy she did—writing 
letters, producing elaborate testimony, and even soliciting letters from former neighbors in 
support of her. However, this evidence was given very little weight in the final conclusion and 
oftentimes worked against her. 
Also like Rosemary, Magdalena did not have enough money to support her children. But, 
whereas Rosemary was given groceries, furniture, housing arrangements, and ultimately a 
maintenance grant, Magdalena was offered far less support. Part of this was due to the fact that 
Magdalena had a husband who occasionally worked. In many respects, this could have been 
viewed as a status to be supported, that the Amoses more closely resembled the nuclear family 
ideal. But, even when Mr. Amos was unemployed or when his working wage was insufficient to 
cover the costs of rent and food, the Society did not assist. This is not because of the family 
makeup. The Society provided food and clothing (or support referrals) in the years prior to 
intensive supervision, but from 1959-1963, when social workers visited the home an average of 
ten times a year, no resources were offered. Instead, once the three elder children were sent to 
institutions, the court spent a great deal of time and resources attempting to extract a contribution 
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from Mr. Amos that amounted to almost 2/3 of his monthly salary. 80 Yet, he was never offered 
counsel in finding more remunerative work, a common form of assistance at this time. Though a 
consistent critique of Magdalena was that she spent too much time outside the home—quite 
possibly engaging in social and illicitly remunerative activities—little aid was offered to ensure 
she did not work or need to seek support elsewhere.   
Critically, what was at stake in the cases was how Rosemary and Magdalena were 
perceived as mothers. Much of this hinged on caregiving. The case against Magdalena was that 
she was a “neglectful mother.” The files suggest that both women lived a times in conditions that 
the social workers found “dirty” and “overcrowded”, and that the children were found to be “thin 
and unkempt.”81 Magdelena (and likely Rosemary) knew the import of care to the evaluations of 
her and throughout her trial reiterated how she nursed one of her children back from the grave, 
how she regularly took them to the clinic, and how she “sat and sewed til early hours of the 
morning” making clothes for them. 82 However, Rosemary’s issues were seen as remediable 
while Magdalena’s were not. Affective commitment was also central. Rosemary’s hiding of her 
children from the social worker was taken as a testament to her laudable attachment. When 
Magdalena hid her children and “kicked up such a row” at the social worker’s attempts at 
removal that a police escort had to be called, she wasn’t perceived as bonded to her children, but 
as “aggressive” and “abusive”. 83 In the case of Rosemary, she was deemed an “unfit” mother, 
but the social worker concluded, “but that does not mean the children should be taken away.” 84 
                                               
80 Records of the arrears that accrued suggest this was rarely ever paid 
81 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59 and TBD, 1DBN, Dunn 
Protection of Children, unboxed, case number 33/2/4/280/63. 
82 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59. 
83 Magdalena’s letters to the Commissioner of Child Welfare were extensive testimonials to her commitment to her children. In 
one poignant one she closed the letter saying, “I’m praying night and day for my children so that I can get them back. I can’t go 
on any more. I’m to [sic] weak to fight against [the social worker’s] scheming. I pray that God will show you we have done 
everything right by our children, we have sacrificed everything for them it can be proved, even the children can tell you sir.” 
TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59. 
84  TBD, 1DBN, Dunn Protection of Children, unboxed, case number 33/2/4/280/63. 
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In the case of Magdalena, the social worker concluded that “with proper care, these children 
should develop into worthy citizens”, however, that care was not deemed to be Magdalena’s. 85 
Many of the similarities of Magdalena and Rosemary’s case fall away when we turn to 
consider the experience of Grace Ngcobo, a Zulu woman from the rural area of Eshowe. In July 
9, 1963, Grace gave birth to a baby boy, Themba, her third child. Shortly afterwards, likely in 
part because of the pregnancy and birth, Grace lost her job as a domestic servant where she lived 
with and worked for a mixed-race family. As a black woman, her termination meant that, under 
apartheid laws, she was no longer legally allowed to be present in the neighborhood designated 
for coloured persons on the edges of Durban proper.  
During her first pregnancy, Grace had been working in Point and living as a subtenant in 
Cato Manor. However, since that time, the area where Grace had lived was cleared and informal 
housing was scarce. Grace found herself, as another woman in the same situation described, with 
“no home, hiding from the police, living like wild people” (Callinicos 2007: 172). Hopping from 
one backyard room to another, Grace and her newborn lived off the hospitality of other domestic 
servants willing to offer them food and possibly shelter for the night. On those lucky nights, they 
had to creep out from the yard early in the morning before the family discovered them. On other 
nights, fear of losing their own jobs in the context of high turnover kept fellow domestics from 
offering aid. Grace would walk for hours, ducking into alleys to dodge the police looking for 
curfew violators and catching a few hours’ sleep in a public toilet.  
After three months of this, Grace approached a mixed-race woman, Ms. Jacobs, asking 
her to adopt Themba. Ms. Jacobs took the pair to the Durban Child Welfare Society to process 
the adoption. While Ms. Jacobs did not become Themba’s adoptive mother, Durban Child 
                                               
85 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59. 
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Welfare did offer aid. This is particularly surprising because the Society’s mandate at the time 
was to promote the welfare of children and families only of the white and colured populations. 
Deviance from this mandate in Grace’s case was partially due to pity. When they arrived, the 
social worker described Grace as appearing “in a state of neglect...dirty, poorly dressed, and 
malnourished. Her face reveals symptoms of fatigue.”86 However, the Society had for thirty 
years resisted calls to extend their services into impoverished black communities. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of coloured families was only due to the higher status afforded to this group under 
apartheid racial hierarchy and was an uneven inclusion at best. Thus, there was an institutional 
limit to charitable sentiment (Du Toit 2014). More than pity, then, the Society’s willingness to 
give Grace food and to provide Themba milk, medical care, and eventually an adoptive family 
was the result of Grace’s successful manipulation of the flexible category of colouredness.  
At two-months, Themba’s skin was lighter than his mother. Because of this, it was 
conceivable that Mrs. Jacobs, could adopt him. Though Grace had former ties to the Bantu Child 
Welfare Society from her previous two children, she allowed Mrs. Jacobs to take her and 
Themba to the better-resourced Durban Child Welfare Society. There, she completed forms 
about Themba’s father, giving the same first name as the father of her other children, but 
omitting the Zulu last name of Ngcobo. Instead, she said, Themba’s father was coloured. Though 
Grace had already registered Themba’s birth as a black ‘bantu’ child, she went with Society 
social workers to the Population Registrar to have him registered as coloured. She then took 
Themba to the Addington Children’s Hospital—which only treated white and coloured 
children— for treatment of malnutrition and exposure. 
                                               
86 TBD, 1DBN, Children Case Files Box 611, Mkhize, Sub File 33/2/4/282/63 Report by Professional Officer of Durban Child 
Welfare Society for Commissioner of Child Welfare, 24 September, 1963. 
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Prior to her contact with the Society, Grace’s experience is concurrent with what scholars 
have told us about the lives of urban black African women in the 1960s. She had two children, 
Sipho, age 3, and Sylvia, age 2, with Elias Ngcobo, a police constable in Pinetown. As a man 
with a relatively good government job, it is likely that Elias was married with another wife and 
children living in a township house.87 His relationship with Grace, while not unusual, would not 
have been welcomed by his family. In September 1962, Grace was reported to have “abandoned” 
the children with him, after which they were committed to Othandweni Infants home in 
Lamontville. Elias would have made much more money as a police constable than Grace as a 
domestic servant, and two small children would have made her work life a challenge. We can 
imagine her “abandonment” as an effort to coerce Elias into offering more support. The children, 
however, did not stay at the children’s home long. By 1963, they were under the care of a 
maternal aunt in Lamontville. We don’t know if this aunt was a blood relation, but Lamontville 
was an older township with comparatively wealthier residents. It is possible this was a caregiver 
who Grace would not have had to pay to house the children. Grace’s mother was also a domestic 
servant living on her employer’s premises in Pietermaritzburg. Not surprisingly, when the 
Society contacted her, she refused to take Themba or the other children—which would have been 
very difficult with her job—and further said Grace was “irresponsible and over indulged in 
liquor.”88 
The social workers did not have a high opinion of Grace. In their assessment of her, one 
wrote: 
The mother was unemployed and…she and the child lived illegally in the servants 
quarters of various Coloured owned homes…The mother does not play a 
prominent part on the Bantu community. She is a Bantu Domestic Servant of 
                                               
87 Given his job category, it is unlikely that he was a migrant laborer.  
88 TBD, 1DBN, Children Case Files Box 611, Mkhize, Sub File 33/2/4/282/63 Report by Professional Officer of 
Durban Child Welfare Society for Commissioner of Child Welfare, 24 September, 1963. 
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inferior status. Although she states that she is a member of the Roman Catholic 
Church, she does not appear to be aware of the church’s doctrine. She does not 
participate in her religious duties and has not even had her baby baptized. Her 
main interest centers around visiting other Bantu Servants and abusing liquor. She 
does not appear to attach much importance to moral values. She is not conscious 
of her maternal roles. She abandoned her two older children and openly rejected 
the child Themba. She has been unreliable and uncooperative. 89  
 
Grace was seen to have failed in cultivating moral values of religious participation and 
temperance. She had failed in creating economic security and stable housing. Despite the 
provisions she made for her other children and the constraints of her work, she was seen as 
having abandoned them and negated her emotional bond. Her lateness to appointments with the 
social workers was seen as non-cooperation. Despite these negative assessments, Grace still 
managed in securing assistance for Themba. While Themba was in the hospital receiving 
treatment, Grace signed the papers consenting to hid adoption. However, she did not wait to hear 
if a family could be found, instead, she disappeared. Shortly after, Themba, then Clive, was 
fostered and eventually adopted into a Coloured family in Cape Town.  
Discipline and Support: Furthering the Project of ‘Getting By’ 
In all three of the above cases, Rosemary, Magdalena, and Grace sought out the 
assistance of the Durban Child Welfare Society to support their children. I place all these efforts 
under the frame of ‘getting by’ or the project of survival and social reproduction. These women 
invoked their status as mothers to needy children to make claims on resources and, in the case of 
Grace, institutional power. Motherhood was an available resource for their claim making 
because, by the 1960s, mothers has gained a particular social and political salience in South 
Africa. In the domain of social welfare, underlying ideologies of moral responsibility had shifted 
away from ideas that social ills arose from individual moral and character flaws, recognizing the 
                                               
89 Ibid. 
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influence of relations and opening a space wherein the institution of family could be targeted for 
intervention. In this period, problems such as juvenile delinquency, crime, or prostitution were 
addressed with interventions into the family and childrearing practices as the wellspring from 
which such issues arose (Ferguson 2015). In this framing, then, maternal care became both the 
source of problems for the ills of society and the powerful solution (Donzelot 1979). However, 
while motherhood as a unified category held enormous potency, the “problems” that maternal 
care was thought to beget or address were figured quite differently for different racial groups. 
Thus, the stakes for coloured, black, or white women invoking motherhood as a form of claim 
making were quite disparate.  
In accounting for the difference in the outcomes of the three above cases, we must 
acknowledge the important role that the social workers themselves played. Social workers were 
the gatekeepers to a robust system of resources and restrictions. They were actors with a great 
deal of disciplinary power, but they were also constrained within a larger system. It is altogether 
possible that Rosemary’s statements were not subject to as much corroboration as Magdalena’s 
because coloured social workers like Mrs. Smith were not given the same resources of 
transportation, time, and police escorts as white social workers like Mrs. Glynn. Social workers 
were also people with personalities and proclivities. The social worker who successfully 
removed Magdalena’s children stands out in the files as having unusually harsh language and 
judgment. In contrast, Miss Coetzee, who oversaw Grace’s case used very sympathetic language 
in her report on Grace and the few times she also offered input on Magdalena’s case. 
Importantly, before Grace disappeared and left the Society no choice but to handle Themba’s 
case, Miss Coetzee was complicit in an effort to have him classified as coloured, despite many 
questionable data points that could have thwarted that effort.  
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I also want to focus on the different meaning given to the maternal status of these 
women. Though Magdalena and Rosemary’s circumstances were similar, their differential 
treatment was a result of the social meaning their motherhood held vis a vis their racial 
categorization. Rosemary’s transgressions were framed as issues of material need. This is, in 
part, because she was not described to exhibit the social ills stereotypically associated with 
coloured women—hypersexuality, drinking, and irresponsibility.90 Practices that could have been 
framed as moral weaknesses (e.g. theft) were instead framed as evidence of economic want, as 
the assistance provided to her reflected. Magdalena’s conduct, however, was framed as evidence 
of an improper “attitude towards life” and a lack of “proper values” when it came to family 
care.91 Given the national concern over these moral ills that were seen to be plaguing the white 
population, social workers were given a strong mandate to inculcate their clients with a set of 
values that placed children above material gain. Magdalena’s case managers worked to do just 
that. Despite the ongoing presence of poor whites such as Magdalena, their categorical existence 
was continually denied. As one commission of inquiry noted, “whites are not suffering material 
want” and, “material want is incidental”.92 Under these terms, the stakes of misrecognizing 
Magdalena’s poverty were high, and the means to her reform was not economic assistance, as it 
was with Rosemary, but a value-based rehabilitation to impress upon her that she needed to 
foster a stable nuclear family for her children. As a white woman, households like hers was to be 
the basis for the future success of the white population.  
                                               
90 The face that Rosemary had only three children by age 32 would have likely been seen as low fertility within her race group.  
91 Report of Committee of Inquiry into Family Allowances (Pretoria, 1961), p.85. 
92 Ibid. p. 59. Between 1951 and 1960 the unemployment rate of whites (though very small) had increased from 2.8 to 3.6 while 
the unemployment rate for coloureds increased from 10.3 to 16.3. A. L. Muller, Minority Interests: The political Economy of the 
Coloured and Indian Communities in South Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 1968) p. 19. 
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For black African women like Grace, her motherhood and the value of her children had 
quite a different meaning. Her motherhood was secondary, necessary only insofar as social 
reproduction ensured a continued labor force; her value was her labor, essential to the state’s 
attempts to solve the labor question by both ensuring that there was enough black labor in cities 
while curbing the massive influx of black Africans into the city that by the 1960s was well 
underway. Black women were expected to assist in this project in three critical ways. First, by 
remaining in the native reserves. But for the small numbers of women employed in formal jobs 
in the city, black women were an unwanted presence in the city. Since early in the twentieth 
century, the presence of unattached black women in the city had been the source of tremendous 
national anxiety. By 1963 the apartheid government would succeed in making the presence of 
women like Grace—unemployed and destitute—illegal, punishable by fines or expulsion. Prior 
to that, however, the illegal presence of black women in the city was thought to breed 
lawlessness, prostitution, immorality, and of course, an overindulgence of liquor. As an 
unemployed, unmarried woman, Grace’s condition only fed into these fears. Her history of 
alcohol use did not help her case.   
Black women’s second role was to enable the migration of male laborers into the city by 
remaining in the reserves. It was the imagined role of rural black women maintaining the 
homestead that undergirded apartheid state arguments against providing black men a family 
wage or offering black youth in the city poverty relief. Women’s labor in the rural reserves, 
“provided a form of indigenous pension which enabled them to support the aged and destitute 
Africans” (Kaseke 2002: 222–23; see also Iliffe 1987:206). In short, black women were the 
welfare system for the black African population. Under this logic, the destitution of black women 
like Grace did not prompt the extension of support, but instead became a justification for 
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removal from the city. Instead of supporting a migrant labor system, Grace’s poverty was a drain 
upon it. Grace’s decisions to run away from the social workers (and their police escorts) when 
they visited her, as well as her disappearance, are all the more legible in this context.  
The third important responsibility of black women was to raise black children to occupy 
the social position afforded to their race. By not caring for her two younger children herself, 
Grace deviated from the important role of labor reproduction qua social reproduction that 
undergirded the state’s welfare logic. Instead, as progeny of an ‘unattached’ woman whose 
enjoyment of alcohol was read as immoral, her children were in danger of becoming unruly 
delinquents who would wreak social havoc and cost the government important resources.  
Herein lies a critical difference to the cases of Magdalena and Grace. Though both were 
able to locate their actions under the moral umbrella of maternal care, their mothering was 
subject to different valuation due to their race in ways that powerfully impacted their daily 
efforts of social reproduction. Magdalena’s children were viewed as future citizens. As such, her 
care for them was supported until it was deemed so insufficient it could not be remedied. Only at 
that point were her children sent to state institutions, but again, to be rehabilitated into productive 
members of the nation. For Grace, her child a priori was viewed as a burden on an already 
strained urban welfare infrastructure. Had she remained in contact, the likelihood was that both 
mother and child would be sent to the reserves where their poverty would be no less pressing, but 
decidedly less visible. Instead, Grace dodged this fate. Her actions suggest that she was savvy to 
recognize the different racial valuations of maternal care and their political power. The father she 
named for Themba had the same name as the father of her younger children, with the notable 
difference of being mixed race instead of black. She said she had no information as to his 
whereabouts as they only slept together once, thereby forcing the social worker to rely on her 
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word. By recasting Themba as mixed race, Grace was able to raise his social status and make 
claims on a better resourced welfare institution. In short, she was able to persist in the project of 
getting by and the provision for Themba, even and indeed because of her maternal absence. 
Conclusions 
The above provided a brief historical overview of the development of the South African 
welfare state from colonialism through until the 1960s and its related interpretation of proper 
family life and maternal practice as refracted through racial ideology. A close examination of 
three 1960s Children’s court cases of women classified as white, coloured, and black African 
enabled an examination for the intermingling of domestic, welfare, and racial ideologies as they 
worked out in practice. In each case, the women made claims to welfare resources on the basis of 
their maternal status. I understand such efforts to be part of a larger practice of ‘making 
motherhood work’ by which I mean mobilizing the legitimacy and moral authority afforded to 
the social category of mother to enable the project of social reproduction, or getting by.   
The category of mother had such potency to make claims because in popular discourse, 
motherhood functions as a symbol that subsumes very different meanings, identities, and 
experiences under a single referent. It is seen as a self-evident concept with tremendous social 
weight which affords the social position both great authority and great vulnerability to critique. 
Female activists across the century have drawn on this symbolic power and used public 
motherhood to contest state policy. The capacious reach of motherhood as symbolic concept 
allowed women’s groups to transcend huge differences in ideology and social position.  The 
above chapter argues that, in a similar vein, poor women also drew upon the potency of 
motherhood for their own political actions. However, they also confronted the ways in which 
motherhood is subject to very different meanings.  
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The South African welfare system, like its counterparts in other countries, developed an 
ideal type of motherhood that was used to evaluate and shape the lives of the families who 
encountered the system. In the context of intense racial hierarchy, it is not surprising that for the 
most part the ascendant ideal was that of the white middle-class homemaker who devoted full 
time efforts to childrearing, meal prep, cleaning, and (usually Christian-inflected) spiritual uplift. 
In many ways, a similar ideal was promoted within the coloured race groups with a greater 
emphasis also placed on service to the community (Erasmus 2001). Rural black African women 
were less subject to a domestic ideology based on the nuclear ideal because they were both 
understood to be living in adherence to very different cultural norms and because they were not 
recognizably part of an industrial class (Gaitskell 1983). However, their urban counterparts were 
subject to the disciplinary technology of influx control and the township house that attempted to 
make them into full-time mothers of a nuclear household. 
For the women in this chapter, motherhood most lost its symbolic coherence in how 
deviance from the maternal ideal was defined and the regulation to which such deviance was 
subject. White women such as Magdalena were first and foremost deviant because of their 
poverty. A higher standard of living was seen as the marker of white civilization and ascendance. 
Improper practices such as too much time spent outside the home, multiple sexual liaisons, 
inadequate disciplining of native servants, and overconsumption of alcohol were only further 
evidence of how her internal sensibilities needed to be brought in line with the motives of thrift, 
piety, and discretion, more befitting of her gender and race. In contrast, Rosemary’s poverty was 
seen as less of a moral failure and more of an obstacle to proper childrearing. Her primary 
deviance was as a single mother who sought work outside of the household instead of attending 
to the care of her children. Comparatively, Grace’s poverty was also less an issue of personal 
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failure—although the report suggests she lost her job by virtue of improper conduct—as much as 
it was a violation of the role assigned to black women. The cause of her poverty was less a 
concern as much as its location. Women like her were not to be supported but relocated back to 
the reserves where they could be aided by an imagined kin network. She was failing in her role 
to ensure the reproduction of the migrant labor system and in her responsibility to produce the 
next generation of laborers. Importantly, these ideals and deviations were not formed in isolation, 
but were co-constituted through practices of differentiation and distinction. Likewise, social 
workers, aid workers, missionaries, teachers, and church women’s groups all engaged in the 
project of shaping domestic life and contributed to the conversation of what the ideal family 
should entail. 
The files make clear—most visibly in Grace’s case—that in their claim-making, these 
women were aware of the dynamic, dual nature of motherhood—as singular symbol and as 
multivalent signifier. They worked hard to maintain control over how the meaning of 
motherhood was translated in a given context, most evident in Magdalena’s multiple letters. The 
efficacy of making motherhood work both relied on this duality and was threatened by it. 
However, not only was the singularity of motherhood subject to differentiated meanings based 
on race (and class), its meanings also shifted over time. Chapter 4 considers how Motherhood 
operated quite differently in Point in 2014. 
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Chapter 4 - Multiple Maternities: Maternal Repertoires and Support Seeking  
 
 
Figure 4.1: A statement about distribution on Maryann's door 
Maryann and Lolita were in another fight.1 This time it was over meat that Maryann had 
left in Lolita’s refrigerator. The two women lived in adjacent rooms such that when Maryann’s 
refrigerator broke, it only made sense that she would store her remaining chicken in Lolita’s 
fridge until Maryann could afford to repair hers. Despite Lolita’s appliance-hospitality, Maryann 
often complained that Lolita was ungenerous in her sharing of resources with neighbors, taking 
more than she gave—a dangerous accusation in South Africa. Now Lolita had crossed the line. 
She had used Maryann’s meat. One afternoon during the meat incident, Maryann was away and 
Lolita and I were chatting in the open-air corridor outside her and Maryann’s rooms. Out in this 
semi-public space, Lolita complained animatedly about Maryann’s imposition, saying her 
                                               
1Unless respondants requested otherwise, all names used are pseudonyms. 
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perishables took up precious space and had been there too long. As her rant reached its apex, 
Lolita noted that the chicken had overstayed its welcome because Maryann was “lazy to cook.” 
“Me,” Lolita said emphatically, “I make my husband and children a hot meal every night. Many 
nights her kids eat just butter and rolls.” I smiled, also knowing Maryann’s hatred of cooking, 
but not wishing to say more. “You know,” Lolita continued, her voice dropping conspiratorially, 
“the girls are getting poor marks”—referring to Maryann’s daughters newly enrolled in the 
neighborhood school— “they will probably have to repeat. I told Maryann to go over their work 
with them, but she is lazy to do it. That’s what I did with [my son] and his marks are good.” 
 And just like that, a conversation about meat out of place became a conversation about 
motherhood—both Maryann’s and Lolita’s. The transition, if one could even call it that, was 
subtle and swift. The subjects flowed so easily into one another that it was only much later that I 
noted what had happened.  
 Unknown to Lolita, the chicken had already served an important purpose beyond simple 
nourishment. The week prior I had come by to visit Maryann. Her door was closed, as it often 
was. On it was a note scrawled in marker, “This welfare is closed. Don’t knock.” a pointed 
message indicating that Maryann did not want people coming to borrow things from her (See 
Figure 4.1). Hearing voices, I knocked anyway. A smiling Maryann answered to reveal another 
woman, Jamila, sitting in front of a spread of mismatched teacups, bowls of sugar and milk, and 
cakes all crowded on a tray that balanced on an overturned bucket. Jamila, an Indian woman, 
worked for a well-endowed historically white church that ran an aid program out of the 
neighborhood school. The school children, like their families, identified predominantly with the 
black African and mixed-race coloured racial groups with some white and Indian families also 
represented. Coloured women like Lolita and Maryann considered themselves different from 
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women like Jamila both in terms of race and a broadly defined “culture.” Here, too there was an 
added dimension of social power. Though not formally trained as one, most neighborhood 
residents referred to Jamila as “the school social worker.” This was in part due to her efforts to 
counsel troubled kids and in part because she distributed resources from the church such as 
groceries, clothes, school supplies, and, that day, cakes.  
 As I entered, Maryann offered me tea—a regular ritual—gesturing casually to the milk 
and sugar, the display of which were new to me. I mentioned that the room smelled good, 
glancing at the pots bubbling on the hotplate. Jamila laughingly explained that Maryann had 
been relaying a story of her trip to the shop where she had persuaded someone to capitalize on a 
two-for-one sale on chicken and give her one. Maryann grinned broadly, holding her cigarette 
lightly in her hand, “Oh yes, I just said ‘Are you going to say no to these children?...It’s not for 
me.’ The girls said, ‘Mommy do you know that man from work?’ I said, ‘No my darling, he is 
just a very nice man.’” We all laughed at Maryann’s cleverness. Jamila wrinkled her nose, 
adding “She is so naughty.” Bolstered by the laughter, Maryann shrugged casually and said, “My 
family must have their meat. What must I do? I made a plan.” 
 The lives of women like Maryann and Lolita represent much of what urban poverty looks 
like in present-day South Africa. They are exemplars of a large population group—women not 
formally married or employed who receive government grants for at least some of their children. 
Unlike the women of the previous chapter, Maryann and Lolita did not interact with a social 
worker in order to receive their grants. By providing documentation that their income was below 
a certain threshold and by showing the birth certificates of their children, they were able to 
register to receive a Child Support Grant of R140 each month. In 1960, such grants only reached 
a small proportion of the population. But by 2014, close to 60 percent of South African children 
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received a grant (Hall, Meintjes, and Sambu 2014). Despite the CSG’s broad reach and 
demonstrated efficacy in reducing poverty, the small size of the monthly payment (appx $100 in 
2014) left a widely recognized shortfall of support (Ferguson 2015; Neves et al. 2009). Unlike 
the apartheid-era predecessor, the CSG was not designed to replace the full-time work of a 
caregiver. Furthermore, the supplementary welfare resources that white and coloured poor 
families could once draw upon, were entirely privatized and unreliable. Yet, at the same time, 
government agents and lay people alike used the social and financial stability of families as a 
metric for evaluating the state’s efficacy, citizens’ commitment, and ultimately, the success of 
the new democratic South Africa. This chapter considers how poor families were functioning in 
this era without waged work and how grants to children, as the most reliable form of household 
income, reconfigured relationships within the household, among neighbors, and with the state. 
 This chapter draws upon ethnographic fieldwork with families and aid programs in the 
dense inner-city Point neighborhood. For women who lived in the well-resourced but costly 
Point neighborhood, grants covered a crucial, but minimal portion of their monthly expenses. 
The men they lived with could find pick-up work nearby that garnered enough income to mostly 
cover rent. However, it was up to women to “make a plan” to secure cash, food, clothing, 
blankets, or other family necessities. Resources such as chicken-benefactors, neighbors, and 
wealthy churches were available, if one learned to access them. My research tracked how women 
discerned and applied effective ways of speaking and acting to claim support from many 
categories of persons including social workers, pastors, imams, school principals, boyfriends, 
and neighbors. These claims took the form of what I term performances of acceptable 
motherhood. 
 In the above vignette, Maryann, Lolita, and Jamila participated in performances of 
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acceptable motherhood. These included both discourses and practices that, in different contexts, 
were labeled as indicating an unobjectionable—as opposed to an “ideal” or “deviant”—maternal 
status, as well as critiques and evaluations of these actions. Motherhood here is not necessarily 
synonymous with biology but indicates a social relationship brought about through long term 
acts of care and nurturance for dependent children (Fonseca 2003; G’sell 2016). Such 
performances are also not random, but cluster into repertoires and scripts—social proscriptions 
and textual artifacts—that “contain the rules and roles of performances” for a given time, place, 
and audience (Carr 2011, 192; also Bauman 1996; Silverstein and Urban 1996). In other words, 
these directives delimit the interpretive range an actor has to play with in order to be believable, 
or, in J.L. Austin’s terms, “felicitous,” and therefore efficacious (1962; Butler 1989). While 
innovation and improvisation are possible, and in some cases desirable, repertoires and their 
component scripts give coherence to various performances, thereby enabling scholarly 
examination and comparison of these repertoires as objects across time and space (Tilly 2008). 
This chapter considers what work performances of adequate motherhood did for women living in 
the Point in 2014. What repertories of motherhood were available? How were they learned? How 
were they received?  
 I argue that performances of adequate motherhood are both a strategy and a resource in 
South Africa that poor women can leverage for aid and for prestige. In short, successful 
performances enable claim making and social power. However, due to a long history of moral 
panics over mothering as both cause of and solution to the social degradation of the citizenry, it 
is a slippery resource with high stakes (Ferguson 2015). Though potent, these maternal 
performances are shifting and changeable and offer a precarious claim to social recognition. At 
certain times and places, a given maternal repertoire may explicitly be more highly valued—for 
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instance the ascendance of the white, middle class housewife. In everyday practice, however, 
there are multiple repertoires in circulation. Further, multiple people and institutions are 
concerned with scrutinizing and evaluating maternal performances—from the neighbor to the 
social worker to the parliamentarian. This multiplicity means that in order to successfully 
position themselves, women must cultivate a number of semiotic skills.  
 The social import of performances of motherhood is no less critical in other places in 
South Africa and arguably beyond, but the particular social spatial dynamics of the Point 
neighborhood create a stark backdrop for analysis of these issues. Sandwiched between the tony 
beachfront, the central business district, and the railyard and shipyard, the Point is a 20-block 
long peninsula that contains some of the densest urban space in the country. The neighborhood’s 
high concentration of multi-story apartment buildings meaning that residential life occurs in 
small rooms or apartments, in contrast to the stand-alone houses surrounded by a yard that have 
long been the norm in South Africa. The proximity of neighbors invites and supports a great deal 
of surveillance. Building managers, neighbors, or their guests can all view who is visiting, what 
parcels were brought home from the shops, what furniture is visible through always-open front 
doors; hear the arguments or cries of passion; and smell what is for dinner or whose rubbish has 
been left out. Such public visibility of intimate domestic life fosters opportunities for maternal 
performances to cultivate respectability or prestige. It also provides ample fodder for maternal 
critique. For in these contexts, someone like Lolita knows exactly how often and what meals 
Maryann does or does not cook for her family.   
 In part because of its racial and ethnic heterogeneity and in part because of its proximity 
to Durban’s port, the Point has long had an insalubrious reputation as a site of debauchery. 
Permanent residents have historically been poor, their livelihoods based on contingent jobs at the 
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port or railway or their skill in extracting funds from the holiday makers or sailors who passed 
through the neighborhood with money to spend. This culture of chicanery alongside a large 
transient population–-immigrants, sailors, and soldiers—impeded a sense of community 
cohesion. Further, the availability of casual jobs and quick cash attracted a high concentration 
perceived social deviants such as single mothers, prostitutes, drug dealers, and street children, 
giving the neighborhood a reputation as a “den of iniquity” and a “murky underworld” (Leggett 
2001, 109; Margaretten 2015).   
  As residents often stated, “In Point, everything is money.” The neighborhood’s central 
location and robust infrastructure—e.g., a school, a hospital, and many shops—made it a very 
expensive place to live. Rent for a single room was consistently ten times what the same space 
would be in one of the townships.2 Because of the high expense of housing, few women could 
afford to live alone and support their children. Together with a man—often the father of one of 
their children—these women rented a portion of a room, a room, or a studio apartment in one of 
the multi-unit buildings that predominate the neighborhood. Their boyfriends worked as graffers 
or car guards, directing drivers in exchange for small tips. A few men had higher earnings in jobs 
as truck drivers and security officers, or dealing drugs, but these were the exception. Though 
some women worked part-time as waitresses in beachfront cafes, the lack of such opportunities, 
their responsibility for small children at home, and the high price of even neighborly child care 
made such work difficult. In addition to the domestic work of cleaning and cooking, women 
spent most of their days circulating through neighborhood institutions—church soup kitchens, 
                                               
2 In 2014, the bottom of the rental market in Point was about R2000 a month for a single room with a shared toilet.  Prices 
increased with amenities. In addition to rent, most tenants also paid for electricity and water and meter-based systems made those 
fees difficult to dodge. For comparison, in the same year, a rented shack/room in one of the townships was about R200 a month 
and often utilities—to the extent that they existed—were included. However, it would cost a township resident R18 each way or 
R36 return to come to the city center. Point residents could walk, take a free bus, or a R5 taxi.  
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refugee care centers, school aid centers, informal prayer groups, or the beachfront—seeking 
food, clothing, blankets, and money. Thus, claim-making was a part of everyday life and 
exchange of resources, information, or labor constituted and demonstrated relationships between 
people (Mauss [1924] 2000). Because this was a social world in which every person was a 
potential donor or petitioner, performances were consistently expected and, in many cases, 
demanded. 
 Successful maternal performances first require that women observe and assess 
interactions to cultivate an in-depth knowledge of “contextualization cues.” These semiotic 
indexes communicate the rules and roles for a given interactive context (Gumperz 1982). 
Through this analysis, Point women develop what Carr calls “anticipatory interpellation” which 
allows them to forecast how a more powerful audience will expect them to act (2009). Applying 
this knowledge, women then work to attune their maternal performance to these expectations. 
Yet, this calibration does not only happen in one direction. In the geographically dense context 
of the Point neighborhood, interactions often have multiple audiences with varying social power. 
For instance, neighbors are often privy to interactions with social workers. Frequently, these 
various audiences hold different and often conflicting definitions of acceptable motherhood (e.g., 
the hard-working prostitute who puts food on the table vs the celibate Christian mother who 
relied upon the Church’s soup kitchen). Women in the Point deploy another set of semiotic 
strategies to manage these contradictory metrics of evaluation as well as the discord their 
conjunction produces. 
 The visibility of women performing multiple contradictory maternal repertoires 
challenges ontological assumptions about personhood, namely, that one’s words and actions 
sincerely represent a stable, individual self (Carr 2011). Revealing the performative nature of 
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motherhood destabilizes the mechanisms by which audience members evaluate the efficacy of a 
performance. Sincerity is put into question and insincerity is equated with morally reprehensible 
falsehood and deception. Aware of the suspicions of their audience(s), women use the 
metalinguistic term “the hustle” to delineate between sincere and insincere performances and 
therefore re-establish their credibility as actors (e.g., “there I was just hustlin’”). In doing so, they 
work to again produce a cohesive image of themselves—a single self amongst multiple 
maternities—that makes the contradictory practices “hang together” (Mol 2002).3 Nevertheless, 
the invocation of the hustle, which acknowledges that one’s words and actions might not always 
transparently reflect one’s interior self, is not possible or efficacious in every interaction. 
Audiences such as social workers and pastors require greater assurance that what they witness is 
sincere action. The result is a complicated landscape of layered stages and audiences that poor 
women seek to navigate. 
 The successful performance of adequate motherhood has long had high stakes for poor 
mothers in South Africa and available repertoires differed sharply by race. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, for the first half of the 20th century, poor white mothers were the targets of 
robust state poverty relief cum social engineering programs to rectify a class habitus that was 
seen as a threat to the racial hierarchy. By the 1960s, white mothers in the Point could make 
claims upon a variety of institutions: e.g., churches, aid societies, state agencies, parastatal 
organizations for a wide array of welfare provisions.4 A veritable army of social workers, such as 
those in the previous chapter, policed adherence to repertoires of adequate maternal care that 
                                               
3 Mol’s writing on atherosclerosis highlights the work that goes into producing cohesion out of multiplicity either by treating 
discrepancies hierarchically in which one displaces the other or additively by which both entities are allowed to coexist because 
their discrepancy is attributed to different orders and is therefore unproblematic (2002). 
4 By 1950, the poor whites who dominated the Point had access to benefits such as free public education and health care, job 
reservation, subsidized housing, social grants, and rehabilitative social services (Patel 2011). 
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demonstrated sobriety, thrift, Christian piety, respect for patriarchal dominance, and, critically, 
an awareness of white racial superiority (Teppo 2004). Were they to founder in their 
performances, as Magdalena women’s lives were subject to increasing intervention and, 
frequently, their children were removed to state institutions.  
 Under apartheid, low income women of color faced a far more limited range of welfare 
assistance than white women, but their higher poverty levels made their maternal performances 
no less critical. Poor coloured families were associated with promiscuity, criminality, drug and 
alcohol abuse, and vulgarity (Erasmus 2001).5 Coloured and white social workers promoted and 
rewarded repertoires of respectability that eschewed interaction with black Africans and 
embraced white middle-class norms of conduct (Adhikari 2006). In contrast, the repertoires 
emphasized by volunteers at the Durban Indian Child Welfare Society valorized the Indian 
mother as the keeper of a specifically Indian tradition against a hostile foreign—read white—
environment (Kuper 1960; Nowbath 1978).6 Indian women were encouraged to be submissive to 
their husbands and to strictly discipline girls to a life of domestic labor and relative enclosure 
while showering affection on sons as emissaries to the outside world (Meer 1972).7 For urban 
black mothers, culturally-specific childrearing practices were not valued, but instead, were 
viewed as a sign of backwardness. The repertoires of deserving black motherhood, then, 
emphasized a woman’s ability to shed her rural roots and rear her children in “modern” ways that 
                                               
5 The historic marginalization of people classified as coloured has led to a racial identity based on a negative argument of non-
resemblance rather than a positive self-definition. Some argue that despite changes in coloured identity over the past century, 
certain elements remained consistent including a strategic attempt at assimilation to dominant white society which manifested in 
placing value on associations with whiteness—clothing, hair styles, cuisine, kin photos—and a concomitant distancing from 
black Africanness (Adhikari 2006).  
6 Unlike the Durban Child Welfare Society that served the white and coloured population, the Durban Indian Child Welfare 
Society employed very few social workers. Instead the society relied on Local Committees” or community volunteers—often 
teachers, principals, religious officials etc.—who knew the applicant families—in order to administer and oversee the distribution 
of aid (Nowbath 1978).   
7 There is tremendous linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity in the Indian Diaspora community in South Africa. However, 
scholars suggest that due to both a shared experience of discrimination and a shared familial, it is possible to talk in terms of a 
shared “Indianness” and an “Indian Family” (Kuper 1960, Vahed and Desai 2001). 
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involved regular medical checkups and inoculations, dressing them in western clothes and 
expensive shoes, and teaching them English or Afrikaans (Gaitskell 1983).  
 In 2014, women in the Point were similarly the subject of national concerns over “family 
disintegration,” but they lived within a dramatically altered welfare landscape as compared to 
their predecessors (DSD 2012:3). Since the 1970s, waged jobs have contracted, undercutting 
men’s ability to formalize marriages and support families.8 Poor women who by 2014 were 
overwhelmingly single mothers, were increasingly vulnerable to unemployment, poverty, and 
HIV/AIDS. The robust welfare services that once supported poor whites were stretched thin as 
they tried to address years of unequal treatment of a much larger population. Despite a national 
concern about poor (in both senses of the word) mothering, only low-income children, not their 
mothers, bore the right to state aid. Family allowances were no longer fiscally possible. The 
mothers’ component of the Maintenance Grant, the apartheid-era predecessor to the Child 
Support Grant (CSG), was jettisoned and the grant payment reduced to allow for broader 
eligibility (Lund 2008).9 Thus, for poor women in the new South Africa, it was only by framing 
themselves as a particular kind of citizen-caregiver for a rights-bearing child that women could 
gain state recognition and support. However, this recognition was quite limited as women could 
only make claims for a child, not directly for themselves.  
  The retrenchment of state services and a narrowing of the terms under which they could 
request aid left poor women in a precarious position. Notably for my argument, the logic of the 
                                               
8 Whether a “white wedding” in a Christian church or a traditional wedding, ilobolo, or bride wealth transferred from the groom 
to the bride’s family, remains a critical element of the process of marriage. Ilobolo, usually figured in cows (e.g, 10 cows for a 
woman with no children) and converted to cash, by design is many times the monthly wage of most men and entirely out of reach 
to most unemployed men.  
9 The CSG is a radical form of social welfare that has made huge difference to the lives of poor women. Two unique elements of 
the grant are its status as a cash transfer with no conditions required from the recipient (other than a means test) and its design to 
“follow the child” thereby recognizing the caregiving provided by grandmother, aunts, fathers and non-kin in addition to mothers 
(Lund 2008: 53). 
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CSG pervaded community relationships as well. Although women were expected to translate 
resources into proper social reproduction, they themselves were not regarded as legitimate 
recipients of aid in their own right. The neighbor, pastors, or school principals to which Point 
women turned to make claims saw children as the only social actors worthy of aid.10 Therefore 
performances of motherhood—of care for a deserving child—enabled women to makes claims 
upon critical resources otherwise unavailable to them.  
 Herein lies the center of what was at stake in Maryann and Lolita’s performances of 
motherhood to one another and to me. It is a pressing concern that poor women have no 
mechanism to achieve state recognition other than through their status as mothers. However, this 
lack of recognition does not only exist at the level of the state. Women’s recognition from their 
own community members and sometimes their own household is also predicated on successfully 
embodying shifting and contradictory performances of deserving motherhood. This gives them a 
rather tenuous hold on subjectivity indeed.  
 Today in South Africa, it is no longer just social workers or the state that evaluate 
deserving motherhood—it is something that everyone has taken up, from the volunteer dishing 
out plates at the soup kitchen to the neighbor in the stairwell. These audiences are pervasively 
present and overlapping. Neighborly critiques—as seen with Agatha and Magdalena—have long 
been present, but now, more than ever, their opinions matter. While the gossip of a neighbor no 
longer results in the removal of a child to a state institution, it can cut a mother off from critical 
resources and information and thereby heighten her economic and social insecurity. In the Point, 
                                               
10 This is in part due to the privileged social position given to wage (or any) labor as a condition of social 
citizenship. Any able-bodied adult who could work, should work, regardless of employment availability. To ask for 
aid if the capacity to work exists is to invite a criticism of laziness. Since the 1920s, children have been exempt from 
this requirement and are thus viewed deserving beneficiaries of state and public support. As the normatively 
assumed caregivers of the deserving child, mothers can often successfully make the argument that work outside the 
home in addition to caregiving is not possible or beneficial (Ferguson 2015). 
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successfully learning, enacting, and managing performances of motherhood is a critical means to 
survival. 
On Metaphors and Maternity  
 Performances of motherhood were an effectual tool for women like Maryann and 
Lolita—as they were for their predecessors—because of motherhood’s appearance, despite its 
malleability, as a self-evident concept. Both analytically and ethnographically, the term demands 
clarification. My use of motherhood is specific. Many American feminists today retain a 
distinction first proposed by Adrienne Rich between motherhood, as the social, ideological 
construct of the maternal subject, and mothering as the active, relational work of care that is 
shaped by context (1986; Ruddick 1989). The surge of feminist scholarship that followed drew 
upon Butler’s work on gender to complicate this contextually-constructed work of mothering and 
to carve out a space for the resistant subject to participate in the construction of an alternative 
maternal identity (1989, 1990; Hequembourg 2007; Lewin 1993; O'Reilly 2004; Ryan-Flood 
2009; Fraser and Nicholson 1990) and to explore how resistance is a privilege shaped by race, 
class, and political context (Collins 1994; Glenn, Chang and Forcey 1994; Lareau 2003). In 
contrast, I am not concerned with the maternal subject or identity as such—how Point mothers 
understood themselves or mothering. Indeed, I argue that these are not data to which I have 
access. Instead, I focus on the semiotic work of authoring and authorizing certain versions of 
motherhood as social facts. Thus, like Chandler pace Butler, I use mother as a verb: “To be a 
mother is to enact mothering” in an inherently interactive mode (1998, 273). 
 In this chapter, “motherhood” incorporates two domains: first, the labor and practices of 
mothering, and second, the discourses and norms of motherhood—often evaluations of that 
 142 
mothering work—that are in circulation in a particular social group or sub-group. 11 In doing so, 
my analysis brings together once more the distinction between motherhood and mothering. A 
motherhood performance is made up of the material and symbolic acts women engage in as they 
care for a child and the ways in which they narrate, critique, and perform those acts to different 
audiences—their children included—to have themselves understood as someone who is called a 
mother.  
 My use of the term performance is also specific. Performance captures the idea of the 
social life of words and actions, e.g., things done in the presence of an audience—be it a child, 
neighbor, social worker or boyfriend. In my use, performances are a class of speech acts which, 
J.L. Austin aptly terms “performatives” in that they do social work in the world such as persuade 
or protest (1962). The content of performances is collectively produced by the language 
ideologies, repertoires, and actors within a given interactional context. Language ideologies 
outline the situationally specific conditions under which actors can do work with words and how 
their actions may be interpreted (Bauman and Briggs 2003; Carr 2009; Irvine and Gal 2000). 
Repertoires capture the temporal durability of performances, the historical sedimentation of ways 
of acting and speaking that contain rules and roles to ensure repetitive reenactments achieve a 
given reception or comprehensibility (Bauman 1996; Butler 1990; Jackson 2005). This is how in 
various times and places, the concept of the “deserving mother” conjures up different clusters of 
words and actions—repertoires with attendant scripts—that could or could not be enacted. These 
repertoires can be inhabited by an actor, or in Goffman’s term, an animator, in accordance with 
the roles a given language ideology assigns to various persons (1981). Actors can interpret the 
script, improvise, or refuse the assigned role altogether, but such deviation threatens the 
                                               
11 These distinctions were drawn out by Walker, but she includes a third domain of maternal identity that I find less 
useful for this analysis (1995). 
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comprehensibility or effectiveness of the performance (Austin 1962; Briggs 2007). Performance 
offers a name to the work that women do to adhere to or avoid the repertoires of an interactional 
context. 
 Motherhood as I use it, then, is performed, and attributed, in the socially constituted acts 
of mothering. In this interactional model, motherhood is not static and singular, but rather 
multiple and iterative, brought about in the act of performance for an audience (Butler 1989; 
Fraser and Nicholson 1990). But, the performance is limited to durable repertoires—discourses 
and practices that a given audience view as constituting “deserving motherhood.” These include 
not only ways of speaking but also involve actions of care such as modes of food preparation, 
bathing, clothing, or discipline. In short, motherhood can be many things, but not everything 
works at any given time. Likewise, not all people can enact all repertoires of motherhood. 
Differences of race, religion, or habitus constrain the possible repertoires that a woman can take 
up in a particular interaction. 
 While the term performance may evoke play or, at least, interpretive creativity, the 
boundaries of that play are quite limited by already existing directives and by differences in 
power. As others have responded to Austin, not all people have equal power to do work with 
words and the relative power of an actor vis a vis an audience shapes the degree to which an 
actor can rework repertoires (Brada 2013). For women in the Point, performances of deserving 
motherhood were a means of making claims and were thus most frequently done for a more 
powerful audience that was evaluating and assessing them. They enacted performances as part of 
a “semiotic economy” that valued—and materially rewarded—certain repertoires of motherhood 
in certain contexts (Carr 2011, 82; Keane 2007). The women I worked with were constrained by 
the existing repertoires and lacked the power to fully set the terms of deserving motherhood. 
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However, by learning the language ideologies and repertoires in circulation in the Point, women 
could calibrate their performances of motherhood to various audiences and thereby intervene in 
the distribution of resources. In this way, performances of motherhood were key survival 
strategies.  
 As a strategy, performances of deserving motherhood required a great deal of knowledge 
and skill. In order to be successful, women had to become, as Carr says, “ethnographers of 
language” to learn in detail the repertoires of speech and action valued in each kind of interaction 
(2011,19). One effect of the narrowing of South Africa’s welfare system is that where claim 
making once involved a more limited range of interactions mostly with persons who functioned 
as social workers, in 2014 the audiences were more varied and diverse and their interactions far 
less formal and routinized. For instance, while state social workers in 1960 had a fairly set script 
for home visits—one that resembles what unofficial social workers like Jamila use today—the 
terms of interaction with the volunteers at the church soup kitchen are quite different and little 
resemble the ritual confessions expected at an informal prayer group. It was only through 
continued and repeated participation in these various settings that women learned the particular 
contextualization cues that signaled the expected ways of acting (Gumperz 1982). It is not 
surprising, then, women’s abilities to successfully perform motherhood varied enormously. 
Some were quicker studies while others were more adept at acclimating performances to 
different contexts. Though all of the women with whom I worked made claims upon a number of 
persons and institutions, many began to specialize in certain interactional contexts. These 
specialties arose out of women’s personal history with certain audiences as well as their 
performative assets such as race or linguistic knowledge, here meaning the ability to speak 
Afrikaans, Arabic, or isiZulu.  
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 Not only did women learn the contextualization cues for a given interaction, they also 
had to develop “anticipatory interpellation” or an understanding of how a more powerful 
audience would expect a person like them to enact deserving motherhood (Carr 2009). This 
meant attending to what counted as deserving motherhood in a given context and how repertoires 
of deserving motherhood changed based on the race, class, social position of the actor. The very 
notion of deserving vs. undeserving motherhood points to the moral evaluations to which 
motherhood has long been subjected and with which feminist scholars have been concerned 
(Jeremiah 2004; Ladd-Taylor and Umansky 1998; Scheper-Hughes 1989). Point women were 
well aware that standards of “good” and “bad” motherhood are defined within a given 
sociocultural context rather than from an extra-social metric (Gustafson 2005; Van Gillies 2006). 
However, though the women with whom I worked were aware of constructions of deviant and 
ideal motherhood, successful performances required them to enact a middle category: deserving 
motherhood. By virtue of their poverty and lack of high class habitus, Point women could not 
successfully perform repertoires of ideal motherhood. Further, embodying almost any ideal 
would only have limited their eligibility for aid. Instead, the repertoires that attracted support 
were those of adequate motherhood, neither stellar nor disgraceful, but unobjectionable 
motherhood, in need of support. This might involve dressing children in stained, secondhand 
clothes that were meticulously ironed or speaking about homemade remedies to forgo expensive 
medicine. The critical knowledge was determining an alignment of the values of the audience as 
they mapped onto the particular subject position of the actor so as to enable a successful 
performance.  
 My framing of women’s work as strategic performances can inadvertently invoke an 
opposition between a performance as “an act” or somehow “false” and a “real,” intentional self. I 
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disagree with this opposition on both theoretical and methodological grounds. At the theoretical 
level, the pejorative connotation of performance is due to the American language ideology 
according to which words and actions that do not directly reference the speaker’s internal 
thoughts or feelings are not only insincere but false (Carr 2011). Yet as Rosaldo has 
demonstrated, there is a culturally specific relationship between intentions and words (1982). 
Instead of questioning the intentions of an individual speaker, she posits, we should understand 
speech acts as social facts, or as Carr suggests, “as joint products of many speakers” (2011, 
218—219). Herein lies the methodological issue.  
 If, according to Briggs, researchers must understand interviews—and arguably any 
interaction—as platforms for the subject’s performance of self, then the opposition between 
“strategy” and “truth” is not only unhelpful but also impossible to discern from the data available 
(2007). However, if like Rosaldo and Carr, we view all words and actions as equally “real” in 
that they have social consequences, then we can examine the form that these performances take 
and how their audiences view, interpret, and react to them.  
 This distinction is especially important for this research with Point women. First, as a 
white, American researcher who was, correctly, perceived to be economically better off, women 
often made claims upon me for resources or contacts to jobs. For those who did not know me 
well, I was also consistently misinterpreted as a social worker who held the power to remove 
their children. Thus, any data to which I had access constituted a strategic performance. There 
were no methods to step outside of that orientation.  
 Second, dispelling the association of performance with falsehood or insincerity is all the 
more critical in a study on mothers. Strategic actions are seen as both antithetical to sincerity and 
to love. It is well-trod ground that there is great cultural discomfort with any analysis that might 
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imply that mothers do not ultimately love their children (Scheper-Hughes 1989). However, the 
question of whether Point women really loved their children is neither my concern nor within my 
ability to answer. Instead, what I have access to are performances and their reception. Maryann’s 
wiping of her son’s nose was as much a performance as how she cooked the chicken for Jamila. 
She might wipe to show her son love or to relieve discomfort. Or, she might wipe to show a 
pastor that her child was well-cared for and that she was the kind of person who attends to things 
like runny noses. These multiple interpretations are not incommensurate.  One does not negate 
the presence of the other. As a researcher, I attended to how Maryann’s son and the other 
audiences to her wiping responded to the action and the outcomes that arose from it. I argue that 
within the semiotic economy of the Point, there were important contexts in which such wiping—
alongside other acts—was rewarded with critically needed support. 
“We are mothers, we are hustlers”- Making Motherhood Work 
  As has been already noted, the context in which Point women performed motherhood 
were evaluative interactions between persons with unequal power. Teachers, social workers or 
pseudo-social workers, and neighbors constantly assessed the words and actions of women to 
determine if they aligned with valued repertoires of deserving motherhood. However, two 
simultaneously held ideological regimes made this evaluation quite complicated. First, as 
mentioned above, performances were expected and disciplined—to not clean your house on the 
day the social worker came to visit provoked criticism as did the failure to greet your neighbor. 
Second, also present was an ideology that words and actions should reflect the inner psyche of 
the actor. Therefore, clean houses and hellos should arise out of personal desire for tidiness and 
hospitality. But, no one was naïve enough to think that this was a community uniquely populated 
with overly clean or friendly people. This produced what Judith Irvine terms a “sincerity 
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problem” or an inability to assess whether acts referred to inner states (1982). The result was 
high levels of mistrust and anxiety throughout the neighborhood as residents guarded against 
insincere performances with little epistemological grounding to enable assessment.  
 Due to the density of the neighborhood, the suspicions of insincerity that pervaded 
interactions caused a further complication for Point women. As one walked the streets, 
stairwells, or beachfront, they were visible to other pedestrians, taxi passengers, and apartment 
residents hanging out of windows who often would announce their presence with a shout of 
greeting or a catcall. Frequently these overlapping audiences valued quite contradictory 
repertoires of deserving motherhood. For instance, one prayer group leader who was cultivating 
a following of mothers through prayer and patronage, chastised a group of women she had seen 
in line at the Episcopal Church soup kitchen as she drove her Mercedes out of the neighborhood. 
She accused the women of “religion shopping,” implying they lacked a sincere commitment to 
spiritual transformation. In another case, a woman was seen selling the toddler shoes she had 
received as a donation from the refugee care center and the manager accused her of 
misrepresenting her need. The presence of multiple audiences rendered the multiple maternities 
of Point women visible and gave evidentiary fodder for critiques of insincerity and 
duplicitousness.    
 Point women managed these accusations of dishonesty through their use of the term “the 
hustle.” I first encountered it one day, early in fieldwork, while waiting outside with a group of 
women to walk to a Christian prayer meeting.  
BG: Where is Claudette? 
M: (crossly) I called her. I dunno what she’s doing. 
P: (laughing) She’s taking off her Muslim clothes…she can’t go to church with  
Muslim clothes so she’s put jeans on. (all laugh) “Those people that live a double 
life. Hey, but when you are a mother, we must do.  
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S: Ja, that’s the life, we are mothers, we are hustlers. That’s what we do. We are 
hustling.... That’s how we survive.  
L: (laughing) double jobs. 
P: A double life. I must do this, do that…In the day I am a Muslim, in the night I 
must be a febe (prostitute). 
 
This is the same joke Maryann was sharing with Jamila when she told the story about “making a 
plan” to get the chicken. The ability to hustle—to successfully enact the repertoire expected by 
your audience—was a source of pride, a skill. It was part of being a mother. Further, to name 
your actions as the hustle was to share in a collective recognition that some performances did not 
necessarily refer to inner states, but could nonetheless, be effective.  
 The term hustle most likely came from African American vernacular communicated to 
South Africa through music, movies and the television that virtually every family owned. In 
South Africa, the concept retained much of its American meaning as a “survival strategy” 
(Anderson 1976; Stack 1974;), a form of creative opportunism (Thieme 2013; Venkatesh 2002), 
and a form of deceit through either manipulation or charm in the pursuit of pecuniary gain 
(Wacquant 1998). The key here is that the ability to successfully perform a multiplicity of valued 
repertoires—which necessitated disconnecting at least some words and actions from inner 
reference—was a form of social capital that Point women recognized paid dividends within the 
semiotic economy.  
 Further, the metalinguistic concept of the hustle did critical work for Point women as 
they managed the multiplicity of audiences and the ubiquitous suspicion of insincerity. It was a 
descriptive mechanism that allowed women to attribute contradictory actions to different 
epistemological orders and therefore create cohesion (Mol 2002). By invoking the hustle, women 
could call out one performance as insincere and work to (re)establish another as “real”—
meaning referring to the inner self. In the case of the prayer group, Sheila, one of the “religion 
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shoppers” told the leader afterwards that she had to hustle for her sister who was sick and had no 
food at home. Therefore, she had gone to the soup kitchen with Tupperware in hand but with a 
non-believing heart. Through her use of the term, Sheila re-framed her presence at the soup 
kitchen as an insincere request and her involvement in the prayer group as committed belief. In 
doing so, Sheila reconstituted herself as a trustworthy, and therefore deserving, mother. 
However, as powerful as the category of the hustle was for women’s management, it had rather 
limited effect.  
   
Managing Multiple Maternities 
 In 2014 government welfare and aid societies were no longer able to offer the support to 
mothers of all races that they did to white mothers during apartheid. Thus, Point women 
cultivated large networks of people such as social workers, pastors, imams, school principals, 
boyfriends, and neighbors. These various audiences, who often valued different and sometimes 
conflicting repertoires of deserving motherhood, were frequently simultaneously present in the 
same interaction. The ability to calibrate their performances to the appropriate audience and to 
make these diverse performances hang together into a cohesive maternal self was a skill Point 
women regularly practiced and, occasionally, also, blundered. 
 Many of the women with whom I worked had grown up in a state child welfare 
institution, and thus knew best the social worker’s repertoires for deserving motherhood. 
Notably, the social workers circulating in the neighborhood in 2014 were not employees of any 
state agencies that could remove children. They did, however, regulate access to aid such as 
groceries or school uniforms. Maryann and Lolita would clean their rooms meticulously and set 
a pot of beans to boil on the stove to demonstrate their thrift and work ethic, but would also set 
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out milk and sugar for the tea to exhibit hospitality. For women with less high-status partners 
than Lolita’s white husband, they would remove any evidence of a man (who might be giving 
them money or invite inquiries about their sex lives). Luxury items such as hair creams or body 
sprays also countered their claims to poverty or sexual purity, and would therefore be squirreled 
away into cupboards. The children’s fresh-pressed uniforms were hung on display. The children 
themselves were counseled to stay in the room and not play with the neighbor’s children who 
might be perceived as a bad influence. The children were expected to show respectful—greeting 
the social worker and pouring tea—and disciplined behavior—sitting quietly and not speaking 
during the interview only answering questions as directed. 
 In contrast, the many informal prayer groups and churches that offered aid to 
neighborhood children of the community demanded a slightly different repertoire. Women would 
come equipped with Bible verses they had memorized to describe their poverty in Christian 
idioms of graceful suffering. The children, too, were coached to be able to recite the opening of 
the Lord’s Prayer. Here, children were encouraged to play freely and mothers responded to their 
children’s requests with indulgent kindness.  
Boyfriends, too, demanded certain conduct in order for the women to enjoy the privilege 
of the cash they brought home. These included sexual and domestic labors, but also dictated the 
treatment of the children, who frequently had different fathers. Women had to be careful not to 
be seen as spending the boyfriend’s money on another man’s child but also—in the event of a 
generous donation of gym shoes or clothing—that the other children were not seen as better 
resourced than the boyfriend’s own. This meant a delicate and rarely successful calibration of the 
desires and opinions of boyfriends, children, donors and of course the women themselves. 
Sometimes these would create conflict with donors who might ask why a child was barefoot 
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when shoes had been given only the week before. Women had to swiftly generate explanations 
that would counter any concerns of ungratefulness or suspicions that the shoes had been sold. 
 Some women also made claims upon various Muslim associations for aid. This required 
that women know how and when they were supposed to be fasting, Arabic greetings, and prayers 
for maternal piety. Only women with particular social capital could perform these repertoires. 
Their children were enrolled in Madrasa and had Muslim names whose genealogies the women 
could recite. Wearing the hijab was a highly visible marker of identification with a Muslim 
audience, but it did not protect women from suspicions of insincerity. There was a circulating 
discourse disparaging black African women who, during Ramadan, would “put on hijab and go 
running” to receive zakat money.  The Zulu and Xhosa women I knew who had married 
Burundian men and converted to Islam complained of these critiques as irritating and hurtful. 
They bemoaned that their commitment was constantly under question and considered the 
suspicions racist because, in Durban, Islam was more closely associated with the Indian 
community. These women experienced the converse of the “sincerity problem” wherein they felt 
they lacked the means to demonstrate their genuineness.  
 In contrast, Claudette, who moved between Christian and Muslim maternal repertoires, 
felt less personally attacked, but also complained of facing a higher burden of proof. As a more 
recent convert, she said, her Arabic should not be held to such high standards. However, if she 
encountered a church pastor on the street while wearing the hijab, it was more challenging to 
reframe its interpretation. Her success in performing both repertoires depended on her ability to 
keep those two audiences separate. It also depended on her maintaining good relationships with 
neighbors by sharing the spoils of her work. A disgruntled neighbor was a threat who could bring 
the contradictions between these two repertoires to the fore. Instead, as seen above, Claudette’s 
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skills in performance provoked mostly praise and amusement.  
The most complicated performances of motherhood by far were those for women’s most 
proximate neighbors such as between Lolita and Maryann. The generosity of neighbors was the 
lifeblood of survival of Point women. Neighbors provided anything from cooking oil to loan 
payments when someone was short, short-term childcare for a trip to the store or job interview, 
or much needed appliances (or appliance space in the case of Lolita). Importantly, neighbors 
were the source of vital information about who was passing out biryani, when a new church 
opened its doors and its donation bins, or when a much-coveted flat became vacant. These 
exchanges embedded women in complicated webs of reciprocity and obligation where neighbors 
were constantly tallying their credits and debts. Women sought to cultivate a delicate balance 
between appearing generous enough with their time and resources to inspire other neighbors to 
be the same, but not so generous as to invite too many requests. Women likewise cultivated 
closeness with neighbors through their own and others children—caring for them, feeding them, 
offering friendly advice. Success was a fragile balancing of demonstrating one’s own skill 
against the potential of appearing to be “too proud” or superior to others. Therefore, actions such 
as prohibiting children from playing with the neighbor’s children when the social worker visited 
could quickly backfire and alienate neighborly allies if not handled deftly.  
 In addition to the resources and labor that neighbors provided, the collusion of neighbors 
was necessary to maintaining cohesion across contradictory repertoires of motherhood. The 
assistance of neighbors could support a metalinguistic narrative that differentiated between “the 
hustle” and sincere action. Sheila’s re-framing of her attendance at the church soup kitchen as a 
caretaking act for her sister was accepted in part because she had a history of active participation 
in the prayer group and in part because she brought a neighbor to the group to pose as her sister, 
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which both verified the story and increased the leader’s following. Conversely, an alienated 
neighbor could sabotage a performance by calling attention to the discrepancies between 
repertoires. One of the most potent threats was a holdover from the era of a more robust welfare 
system. An angry neighbor might report a woman to “the Welfare” and trigger state intervention 
or, at worst, removal of the children. 
 I was walking into the building one day when Priscilla, the notoriously corrupt manager 
of Maryann and Lolita’s building, called me into her office. In exchange for free housing, 
Priscilla collected rent, interviewed new tenants, issued eviction notices, and enforced the 
building rules, giving her a great deal of access to tenants’ lives and power over them. Like the 
tenants, I trod a careful line with Priscilla to keep my distance, but not alienate her. That morning 
she was especially chatty and asked me how my work with “the mothers” was going. She 
complained about a tenant, Rose, saying that Rose was a prostitute who didn’t discipline her 
children and let them “run wild.” In his “wildness,” Rose’s eldest boy had beat up Priscilla’s 
middle child, who had stolen Rose’s hotplate to sell. Rose then refused to pay rent.  
 Priscilla related this to me indignantly and directed me to talk to Rose and “set her 
straight,” something I had no intention of doing. Furthermore, Priscilla continued, she was very 
concerned about the condition of Rose’s children and wanted me to be present when she called 
“the Welfare.” As she dialed, I reiterated that I had no connection to anyone at Durban Child 
Welfare, but was cut short by Priscilla who was declaring to the person on the other end of the 
line that she wished to report an incident of child abuse. While I stood there, Priscilla proceeded 
to enumerate a list of Rose’s maternal failings. She said Rose would drink and go out with men 
all day and night, leaving her children unsupervised in a locked room. Priscilla, positioning 
herself as the savior, would then unlock the door to get access to the children so she could “feed 
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them nicely,” bathe them, and give them clean clothes. Rose, she said, was “ungrateful” for all 
Priscilla had done for her and would instead swear at her for interfering.  
 Though Rose, like many tenants, had a tense relationship with Priscilla, she otherwise 
was well-respected in the building. She was away from the building most of the day and she 
often paid an older resident, Gogo Sotatshe to watch her two younger children. Gogo spoke well 
of Rose, praising her for working hard and “seeing to” her children well. Gogo often borrowed 
the food or diapers from Rose’s children for some of her other charges who were not as well 
provisioned. As one of the few women who lived alone with her children, Rose was praised as 
being both “mother and father” by earning money and organizing care. She had a reputation for 
being a “good hustler” which enabled her to support her family, provide a wage to others, and 
maintain a reputation within the building as a good mother. 
 No social worker ever came to follow up on the report on Rose, much to Priscilla’s 
disappointment. As we saw in the case of Magdalena, an identical list of complaints in 1960 
resulted in intense supervision by a social worker and, likely, removal. As of 2014, however, the 
child welfare services were wildly fragmented and overburdened and calls of neglect were often 
simply overlooked. Furthermore, in the intervening years the child protection model had shifted 
from removal to family strengthening that involved supporting the child in the home. But, many 
Point women had grown up in state institutions and they remembered well the intervention 
neighborly critiques of motherhood could bring. Indeed, though such reports no longer brought 
down the arm of the state, they still retained disciplinary effect. Instead, regulatory forms of 
surveillance had become as dispersed as the sources of aid. The consequences, while different, 
are just as deeply felt.  
 Maryann continued to go to the prayer group long after the others had stopped going. She 
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had garnered the leader’s favor and received a regular supply of groceries and lotions. These 
resources she refused to share with the other women, arguing that they were rewards for pious 
adherence that her neighbors did not deserve. Fed up one day by what she saw as Maryann’s 
habitual stinginess and pride, Lolita unexpectedly returned to tell the leader that Maryann had 
spent the previous Sunday drinking with a man on the beachfront, not watching her young 
daughters. “And you know those girls have green eyes and would be snatched by anyone,” Lolita 
noted, adding another layer to the transgression. Indeed, Maryann had been on the beachfront 
socializing with a former colleague from work who had gone on to buy her daughters new spring 
clothes, a boon for their family. It is likely that invoking the hustle would not have helped 
Maryann explain her weekend performance because that particular group leader was known to 
find talk of hustling distasteful and sinful as opposed to entrepreneurial, as others did. Maryann 
knew this and instead argued that it wasn’t her on the beach, but her sister who, from a distance, 
resembled her. Yet, in this interaction, Maryann lacked the power to reframe the interpretation or, 
like Sheila, the social capital to bring a friend to verify her version. Unconvinced, the prayer 
group leader lectured Maryann on her maternal responsibilities and dismissed her from the 
group.  
 The successful performance of multiple repertoires of motherhood to different audiences 
depended on women’s ability to make multiple repertoires hang together in a comprehensible 
way. As much as the notion of the hustle was one tool for such work, so too was the cultivation 
of amicable relationships with neighbors. A performance’s success was dependent on the 
supporting roles of children and neighbors. Discord with these supporting actors could 
undermine a performance or undo the tenuous cohesion women build across multiple maternal 
repertoires. An angered Lolita highlighted the contradictions between Maryann’s actions as a 
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party girl/socialite and the expected conduct of a Christian mother. Despite her skills, without 
supporting actors Maryann could not regain the performative authority to successfully recuperate 
a cohesive harmony between these contradictory repertoires. The result was that she was cut off 
from a lucrative source of aid.  
Conclusion 
 While the Point neighborhood of Durban has a unique history and urban density, it 
functions as a critical microcosm of larger trends facing the country and the continent. Rapid 
urbanization has not slowed over the past six decades making urban centers sites of limited 
housing, rising housing costs, and increased conditions of overcrowding. Waged labor is 
increasingly unavailable to new and old urban residents and people are finding ways to meet the 
needs of a cash economy through a broader array of economic activities. Tensions are high as an 
influx of immigrants only contributes to feelings of scarcity. Though informal segregation still 
remains, South Africans, especially the urban poor, are living in increasingly diverse 
communities where they must rely on people of very different racial and cultural backgrounds.  
 I have argued that in the absence of state welfare services that provide sufficient 
resources for survival, poor mothers rely upon a large network of multiple categories of persons 
to make claims for resources, labor, and assistance. Given that claims for themselves are not 
recognized as legitimate, poor women’s requests take the form of performances of deserving 
motherhood, carefully aligned to the values of particular audiences. These performances require 
women to be skilled ethnographers and learn the rules of each interactive context, as well as how 
those rules map on to their particularly racialized body. In the context of the Point, women must 
also attend the presence of multiple audiences, frequently with conflicting values. Performances 
that contradict the value system and preconceptions of the audience validate suspicions that Point 
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women engage in performances that are false and insincere. Women manage this concern—
brought about through the multiple maternities they are asked to embody—by marking certain 
performances as strategic and others as authentic with the term the hustle. However, this ability 
to create cohesion—to make their multiple maternities hang together—is dependent on the 
collusion of supporting actors, often children and neighbors. Without the support of these 
collaborators, Point women can be left without a stage to stand on.    
 For as much as I have focused on how women use performances of motherhood to shape 
the distribution of resources, also at play is the issue of recognition. The inhabitants of the new 
South Africa now enjoy many new forms of inclusion such as voting rights and constitutional 
rights to housing, water and social services to name a few. However, the persistence of poverty 
and the decline of waged labor have led to many forms of exclusion from the promises the new 
democracy was supposed to bring. Some of this exclusion has been mitigated by the broad 
expansion of social grants such as the CSG, but the categories of recognition remain quite 
limited to the elderly, the child, and the sick or disabled. Able-bodied women and men who find 
themselves out of work and out of opportunities lack the mechanisms to make claims for support 
of their own, individual, projects of living. As demonstrated by Point women, motherhood offers 
women access to a repertoire of legitimate claim making that recognizes and incorporates them 
into the national social fabric. However, this recognition remains limited as their legibility and 
merit resides not in their own needs or even in the value of their maternal labor, but in the social 
value of the child. The rest of the dissertation takes on the effects of this limited legibility from a 
variety of angles. The next chapter considers how concerns about fatherhood as always 
intertwined with ideals of motherhood and family, have changed between the 1960s and 2014. 
Having discussed motherhood in depth, I attend to how discourses of family disintegration and 
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paternal failure shape men’s projects of supporting their children. From there, I turn to 
negotiations between women and men as they are mediated through the transactions in the 
maintenance court. Finally, I consider the meaning of marriage to both social personhood and 
membership within the polity. These final chapters to not take citizenship as a given, but instead 
attend to the contours and boundaries of a lived sense of belonging. In short, I track how 
citizenship is worked out in everyday practices such as the wiping of noses and the cooking of 
meat. 
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Chapter 5 - Problematic Paters and Foreign Fathers: Race, Class, and Paternal Projects 
 
 
In April 1961, the Congress on Family Life was held in Pretoria as the culminating event 
of the Family Year, a year of national reflection and research on the condition of the South 
African family. Attended by over 750 delegates, the Congress brought together those concerned 
with “the deteriorating condition of family life in this country” so as to formulate agendas for 
various social sectors—welfare, religious institutions, education, civic organizations—to “restore 
family life to its place of honour.”1  
In one of the first addresses of the Congress, Professor S. Pauw, Principal of the 
University of South Africa, named some of the outcomes of family deterioration that would be 
discussed throughout the Congress: “Some of us are deeply concerned about family life and have 
a fear of serious retrogression which we believe is evident in the divorce rate, the neglect of 
children, juvenile delinquency, in the neglect of the older generation, and in the disturbed 
personalities which our families produce.” 2 He went on to place these current issues in historical 
perspective as products of a particular moment: 
“I also believe that we in South Africa have all but passed through a difficult 
phase in regard to our family problems. This phase was the transition from 
country to town, in which the vast majority of Afrikaans urban families was 
concerned. We are now entering a period in which most urban families have 
survived this stage and have attained a measure of security and stability. They feel 
at home in the city and have to a great extent achieved a secure pattern of life, 
which ought to contribute to the stability of family life. But we must not shut our 
eyes to some serious problems. We must not only be concerned about the visible 
                                               
1 Opening Address by the Governor-General. Report of the Family Congress. University of Pretoria 4-7 April, 196. The Steering 
Committee of the Family Year and the Family Congress. Pretoria:8.  
2 S. Pauw. “Family Life in Transition.” Report of the Family Congress. University of Pretoria 4-7 April, 196. The Steering 
Committee of the Family Year and the Family Congress. Pretoria:11.  
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signs of the decay of family life. Visible decay is only symptomatic of a general 
and deeper tendency to complete social decay.” 3 
 
Statements such as these are prevalent throughout the report of Congress proceedings and echo 
the official discourse of other governmental writing of the same period. Indeed, the late 1950s 
and 1960s saw a renewed fear over family disintegration that focused on the social ills that had 
come with widespread postwar economic prosperity and greater global integration.  
 A number of historic changes gave this “crisis in the family” its particular flavor. First, 
the economic growth that came with the war and the immediate postwar years—together with 
twenty years of welfare investment—had all but eradicated the ‘problem’ of poor whites.4 In 
many cases the women who had filled the labor gaps left by men during wartime did not leave 
their jobs, and more women were entering the workforce every year. With full employment came 
concerns that this new white middle class had lost touch with important Christian national values 
of family, church, and marriage. Parents were thought to be too busy in the workplace and too 
concerned with social climbing to attend to the needs of their children: 
“A competitive urge to succeed, to excel, to outdo and out rival others in their 
standard of living, is symptomatic of a high degree of selfishness and egoism. 
Self-interest is the overriding factor. No effort is spared and even great hardship is 
endured for the sake of personal rights and privileges, but there is marked 
reluctance to be drawn into any undertakings involving obligations.”5  
 
During this time, divorce rates among the white population soared, which only fueled concerns 
about the security of the white nuclear family (Burman and Fuchs 1986:15). Furthermore, there 
was an international growth in psychology as a discipline, and in contrast to a prior emphasis on 
material need, a turn in official government policy toward a concern about mental and moral 
                                               
3 Ibid:15.  
4 By 1959 only a tiny percentage of whites were unemployed.7 7- Lazar (1987: 90) estimates that in 1959 only 13 314 whites – 
less than 0.5 per cent of the total white population, and only one per cent of the white workforce – were registered as 
unemployed. 
5 Report from the Committee of Inquiry into Family Allowances, 1961:12. 
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welfare of white children (Muirhead 2012). This change in emphasis manifested in an abiding 
concern that the shift in parental attitudes was causing moral degeneration in youth. Between 
1955 and 1960, four commissions were convened to delve into the problem of delinquent white 
youth that detailed issues of drug abuse, suicide, homosexuality, theft, pregnancy, and workshy 
behavior amongst juveniles (Glaser 2005). Fueled in part by the ‘ducktail and flick knife’ 
subculture that gained popularity among white youth in the 1950s and 1960s, news stories of 
ducktail gangs’ promiscuity, aggressive behavior, destruction of property, and flagrant disregard 
for the rule of law incited discussion intervention by the state and social workers alike (Glaser 
2005).6 The consensus was that parents, most notably fathers, had failed to inculcate their 
children with proper vales and respect and had lost their authority and control. In addition to 
national censorship of books and entertainment material,7 there was renewed effort for social 
workers to provide “specialised attention” to parents who couldn’t cope.8 
 In quite a similar vein, the years prior to 2014 saw a reinvigorated national concern about 
“the breakdown of families” in ways that have been addressed throughout this dissertation 
(SAIRR 2012:4).9 The language in the 2012 White Paper on Families is remarkably familiar: 
“The South African society, with specific reference to family life and school life, 
is experiencing a serious moral breakdown or degeneration, described as the 
process of declining from a higher to a lower level of morality (Louw, 2009). 
Moral degeneration is often seen as preceding or concomitant with the decline in 
                                               
6 Arguably, the fact that these anti-establishment youths would soon constitute the electorate was of great concern to the state. 
Further, Kate Mooney has argued that the Ducktail movement received so much attention because the deviant and idle behavior 
evinced by these youths had always been associated by the apartheid government with Africans, thus—very much like the poor 
whites of the 1940s, bringing the idealised white Christian identity into disrepute (1998). 
7 Members of the South African National Council of Child Welfare attributed the growth in juvenile delinquency to the youth 
being influenced by ‘undesirable’ cultural discourse from modern western society. In their opinion, economic and technological 
developments “made of man a cog in an impersonal machine”. KAB, File 2/OBS 3/1/663 N7/22/3 Agencies Section 48 of the 
Children’s Act 1960: “Our Children’s Day”, Appeal by Mrs JJ Fouché, state president’s wife, 3 July 1968. 
8 By 1957, the Society for the Protection of Child Life, set up a Parent Guidance Office to offer parents support by social work 
experts. KAB, File 3/CT 4/1/10/14 E4/1 Vol. 4. Maternity and Child Welfare. South African National Council for Child Welfare, 
1946-1954. SA National Council for Child Welfare: Annual Meeting and Committee, Port Elizabeth, August 1959. “Report by 
the SPCL on New Service”. 
9  A brief overview into the policy work done in regards to families includes: 1992 White Paper for Social Welfare; 2001 a draft 
National Policy Framework for Families was developed by the Department of Social Development and issued in 2005; 2005 
Children’s Act; 2011 Green Paper on Families; and 2012 White Paper on Families.  
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quality of life, and in South Africa it is widely-reported in the media and is 
evident and reflected in social ills such as a general lack of discipline, violence, 
poverty, unemployment, a high crime rate, school vandalism and corruption. 
According to Louw, (2009), these moral ills, which have negative implications for 
society, have been attributed to a lack of a positive value system in society as a 
whole as well as to social media and technology which often infiltrates family life 
by, for example, exposing children and youth to pornography and other negative 
influences (Louw, 2009; Bayaga & Jaysveree, 2011) (DSD 2012:29-30). 
 
In contrast to the predominant focus on white families in 1960s (conversations about non-white 
families were taking place in other spheres), in the 2010s the implied emphasis is predominantly 
on black African families who, numerically, made up the majority of those families experiencing 
poverty. Furthermore, the efforts in the 2010s were in direct response to the instabilities wrought 
by government policies in the 1950s and 1960s. Conscious of this history and in keeping with a 
new national vision, policy drafters were very careful to not explicitly promote a single 
normative ideal of family life and to acknowledge the flexibility of family forms. Nevertheless, 
implicitly, a nuclear family formalized through marriage was reasserted as the most beneficial 
through the articulation of family challenges. For example, the 2012 White Paper on Families 
states: 
“Non-marital childbearing—is also high in the country, particularly among 
Africans and Coloureds (Nzimande, 2007).… Socioeconomically although family 
structure and parental marital status alone do not guarantee positive or negative 
outcomes (Manning, 2002), non-marital childbearing has been shown to have 
more negative implications for children’s education, economic and overall well-
being, with research indicating that stable marital unions “benefit nearly every 
aspect of children’s well-being. This includes greater educational opportunities, 
better emotional and physical health, lower incidences of anti-social behaviour 
such substance abuse, early sexual activity for girls, and delinquency for boys” 
(Wilkins, 2012:vi)” (emphasis in original, DSD 2012). 
 
While the statement hedges its claims, the preference for nuclear families as the basis for 
beneficial childrearing is clear. In the framing, concerns about family instability centered around 
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the rising number of black children living in households headed by unmarried women.10 In this 
context where “economic activity” and “self-sufficiency” were valued, these female-headed 
households were recorded as “ less likely to be economically active than individuals living in 
households with male heads” and “ more dependent on social grants as the main source of 
household income than maleheaded households (44 percent compared to 67 percent)” (DSD 
2012:19). 
 Of the ills that South African families were listed to be facing—poverty and inequality, 
unemployment, housing, HIV and AIDS, absentee fathers, crime, substance abuse, gender-based 
violence, teenage pregnancy and moral degeneration—four of them notably had a black male 
source. Indeed, as Posel suggests, in the decades since transition “there was widespread alarm at 
the prospect that the newborn democracy, the fledgling nation, was sick to its core, confronted 
with the threat of moral death at the very inception of its new life;” and, at issue was black male 
sexual and economic irresponsibility (2005: 248). In an opinion piece on 'Restoring Respect for 
Family', Bongani Khumalo, founder of the South African Men’s Forum, summarized the issues 
well:  
“Men form a large proportion of the moral degeneration that we see in our 
society. There is not a single crime-whether rape, robbery or abuse-where a man 
is not the common denominator. Until you address the issue of men, and the 
violence they perpetrate in our society, you will not begin to steer society towards 
moral regeneration” (2002). 
 
Within this logic, men are the problem, and the moral degeneration of the individual is clearly 
mapped onto the moral precarity of the nation. Should men fail “to don the mantle of responsible 
fatherhood,” they threaten the possibility of national stability (Posel 2005:249). 
                                               
10 Co-residence with fathers differs dramatically by race.  In 2012, 69% of black children lived without their fathers,. The number 
of children who live in the same household with both biological parents presents an even starker comparison: 28% for black 
children, 81% for Indian children and 77% for white children (Hall et al. 2014). 
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This chapter considers the work of fathers living in the two very different times of these 
panics over family decline and, ultimately, deviant masculinities. The fathers considered here 
hail from a variety of races and ethnic groups, and none embrace the masculine identity 
considered problematic in their respective times—what I call dominant deviance. In addition to 
their paternal status, what they share is membership in another stigmatized social category: the 
poor. Their shared poverty makes them reliant on outside sources of support—and the attendant 
moral evaluation that brings—to assist them in their projects of caring for children. This chapter 
is concerned with the effects of these larger panics on the daily lives of men attempting the 
quotidian work of social reproduction at the tenuous fringes of poverty.  
I argue that men’s abilities to claim support for their projects of caring for children is 
shaped by their relationship to the dominant ideas of masculine deviance in their socio-historic 
context. Certain norms of acceptable and unacceptable gendered behavior were applied to and 
shaped the availability of support afforded to fathers of different races. Further, as these notions 
of dominant deviance shift over time, so too does the conditions of possibility for claim making. 
More specifically, in the 1960s the two versions of male dominant deviance at play were the 
inattentive father and the juvenile delinquent that resulted from derelict care. These fostered 
anxieties over male control and providership were often at odds with one another. Concerns that 
children—and especially male children—required the strong involvement of a disciplinary father 
figure lest they lapse into juvenile delinquency would seem to place higher value on male 
presence. But, in the case of single fathers, their responsibility to work to earn sufficient support 
was more frequently held in higher esteem. Their presence in the lives of their children was 
insufficient to garner state support. In contrast, though the dominant male deviance in 2014 was 
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also one of the absent father, valued masculine ideals had shifted such that male presence—even 
amidst poverty—was rewarded and supported.  
Drawing upon case files from the Durban Children’s Court, I explore how in the 1960s 
social workers responses to the efforts of poor white and coloured single fathers to raise their 
children were shaped by national concerns over paternal obligation and juvenile delinquency. 
Further, the lack of a woman in these homes to ratify the family as a social unit constrained the 
forms of aid the households received. I compare these earlier cases with participant observation 
from 2014 of fathers soliciting resources from patrons—a very different audience. With a very 
different spectre of male dominant deviance at play—the black absentee father—the work of 
these Indian and Congolese fathers is met with much greater sympathy than the 1960s fathers. 
Strikingly, in these present-day examples, the invisibility of a female caregiver at home serves to 
enhance the worthiness of these fathers, rather than undercut it. 
Throughout this chapter, I rely on two concepts to analyze how gendered power—
manifested in the ability to make claims—was organized along racial, class, and ethnic lines. 
First, I draw upon the concept of hegemonic masculinity, first developed by Raewyn Connell, 
that has gained dominance in South African gender scholarship over the past few decades. By 
this I mean a version of masculinity—norms of speaking and acting—that is culturally valued 
above others and bestows power and privilege upon those who espouse it (Morrell 1998).11 In 
other words, what are the (socio-historically particular) conventions of behavior and self-
presentation that are viewed as defining a ‘real’ man or a ‘successful’ man as an ideal-type? The 
use of hegemony is important because it is inherently relational and speaks to the multiplicity of 
masculinities that coexist and co-constitute one another. This is analytically valuable in the South 
                                               
11 Importantly, dominance here does not mean a head count or numerical dominance as much as cultural value, in Morrell’s terms 
‘‘a question of relations of cultural domination” (1998:607–8). 
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African context where a long history of racial rule has so clearly divided the political and 
economic landscape along lines of gender, race, and social class making subordinate 
masculinities always present.  
Hegemony, in the Gramscian tradition also retains a sense of the fragility of dominance. 
Ascendance is not a given nor stable condition, it must be achieved through constant 
contestation, defense, and reproduction. As I use it here, the social power of hegemonic 
masculinity rests in its deployment by on the one hand social workers and on the other potential 
benefactors. In such instances, dominance is evident in “‘[t]he ability to impose a definition of 
the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate 
ideals and define morality’ (Connell 1987: 107). In this chapter, as I consider two important eras 
for constructions of various masculinities, the 1960s and 2014, the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity allows me to attend to the differences in what forms of masculinity were dominant 
and subordinate in each era as well as how masculine ideals differed by race, class, and ethnicity.  
A second concept I employ is that of dominant deviant masculinity (or DD masculinity). I 
use this to refer to the male gendered forms of speaking and acting whose deviation from the 
ideal or even subordinate masculinity are seen by people in power as the most problematic. 
Again, this speaks to a hierarchy of valuation given to gendered behavior. Dominant deviance 
refers to the male behaviors that are collectively deemed the most dangerous, the most 
disruptive, and provoke social anxiety in a given socio-historical context. DD masculinities are 
not simply subordinate to the hegemonic ideal, as in lesser in power, they are specifically 
negatively marked as troublesome and damaging. 
While the arguments of this chapter are more broadly applicable, they are steeped in the 
particularities of the Point neighborhood in the socio-historic contexts of the early 1960s and mid 
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2010s. The men whose experiences form the heart of this chapter can all be understood as 
foreigners in some sense. This status had important effects for how their claims were perceived 
in their respective times. In both time periods, the neighborhood was the first, if sometimes the 
only, home for a variety of immigrant groups. In the 1960s these were predominantly groups 
from the Mediterranean and Iberia – Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy—whose economies were 
relatively weak vis a vis South Africa’s (Glaser 2010).12 Post-apartheid, there was an influx of 
political and economic refugees from the rest of the African continent. The heterogeneity of the 
neighborhood and relative lack of social cohesion made it an easier community for immigrants to 
integrate into. The relative availability of jobs also helped immigrants quickly establish 
themselves. Ethnic and linguistic enclaves formed throughout the neighborhood and assisted 
newcomers in finding housing and jobs. In the 1960s, the area around Hospital Road was 
dominated by Greek immigrants who overwhelmingly worked as builders and bricklayers. In 
2014, the building named Montrose housed an overwhelming proportion of immigrants from 
Burundi whose male members worked in transport and delivery companies that serviced the port.  
Though originating from quite different countries, the immigrant groups in these eras shared the 
common experience of being outsiders who had to work to make themselves fit into a country 
already riven with divisions. When not clustered in ethnic groups, many foreigners joined 
various gangs within the neighborhood both as a form of sociability and for protection. Emilios, 
a gentleman who migrated from Greece in the late 1950s, spoke with pride about a gang he led 
of Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, Greeks. Without a common language, they developed their 
own vernacular that also served to confuse the bar patrons and sunbathers they sought to rob. 
                                               
12 Following the election of the National Party in 1948, the government imposed a highly restrictive European immigration 
regime. However, in the early 1960s, the intensity of the skilled labor shortage prompted the Nationalists to actively recruit 
European immigrants. For example, about 22 000 legal immigrants arrived in South Africa from the Portuguese mainland 
between 1963 and 1971 (Glaser 2010:69). Glaser suggests that European recruitment was a political choice: “[f]aced with the 
alternatives of mass European immigration or lifting the skills colour bar, the apartheid regime opted for the former” (2010:66). 
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Emilios noted that their shared marginalization from white South Africa further solidified the 
gang’s relationships. However, the high concentration of foreigners in the Point was closely 
bound up with the neighborhood’s reputation as an unruly place of crime, an “area known for 
drunkenness and loose living” in the words of one social worker.13 This reputation could work 
against a foreigner seeking to relocate elsewhere, such as the case of Rhodesians seeking 
improved housing (Dougherty 1981). For the immigrants from other African countries, the 
neighborhood’s reputation instead afforded them a modicum of security. Fearing xenophobic 
violence (e.g. “in the locations [townships] we would be killed”), people bemoaned the ability to 
move elsewhere. But, in 2015, when a wave of xenophobia swept through Durban, throngs of 
immigrants set rubbish bins alight and overturned cars to block the roads to Point and defend 
their right to be there. The “army of Zulus” that my interlocutors imagined were marching 
towards Point, instead avoided the neighborhood.   
Fatherhood in The Files--1960s 
By the 1960s, following forty years of deliberation over the poor white question, the 
throngs of poverty-stricken whites with little institutionalized support had been replaced by a 
small number of poor whites supported by an expansive welfare system that catered to them to 
the exclusion of other racial groups. Yet the reduction in the number of poor whites did not 
translate into a reduction in the anxiety their presence produced. Like Roos, “I also see the 
spectre of poor whiteism as a constant backdrop to the historical dramas” or early apartheid state 
building. However, I push his timeline of the mid-1950s further into the 1960s (2015:1171). 
After the postwar economic boom, there were not enough whites to meet the demands for skilled 
labor (Davenport 1992). Yet, to allow those positions to be filled by other racial groups was to 
                                               
13 TBD, 1DBN, box 464 Amos Protection of Children case number: 3/2/1/3/195 sub file: 33/2/4//308/59. 
 170 
risk upending the entire racial hierarchy on which the apartheid system was premised. Coloureds 
were barred from taking jobs and their unemployment levels rose, leading to a rapid deterioration 
in their economic position relative to whites (Jung 2000:184).14 At the same time, the expansion 
of white affluence that marked the 50s and 60s and increasing availability of consumer goods—
and advertising media that promoted them—led to raised consumer expectations for modern 
lifestyles. This only served to further marginalize the remaining poor whites and the 
economically weakened couloureds who could not maintain such practices.  
In the various commissions of inquiry that took place during this period, the rise of 
juvenile delinquency—which was noted to have taken place across all race groups—was 
attributed to an increase in the inadequate care and upbringing of children (Glaser 2005). 
However, in the case of white families, many argued, these issues did not arise from the problem 
of material want. Instead, they were the result of a shift of values from piety and familial love 
toward consumerism, materialism, and personal ease. As one commission of inquiry report 
stated: 
“It is held that inadequate care and upbringing are much more due to inherent 
weaknesses in parents than to financial circumstances, that insufficient material 
means in present-day society are usually associated more with personality 
deficiencies than lack of opportunity; and that the economic factor is outweighed 
by way of life of the parents. In a straitforward case of want, there is usually a 
particular social background which can hardly be separated from human material 
as such. There are those with personality deficiencies who cannot easily secure a 
settled place in society, while others are handicapped by inferior mental 
endowments. The ability to secure the necessities of life is therefore automatically 
affected by the quality of human material. There are, however, so many forms of 
social assistance and welfare aid available to such weaker members of the 
community that there is really no need for their families to suffer any neglect. 
Inadequate care and upbringing are also ascribed to the maintenance of too high a 
standard of living and easy credit facilities, and it is asserted that, where the 
                                               
14 The 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act and 1965 Shops and Offices Act reserved jobs for whites and coloureds could not 
advance beyond certain positions. The remuneration of coloured employees relative to whites dropped from 41 percent in 1945 to 
24% in 1970 (Jung 2000:184) 
 171 
parent is devoted to the child, economic need is not an insurmountable 
problem”15  
 
Bypassing the possibility of structurally based “financial circumstances,” the discourse of 
parental care that came to circulate in the 1960s was a responsibilizing one, which placed the 
blame of shortfall squarely on the individual. As elsewhere, the role of provider was foundational 
to hegemonic understandings of fatherhood in South Africa (Morrell 2006). Feminist scholars of 
care, who have teased out the distinctions of a caregiving continuum, place the provider role as 
one of often financial care, contributing to, if distanced from, the direct physical work of 
caregiving (Tronto 1993). In this text parental devotion ensured economic security. By 
individualizing the challenges of financial circumstances, official discourse such as the above 
gave rise to the possibility of a financially-evaluated dominant deviance, one which equated 
financial failure onto a personal failure of fatherhood. Thus, when not an issue of a “personality 
deficiency”, the problem of inadequate care was one of a misappropriated modernity seen as 
arising from the consumption of Western—notably English and American—goods and popular 
culture.  
 In his presentation at the Congress of the Family Year, J. De. W. Keyter, Professor of 
Sociology and Social Work at the University of the Orange Free State, made the link between 
inadequate care and its psychological and social effects on the child more clear: 
“Indifference, irresponsibility, lack of interest and control, and immorality on the 
part of the parents figure in increasing measure as the leading causes of neglect of 
children and teenagers. In this regard, the increasing extent of serious forms of 
juvenile misbehaviour and the rising number of children and youngsters who are 
declared to be out of control, bear damning witness to the decline in parental 
control of the child. Almost without exception a lack of healthy home conditions 
and parental interest and care figure largely in the case records of juvenile 
delinquents and offenders.” 16 
                                               
15 Report on the Committee of Inquiry into Family Allowances, 1961:23. 
16 J. De. W. Keyter. “Family Disorganization and its Nature and Extent.” Report of the Family Congress. University of Pretoria 
4-7 April, 196. The Steering Committee of the Family Year and the Family Congress. Pretoria:11.  
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These two quotes help to outline the contours of the dominant deviant masculinities of concern 
in the 1960s. First, fathers either too caught up with the demands of their job or too disinterested 
in the responsibilities of parenting failed to exert the proper control and discipline within the 
family. I term this dominantly deviant provider role indifferent fatherhood. Whether that 
indifference results from lack of interest or (what is deemed) inappropriate prioritization, it 
fatherhood with a misplaced focus. In other words, a lack of or misplaced emphasis of “caring 
about” results in a lack of financially “caring for,” the perceived cornerstone of the provider role. 
Second, fathers could fail to provide the moral framework for their children, especially boys. The 
dominant deviance here was moral indifference, and the result of such negligence was juvenile 
delinquency.   
In the 1950s and 1960s, juvenile delinquency took the form of the Ducktails, the name 
given to a (predominantly white) youth gang subculture.17 They embodied what was seen as the 
problematic embrace of Western counterculture in the form of fashion, music (especially rock-'n-
roll), films, and comics (Mooney 1998). Named after the iconic hairstyle, their motivating ethos 
was the pursuit of pleasure and diversion. They were often found in entertainment spaces such as 
the cinema or bioscope cafes or enjoying cross-racial music jam sessions in dance halls, billiard 
rooms, bars, or shebeens (illegal liquor selling establishments), which, in Durban, were 
frequently found near the beachfront. In the Point, one ducktail gang was known to occupy the 
Blue Grotto café on the bottom level of a beachfront structure while another frequented the 
rough and notorious nightclub The Smugglers Inn (Buttigieg 2016).  Notably, the Point gangs 
were more multiracial than other ducktail gangs. The male members also engaged in more 
                                               
17 " The South Africa Ducktails were part of a broader 1950s international youth culture, which took the form of the Teddy Boys 
in Britain; the Greasers in the US; the Bodgies and Wedgies in Australia; the Halbarstarke and Nozems in Holland; the Schwarze 
Jakken in Germany; the Blousons Noirs [Black Jackets] in France and the Stiljags in the Balkan States (Mooney 2016. 
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violent and destructive activities such as “vandalism, the temporary theft of cars for the purposes 
of joy-riding, the assault of innocent bystanders, inter-gang street fighting, petty crime, the 
buying and selling of illicit liquor and dagga (marijuana), the molesting of girls and women, and 
the assault of African and homosexual men.”18 In Durban in 1962, one ducktail gang took over 
the midnight show at the Playhouse theater and overturned the police vehicles that attempted to 
restore order (eNongqai Staff 2011: 3-11).19 
Kate Mooney, the leading scholar on the Ducktails argues that they had the time to 
participate in so many of these activities in part because they hailed from class backgrounds that 
afforded them economic security that allowed them to actively avoid work.20 A 1961 social work 
thesis on the Ducktails of Greyville suggests this was less the case in Durban. The researcher 
noted: 
“The home of Lennie and Tony's parents was typical of the homes from which 
many of the Greyville Ducktails came. Several social agencies in Durban (among 
them, the Social Services Association, Durban Child Welfare Society and the 
Department of Social Welfare) at one time or the other, dealt with this family. 
Records showed evidence of petty criminality, drunkenness, workshyness, 
desertion, illegitimacy and a general low level of social morale, with a complete 
disregard for cleanliness, privacy, personal rights and privileges. The family was 
also desperately poor” (Huthwaite 1961:37-38).  
 
Of the twenty-five gang members the researcher described, only one came from what she 
categorized as a “middle class home” (Huthwaite 1961). Instead, they were homes with a great 
deal of economic insecurity and with which social workers were consistently engaged. However, 
                                               
18 list from Mooney, Kate. 1998. '"Ducktails, flick-knives and pugnacity": subcultural and hegemonic masculinities 
in South Africa, 1948–1960,' Journal of Southern African Studies, Special Edition: Masculinities in Southern Africa 
vol. 24, no. 4 (1998), p. 754. 
19 In 1960, Joan Huthwaite observed “In Durban there are several Ducktail groups which possess all the essential characteristics 
of antisocial gangs. These congregate in specific neighborhoods, generally in the central city area and in underprivileged 
neighbourhoods, the Greyville area being one such neighbourhood” (Huthwaite 1961:4). 
20 In addition to protected employment in the public sector, especially on the railways, and widespread public works programs, 
the Colour Bar Act of 1926 provided employers tariff protection on condition that a reasonable proportion of "civilized” (i.e. 
white) workers were employed which was extended through amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 and 1959.  
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in keeping with the focus of the time, it was the psychological condition of the family, not the 
poverty that was the concern.  
The Ducktail masculine subculture was at great odds with the hegemonic masculinity 
espoused by the South African state. By 1960 the state was made up of Afrikaans-speaking white 
men who embraced a masculine identity—constructed in opposition both to British whites and to 
the majority non-whites of the country—that had brought them into power. This hegemonic 
masculinity valued “independence, resourcefulness, physical and emotional toughness, the 
ability to give (and depending on your position) take orders, of being moral and God-fearing.”21 
At its most conservative manifestation, this masculinity espoused a puritanical commitment to 
austerity and strictness in conduct and morals.22 Fathers were expected to be not only the good 
provider but also the moral compass of the family through strict discipline and irreproachable 
personal conduct. Yet these rigid strictures were indeed eroding with the arrival of economic 
prosperity and a more urbanized population. The Ducktails, with their hedonistic rebelliousness, 
represented the furthest edges—the dominant deviance—of a larger shift in masculinity across 
the 1960s.  
To address the transformations in values and lifestyle that urbanization and 
industrialization had wrought on the structure and functioning of the family, the apartheid 
government introduced new legislation to oversee the protection, welfare, and supervision of 
children in the form of the Children’s Act, 1960. This legislation created a host of administrative 
bodies and a re-invigorated role for the social worker in “ensuring that poor families attain 
                                               
21 Morrell, Robert. 2001. The Times of Change: Men and Masculinity in Southern Africa. in Changing Men in Southern Africa, 
ed. Robert Morrell. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press pp. 3-40. p. 15 
22 Du Pisani, Kobus. 2001. “Puritanism Transformed: Afrikaner Masculinities in the Apartheid and Post-Apartheid Period. in 
Changing Men in Southern Africa, ed. Robert Morrell. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press pp157-176. p 158 
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happy, orderly domestic lives”.23 These social workers’ case files reveal how the moral 
evaluations of fathers in light of the social fear embodied by the dominant deviants of the 
indifferent father and the ducktail shaped the support available to single fathers attempting to 
raise children in the early 1960s.  
Victor 
The de Esclana family first came to the attention of the Durban Child Welfare Society 
(hereafter the Society) when Ethel Diplock, the mother of Victor’s children, contacted them in 
1958 seeking assistance. Four months prior she had given birth to twin girls, Julia and Joan and 
the family was experiencing financial difficulties. The babies’ father, Victor age 43, was 
employed at the Durban Ship Guard Company that served the bustling Durban port, and though 
his employment was consistent, his pay was dependent on the number of ships in the port and 
could vary widely.24  
Victor, an immigrant from Spain, had not yet been racially classified but was in the 
process of applying for a white identification card—documentation that would have gained him 
access to more lucrative jobs—while he continued working under an unsupported “white” 
classification.25 Ethel’s race had been classified as “coloured”, as was that of their children. The 
Society assisted with groceries, and the family was not heard from again until June of 1959 when 
Victor called the Society to report that Ethel was intoxicated and neglecting the twins. In July of 
1959, Ethel was arrested for public drunkenness and imprisoned for seven days. The response of 
                                               
23 Report of the Family Congress, (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 4-7 April, 1961) p. 177. 
24 Casual labor was a common feature of many of the jobs available in the port and until the standardization that came with 
containerization in the 1970s, the vast majority of men employed on the docks were subject to the vagaries of the shipping 
industry. Dubbeld, Bernard. 2003. Breaking the Buffalo: The Transformation of Stevedoring Work in Durban Between 1970 and 
1990. International Review of Social History, 48(11): 97-122. 
25 Mrs. Estevao, the social worker assigned to their case described Victor as “white in appearance, but with complexion and 
features of a Portuguese.  
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the Society was not to leave the girls (then 15 months old) in the care of their father, but to put 
them in temporary foster care. They were returned to the family only when Ethel returned. 
Following her imprisonment, Ethel was reported to have attempted to find a job, but failing that 
continued to drink.26 Another daughter, Luisa was born in January of 1960. In November of that 
year, Ethel and Victor separated, and Ethel subsequently left the family. Victor, left on his own 
with three young children, placed the twins at St. Philomena Children’s Home and Luisa at St. 
Thomas Babies’ Home “as boarders” and agreed to pay for their upkeep.27  
In 1963, a Children’s Court case was opened for the de Esclana children because St. 
Philomena’s Home alerted the society that the fees for the twins had not been paid in a year and 
they were unwilling to continue to care for the girls unremunerated.28 Because the children were 
coloured, the case was managed by a coloured female social worker, Mrs. Estevao. Married to a 
Portuguese immigrant herself, Mrs. Estevao was the first coloured social worker to be employed 
by the Durban Child Welfare Agency. In her 20s at the time, Mrs. Estevao was beginning what 
would be a long career at the Society. She inquired into the living conditions of each of the 
parents and, finding them unsuitable, recommended that the girls be declared ‘in need of care’, 
making them effectively wards of the state and committed to the children’s homes. They 
remained there until the twins were fostered in 1971 at age 13. 
Victor’s status as a Spanish immigrant is important to the context. During the 1960s, 
Portuguese—and likely Spaniards and Italians by extension—fit awkwardly into South Africa’s 
                                               
26 Ethel was already known to the Society’s branch in Pietermaritzburg. In the years leading up to 1958, Ethel had had five 
children—two with a previous husband and one with another lover—all removed by the affiliate Pietermaritzburg Child Welfare 
Society due to her and her previous husband’s heavy drinking. 
27 The children could not be house together, as St. Philomena would not take children under the age of 5 and Luisa was less than 
a year old. The boarder status meant that they were seen as temporary residents and Victor retained custody over them and 
control over decisions about their care.  
28 de Esclana Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/234/63, Durban Archives Repository 
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racial hierarchy.29 Though European in origin, oftentimes they had darker skinned complexions 
that was misinterpreted as placing them the coloured racial group.30 This was not helped by the 
fact that there was a stereotype that these groups were more likely to marry or socialize across 
racial boundaries and that, economically, they were at the bottom of the white racial group—the 
space that, until quite recently, white Afrikaners had occupied (Glaser 2010). Moreover, they 
differed from other immigrants of European descent—namely British and German—because 
they often struggled with local languages and were Catholic, whereas the overwhelming majority 
of white South Africans were Protestant.31 As Glaser summarizes, “[t]hey were white, yes, but on 
the margins: exotic, darker-skinned, Catholic, poorer than most whites, less educated, keeping to 
themselves, [and] unpredictable in their loyalties (2010:77). This helps to explain how, without 
his official identification card, Victor would have faced the employment obstacles that coloureds 
faced in this era.  
The de Esclana file, reveals a strong difference between the evaluation of Ethel as a 
mother and Victor as a father. During her investigation, Mrs. Estevao found that Ethel was 
unemployed and paying her rent through occasional domestic work. Ethel was living on what 
Mrs. Estevao called an “unsavoury” road noted for “illicit liquor brewing” and populated by a 
mixture of racial groups, including black Africans, which would have been both undesirable and 
illegal at the time. In addition to her objectionable residence, Ethel’s psychological condition 
seemed to be of great concern to Mrs. Estevao, who characterized the mother as “irresponsible as 
                                               
29 Scholarship on the history of European immigrants in South Africa is quite limited, though most coverage exists for the largest 
group, the Portuguese. Here I extrapolate Glazer’s positioning of Portuguese within the racial hierarchy to also include Italians 
and Spaniards because of important shared attributes: complexion, romance language, Catholic religion, and in the 1960s an 
impoverished home country (2010). 
30 Glaser notes anecdotes about darker-skinned immigrants having to keep their identity documents on them when utilizing 
whites-only facilities such as beaches or public transport (2010). 
31 In 1972 an anthropologist conducting research in a poorer white suburb of Durban noted a number of immigrant families from 
Italy and Portugal who spoke no English, though they had lived in Durban for “many years” (Clark 1978:13). 
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far as her maternal roles” and “emotionally unstable” as evidenced by her inability to have a 
stable relationship with a single man and to remain sober. However, the more trenchant criticism 
was reserved for Victor who was presented as having far greater shortcomings. Mrs. Estevao 
asserted that Victor was a comprehensive failure. He had “failed to conform to social norms” by 
not marrying Ethel, he had failed to establish a home for the children, he had failed to improve 
his financial position through finding additional work opportunities, and he had failed to 
maintain regular contact with his children, though the file reveals that he was the only parent to 
visit the children. The most energetic critiques were reserved for Victor’s failure in regards to 
payment of the boarding fees.  
Financial concerns are central to this case. The issue was not solely that the care of the 
children was being paid for, but also who was involved in the payment. Though the girls’ care 
was supported by the state children’s home grant administered by the Department of Coloured 
Affairs, in the years from 1963-1968, the Society continuously attempted to enact a contribution 
order for Victor, finally succeeding in 1968. But such legal actions were not taken against Ethel, 
as they often were against women like her.32 Following Mrs. Estevao’s initial investigation, Ethel 
dropped out of the file altogether. Instead, it was Victor’s inability to pay the board for the girls 
from 1962 to June of 1963 that remains the dominant concern in the de Esclana case. Because of 
Victor’s lack of payment, Mrs. Estevao argued he was “irresponsible,” “unreliable,” lacking in 
initiative, and altogether, an unsuitable man and father. 
Mrs. Estevao’s opinion was important for a number of reasons, not least of which because 
she was a gatekeeper of state assistance for Victor. Though transitioning poor children to the 
status of wards of the state was common practice, other forms of assistance were available and 
                                               
32 Of the 52 case files on Point families from the 1950s and 1960s, 13 include instances where a contribution order was issued for 
the mother. Of those 13 cases, 9 were of coloured women.  
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often offered. However, the gendered expectations placed on fathers foreclosed the possibility of 
these options for Victor.  
Mrs. Estevao reiterated across the file that Victor’s primary transgression was his lack of 
earning power and subsequent non-payment. Additional notes in the file suggest that that Victor 
was polite, kept a tidy and well-furnished room, and had no other social vices save irregular 
church attendance. Despite the fact that he had no debt other than the board fees and a stable 
work history, Mrs. Estevao castigated him as “financially irresponsible”. She labeled him as, 
“unreliable as revealed in his failure to keep his agreement re. the boarding fees.” In court, Victor 
disputed that he was “irresponsible”, saying that he intended to pay, but was unable to make 
enough to cover his own costs and the board costs. Mrs. Estevao disputed his claims to poverty, 
saying that he “lacked initiative as revealed by his failure to improve his financial position by 
finding more remunerative employment or supplementing his income.” We see that, in Mrs. 
Estevao’s estimation, Victor’s failure to occupy the provider role that sat at the heart of the 
hegemonic masculinity at the time led to his being constituted a moral failure. 33 Within the 
hegemonic understanding of fatherhood as provider and inadequate provision as evidence of 
indifferent deviance, the social worker read Victor’s inability to pay the boarding fees as an index 
of his failed fatherhood. While it seems evident that Victor likely—affectively—cared about his 
children, he was unable to appropriately—financially—care for them. Without the financial care, 
sentiment little mattered and was rendered invisible.  
                                               
33 Though most of the men I write about share genes with at least one of the children they care for, I distinguish social fatherhood 
from the biological act of insemination to maintain a sense of the constructed nature of this social role. I understand the provider 
role of social fathers not as a given, but as something that is socio-historically produced in certain contexts. This is a well-trod 
scholarly domain. In South Africa, scholarship on the conflation of social fatherhood with providership: Dworkin et al. 2012; 
Hunter 2006; Jewkes et al. 2012; Morrell 2006. On the well-elaborated discourse about men’s failure to perform it: Montgomery 
et al. 2006. 
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Mrs. Estevao’s castigation of Victor speaks to his liminal position in South African 
society. He was on the path to be classified as a white man, a status which would have afforded 
him access to better jobs, healthcare, and housing. However, it also would have rendered his 
relationship with Ethel illegal. That Mrs. Estevao, a confirmed coloured woman, is afforded 
leeway to evaluate Victor at all, let alone so harshly, is further indication that he was not fully 
considered white. A white social worker just as easily could have been assigned to the case, with 
little disruptions. Mrs. Estevao likely had different stakes in disciplining Victor’s behavior. Her 
actions mirror what Constant-Martin says about coloured elites, which she was. He said, “even 
when they placed themselves in opposition to white power base, they sought to prove their level 
of civilization by demonstrating to what extent they had succeeded in assimilating those very 
same codes and clauses that whites used as markers of differentiation” (2001:253. And when 
they did such things, they did it in the name of raising the coloured community’s status. Victor’s 
identity as a Spanish immigrant only confirms this. Married to a Portuguese man herself, Mrs. 
Estevao would have had little tolerance for actions that would contribute to a negative perception 
about Iberian immigrants, and she would have been well-versed in the stereotypes to which these 
immigrants were subject. 
Victor’s placement of his young children in a children’s home on what was meant to be a 
provisional basis so that he could continue to work could be seen as a laudable act of initiative 
and demonstrative of responsible parenting. Without family nearby, Victor had very little 
alternative. Hiring a black nanny, as was common practice for mothers, even in his earning 
group, without the presence of another woman in the house would have invited accusations of 
miscegenation and possible legal ramifications. Even had he been able to afford it, during the 
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1960s, there was a chronic shortage of pre-school and nursery school facilities.34 There were 
mechanisms to support the girls’ stay as boarders without fully institutionalizing them, but, Mrs. 
Estevao was unwilling to pursue any of them. In her report, she stated: “A reduction [of the 
board fees] was considered, but in view of the high cost of maintaining children in Children’s 
Home, it was not possible to give this case charitable consideration.” Here we see that Mrs. 
Estevao’s evaluation of Victor’s financially irresponsiblity likely motivated her evaluation of the 
case as ineligible for support.  
This is further evidence of why Victor was not offered a family allowance—a monthly 
sum that would have tripled his income. Notably, to qualify for a family allowance, a man could 
not earn an income above a certain level, but could also not earn an income below a certain 
level.35  This minimum requirement was meant to encourage a father who was fit to work to 
“improve his position”, which Ms. Estavao argued, Victor was unmotivated to do.36 The concern 
in supporting Victor was not solely that his economic drive would be dampened, but that it would 
undermine his role in the family as the primary provider. These anxieties were articulated by a 
national commission of inquiry into family aid: 
“The material care of his family is one of the basic responsibilities of the parent. 
If the State were to enter this province to some extent by paying a family 
allowance for the better care of the child without demanding anything in return, 
there would be some danger that a right-minded breadwinner and citizen might 
lose his sense of independence, initiative, and sense of responsibility”.37  
 
                                               
34 Across South Africa, in March 1970, there were 263 registered creches or places of care for white children, with 
accommodation for a total of only 11, 376 children country-wide. Report of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions, 
1966-1970, (Pretoria 1970) p. 47. 
35 The Smuts government introduced family allowances on April 1,1947 as one of its social security measure. Father’s were not 
eligible for maintenance grants, but if they had over 3 children, were gainfully employed, and could not support their family on 
their own salaries, they could receive a family allowance the amount of which exceeded that of the maintenance grant. Report of 
the Family Congress, (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 4-7 April, 1961). 
36 Report on Family Allowances p.46 
37 Report on family allowances, p. 61. 
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Under this logic, providing Victor with a family allowance would not just inhibit Victor’s 
patriarchal authority in the family and in his social world, but would also diminish his motivation 
to be a responsible citizen and, indeed, his very manhood.38  
The denial of economic support to Victor reveals the very gendered nature of state 
support in the 1960s. State Maintenance Grants (SMG) were available to white, coloured, and 
Indian mothers, and only mothers who lacked connection to a man who supported them 
monetarily. Unlike their present-day manifestation, the Child Support Grant, these grants were 
meant to replace waged work and allow women to stay home to care for the child without 
seeking work outside of the home. Though the SMG was the most generous form of support, 
many other forms of economic aid were distributed to women under the logic that they provided 
important affective care to children. Yet there was no woman in Victor’s home to authorize the 
family as an entity worthy of support. Further, Victor’s emotional commitment to his children—
as evidenced by his frequent treks across the city to visit them—were illegible to the state social 
worker. He was still seen as “neglectful” because he did not enact his expected role as father and 
provide monetarily for their upkeep. 
James 
 A second case reveals the complexity of the relative value of father’s affective care in 
relation to their financial support within interpretations of the provider role. In 1958, James 
Delport, a 44-year-old white man, was given custody of his three sons, James Jr. (16), Anthony 
(14) and John (8), after his wife divorced him. In 1962, they moved from then Rhodesia and 
arrived in Durban destitute where they were assisted with food by the Department of Social 
                                               
38 Gordon states, “anxieties about family life, furthermore, have usually expressed socially conservative fears about the 
increasing power and autonomy of women and children, and the corresponding decline in male, sometimes rendered as fatherly, 
control of family members.” Heroes, p 3. 
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Welfare and Pensions (hereafter Department). James Sr. was quite hard of hearing and had a 
difficulty obtaining employment, but following his encounter with the Department, he found a 
job with the city and James Jr. found a job in the rail department. This employment status 
allowed the family to live in the Lucien Hotel in the Point and take their meals in the dining 
room. In May of 1963, the family came back into the purview of the Department when the 
middle son Anthony was picked up for truancy—a transgression he frequently made as he was 
often teased in school for his stutter. A Children’s Court case was opened and Anthony was left in 
the custody of his father on the condition that he attend school and enroll in a speech clinic to 
improve his stutter, which he did for a time. For two months, the family was supervised by a 
white social worker, Ms. Ross, who oversaw the case. In July, Anthony was truant again and 
stowed away on a ship to Beira only to be returned and placed in a children’s home. Ms. Ross 
questioned Anthony about his motivation to leave, and Anthony reported that he felt that his 
father didn’t want him. By this point, James Jr. had left his job, and the family was in a dire 
financial position. The social worker, Ms. Ross argued that James Sr. was unable to properly 
supervise his sons and recommended that Anthony and John should be taken to a children’s 
home where they would receive “consistent yet kindly discipline”.39   
In stark contrast to Victor’s case, financial concerns do not figure as prominently in 
James Sr.’s case. Ms. Ross was concerned that the family’s income was out of proportion to their 
expenses with the loss of James Jr.’s job and she noted that James Sr. did not have the means to 
arrange for private boarding of his sons, leaving the children’s home as the only option. Instead 
of critiquing James Sr. for this state of affairs, as Mrs. Extevao had done, Ms. Ross said, “In spite 
of the financial difficulties experienced by this family, they have striven to improve their 
                                               
39 Delport Protection of Children case number 33/2/4/128/63, Durban Archives Repository 
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circumstances and the standard of living maintained is on par to the average working middle-
class family”. While the report did include the recommendation that James Sr. “improve his 
position,” the deviance of the children was written onto evaluation of the father. The 
overwhelming concern about James’s fulfillment of his provider role was his inability to 
appropriately discipline of the two younger boys, the deviance of moral indifference.  
Two key factors formed the base of Ms. Ross’ final decision to remove the brothers. First, 
James Sr. was away from home during the day, leaving the boys unsupervised. This was the same 
issue that Victor also faced. The second was James Sr.’s disability, which had the effect of 
emasculating him. Ms. Ross argued that James’ deafness and resulting speech impediment left 
him dependent on his sons and, importantly, less able to control them. While in Victor’s case, his 
financial failure undermined his paternal status, James Sr. was precluded from proper fatherhood 
by his deafness and dependency, which eventually led to the removal of his children. 
In light of this emasculation, it is interesting to note the strong emphasis Ms. Ross placed 
on emotional ties. Ms. Ross lauded James Sr. for being an attentive parent and noted that he was 
“very genuine in his concern for his son’s welfare.” She observed that “when Anthony and his 
father are together they appear to be very fond of each other, and there is a close bond between 
them,” arguing a similar relationship between James Sr. and John. Though she argued for the 
boys’ removal, she added a caveat, saying that James Sr. was “most anxious that both Anthony 
and John should, however, not be removed from Durban, in as far as he wishes to remain in close 
contact with them.”  
Across the report, James Sr. is portrayed as a loving father who attends to the needs of his 
sons as best he can and even ensures they attend church regularly. It is thus not a surprise that in 
the Children’s Court hearing, he protested the removal of his sons, maintaining he was “not 
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‘unfit’ to exercise proper control” and stating that he did not “drink or misbehave himself.” Yet, 
the order is confirmed and the boys are removed, only to visit their father on school holidays.40  
The comparison of the two cases throws into stark relief the masculine double bind that 
these poor fathers were caught in. The very job that allowed James Sr. to provide in part for his 
family and for which he was praised also opened the door to the perception of neglect and under-
supervision that aroused the concerns of child welfare personnel. In addition, James Sr. 
demonstrated an affective, emotional bond that was praised by the social worker. However, his 
relative economic success vis a vis Victor (James Sr.’s salary was more than three times that of 
Victor’s best earnings) and the sympathy of the social worker were still insufficient to afford him 
state support to keep his children. Notably, the experience of mothers in the same position was 
often the reverse.41  
Whites emigrating from Rhodesia in the years around the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence were also a recognizable immigrant group in Durban. By the 1980s, Durban was 
colloquially dubbed “Little Rhodesia” in light of huge influx of people who had settled there.  
Though more readily accepted as belonging to the white racial group, these Rhodesians did not 
meet with an uncomplicated racial solidarity from Durban whites. South Africa’s government 
was a strong supporter of Ian Smith in an effort to forestall majority rule in such a close 
neighbor. Many Rhodesians were met with pity for the upheaval the country was experiencing in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In Durban, while British conservatives took Rhodesians for commonwealth 
                                               
40 As an additional note, Anthony’s behavior only worsened in the children’s home and he was finally sent to a reform school in 
Cape Town. The letter requesting his transfer asks “Will you kindly make the necessary arrangements for his removal AS SOON 
AS POSSIBLE as he is a source of great trial and difficulty in our home and we have already had to wait several months while 
his transfer was receiving attention.” (Emphasis in the original). Ibid. 
41 In another case of a mother in 1963, the mother’s emotional commitment to her children allows her to garner state 
support even in the face of serious neglect. The social worker argued, “The case history reveals the mother to be an 
unsatisfactory and unfit person to exercise control over her children. However, this does not mean that the children 
would benefit from removal from her custody...this mother can be helped to care for her children. Therefore she 
should be given the opportunity to keep her children.” (Maureen) 
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kin, the more liberal were politically hostile to the likely causes of their migration (Dismayed 
1980). As one opinion writer stated, Rhodesians were not always welcome charity cases, 
“Nobody asked the ex-Rhodesians to come to South Africa, so why do they complain so much 
about conditions here? Do they expect us to come running to them with handouts?” (Dismayed 
1980). Like most immigrant groups, the Rhodesians were blamed for the housing crisis, driving 
up rents, and, in later years, unemployment (Dougherty 1981). 
The evaluation of James was shaped by racialized and gendered stereotypes. As a fully 
recognized white man, in contrast to Victor, higher stakes were placed on the successful social 
reproduction enabled by his parenting success. It is important that James’ had white sons—as 
opposed to Victor’s coloured daughters. These boys were highly prized and their status 
demanded that all efforts be made to ensure they became productive citizens. Notably, though 
Anthony did not display any of the dress or self-presentation of the ducktail, he undoubtedly was 
exposed to them. It is not unlikely that ducktails were among the people who harassed Anthony, 
if not in school than on his travels to and from. As a young white male living in Point, he would 
have encountered ducktails on a daily basis. His truancy and disobedience put him on the edge of 
juvenile delinquency and made him a candidate for a remaking of his manhood in a reform 
school. Furthermore, it was a concern that James Jr. quit his job. Though his age was beyond the 
social worker’s purview by that time, such evidence of workshyness would have been cause for 
concern that he was slipping into delinquency. 
In contrast to Mrs. Estevao’s castigation of Victor, Ms. Ross’ demonstrated overarching 
sympathy towards James Sr. In part, this may be due to her viewing James as racial kin. Though 
still under Afrikanner rule, Durban’s white population traced its ties more closely to England and 
the antipathy between Afrikanners and British whites led to divergent masculine ideals. It is 
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likely that she was of the political persuasion that saw James a case of a victimized white man 
from the tumultuous Rhodesia as opposed to a political undesirable or a freeloader. It is possible 
these factors contributed to Ms. Ross’s more highly valuing James’s emotional care and her far 
lesser emphasis on his economic failure than what Victor faced. Despite her sympathy, though, it 
is unlikely that Ms. Ross would have been able to justify that a father who had both failed in his 
role as provider and lacked a fully self-reliant masculine self could successfully raise three boys 
by himself, providing the proper moral framework to save them from the deviance of 
delinquency and thereby ensure their success.  
 
Fatherhood on Point--2014 
By 2014, poor fathers lived in a very different social landscape. In addition to a change 
from apartheid authoritarianism to majority rule, the comprehensive welfare state that was 
available to white families in the 1960s was stretched thin as it tried to reach all race groups and 
address years of unequal treatment. The culture of social work care transitioned from one of 
institutionalization to one of “family preservation” and support for children in their own home. 
While under apartheid, family allowances were the only forms of welfare available specifically 
to support (white) fathers, in 2014, fathers were eligible for the Child Support grant (CSG). 
However, not surprisingly, paternal caregivers only form 2% of CSG recipients (Patel 2012).  
The context of limited state aid and 40% unemployment country-wide dictates that poor 
families must seek aid from a variety of sources. The women I worked with had large networks 
of people and institutions they drew upon such as social workers, pastors, imams, school 
principals, boyfriends, and neighbors. The fathers with whom they were partnered had different, 
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parallel, networks of patrons and income earning opportunities. Given the multiplicity of 
sources, efforts to gain support were complex and variable.  
Here I consider the efforts of two fathers to garner support from these public sources. 
Like Victor and James, while these fathers did not necessarily embody the dominant deviant 
masculinity that held sway in the public minds of their time, it loomed large in their lives. In 
2014 the stereotype of the black man who impregnated women and abandoned his children to the 
women haunted the minds of most.42 I argue that, in contrast to the 1960s, this social panic made 
the efforts of my informants more sympathetic and more worthy of support.  
Allen 
Allen and Vijy were one of three Indian families in the building where I worked in 2014. 
They had met ten years before when both lived in the Indian township of Phoenix. Vijy, then in 
her mid-thirties, had quarreled with her mother and wanted to move out. Two weeks after 
meeting Allen, they had married, and the couple moved into his family’s home. Plagued by 
family conflict, the couple bounced back and forth between Point and Phoenix until 5 years ago 
when came to the building and settled, in part, because they did not have to pay utilities in 
addition to rent.  
Allen had an unlined face, and his age was only marked by his white beard. He had a 
round belly that bespoke his love of beer, and he resembled a schoolboy when the polo shirts he 
often wore barely covered his girth. In contrast, Vijy’s face was creased with care and years in 
the Durban sun, and she looked older than her 44 years. Sharp-tongued, she would swiftly move 
                                               
42 Though I knew many men who occupied such a category in my other work in South Africa, I encountered very 
few in my fieldsite. The high expense of the Point neighborhood meant that few people could afford to live alone 
and young men clustered in single rooms with multiple roommates. In many cases this situation was temporary 
because the density of other people in these rooms curtailed romantic projects in ways that these men found 
intolerable long term. 
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between castigations and teasing, and her broad smile revealed wide gaps between her remaining 
teeth. Married late, the couple had two children: Calvin, 8, and Katy, 5, and they lived together in 
Blenheim, the primary building where I worked. Allen’s elderly father also lived with them in a 
curtained off portion of the room, and his sizable pension was the primary source of income and 
paid the monthly rent. When he died in late 2014, the family was left destitute. Many said they 
had received an inheritance of many thousands of Rands, but mismanaged it, such that when I re-
connected with them in April of 2015, they were living in a shelter or on the beachfront 
depending on how much they garnered in donations in a given day.  
Many years ago, Allen had been a part of a sales team distributing linens and curtains 
throughout the KwaZulu-Natal coast. When I met him in 2014, he had turned his salesmanship to 
selling stickers on the beachfront. He would buy a roll of 100 individual stickers depicting 
Mickey Mouse or Disney Cars characters for R10 from one of the many Chinese import shops in 
the neighborhood. Pushing Katy in a large donated stroller, together they would walk the 
beachfront selling the stickers for R1 each. They often targeted the south end of the beach where 
a development that included a water park, restaurants, and tourist shops attracted many middle 
and upper class families who were willing buyers of Katy and Allen’s stickers. Katy and Allen 
would also eat multiple meals of hamburgers and KFC offered by beachfront patrons, some of 
which they would inconspicuously package up and take home to the others.  
Despite the fact that people of Indian origin, had been in South Africa for in some cases 
five or more generations, they continued to be treated as a type of foreigner in South Africa. Note 
that in 2005, there was a thesis written about Durban Indian identity entitled, “The Struggle to be 
South African” (John-Naidu 2005). Indians (or Asiatics) were one of the four primary race 
categories under apartheid, and people were categorized as Indian according to skin 
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pigmentation, surname, religion, and cultural practices. Within the hierarchy, Indians were 
granted relatively more privileges than black Africans—better wages, land ownership 
capabilities, and larger housing allocations. Yet, they were still a marginalized minority with little 
political influence. This middle-status frequently left them reviled by groups on both sides of the 
racial hierarchy—too exotic and unassimilable for whites and too privileged and exclusive for 
black Africans.43 Though the population of Indian origin is quite linguistically and religiously 
diverse, at various moments, there has been a great deal of ideological work within the 
community done to assert a collective “Indian-ness” as a defensive identification or to mark out 
the particular kinds of subordinations Indians have suffered. In a characteristically incendiary 
opinion piece, sociologist Ashwin Desai wrote in 1998:  
“Many people outside the community will struggle to understand how Indians are 
still made to feel they do not belong. Sometimes it is just a look, a sneer or a 
whispered "amakula". Many other times it is pretty damn explicit, like affirmative 
action policies where only pigment counts. Throughout South African history, the 
Indian has always been the scapegoat, the perpetual stranger. During indenture, 
Indians were super-exploited and brutalized .... During apartheid Indians were 
denoted in the history books as the "Indian problem" and herded into "coolie 
locations." And in times of economic downturn, like 1949 and 1985, Indians 
became victims of African anger. Indeed Indians' entire history, with the odd 
protest here and there, is a chronology of victimization” (1998). 
 
In contrast, at other times, members of the Indian community sought to slough off the racial 
designation which they saw as retaining the divisive and discriminatory politics of the apartheid 
past. This was the case when playwright and anti-apartheid activist, Ronnie Govender, wrote:  
"At a recent seminar, I objected to being called an ' Indian' playwright. Athol 
Fugard has never been referred to as a 'white' playwright' and I have not noticed 
Mbongeni Ngema being called a 'Zulu' playwright….While my wife may wear a 
sari and I may eat curry and rice, I am an African. I was born here and I am a 
South African, in as much as those born in Britain are British, and those born in 
France are French and nobody has the right to deny me my birthright" (1999).  
                                               
43 Indo-African relations have a long history and a long scholarship in South Africa that trace how antipathies between the two 
race groups were manufactured from above and reproduced from below. In one of the earliest periodizations, Mahoney traces 
antagonism between Africans and Indians in Natal back as far as the nineteenth century (2012:123-125). 
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This brief coverage of an altogether much larger issue is simply to demonstrate that the Indian 
identity was fraught and contradictory and an Indian father’s relative social status depended on 
the person to whom they were making claims. 
The intersection of race and gender was critical to Allen and Katy’s success on the 
beachfront. Durban has one of the largest populations of South Asians outside the subcontinent. 
In the ideologically durable apartheid-era racial hierarchy, Indians are seen as the merchant class 
of shopowners, salespeople, and skilled craftsmen. Whereas a black or white father performing 
the same acts would likely be seen as lazy for not working, Allen’s “sticker sales” were read as 
an enterprising attempt to improve upon a situation that arose out of bad luck. Notably, Katy and 
Allen’s benefactors were not middle or upper class black South Africans.  Predominantly, they 
were either the small number of whites who came to that end of the beach or, more often, the 
large number of Indian families who came to the beachfront for leisure or charity work. Early in 
the morning or throughout the weekend, throngs of Indian families would line the beachfront to 
walk or gather for picnics.44 Many Indians also came to the beachfront expressly to offer charity, 
often in the form of large-scale food distribution.  
Allen also benefitted from a stereotype held by whites, coloureds, and Indians alike that 
Indians are more “family oriented” than other racial groups, which gave credence to the 
perception that in contrast to the absentee father, he was appropriately “caring for” his children 
through his entrepreneurship. Statistically, those in this racial group have higher rates of 
marriage and lower rates of divorce and tend to live in multi-generational extended-family units 
                                               
44 One day an Indian ward councilor had a meeting near the beachfront and encountered Allen and Katy on his way back to the 
car. Wanting to include his wife in this moment of giving, the Councilor drove back to Phoenix to fetch her before picking up 
Allen and Katy to take them on a grocery shopping spree of over R1400 (the near value of their rent). They bought an entire 
package of diapers—something very rare for Katy—and new clothes. Vijy said she was shaking that day as they unloaded bag 
after bag from the car and into the building. Neighbors and Vijy’s brother who also lived in the building came asking for help and 
Allen was angered when Vijy distributed food. They fielded a great deal of jealousy from the neighbors for this boon. 
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(Blom Hansen 2012; University of Durban, Westville 1985; Ziehl 2001). Thus when Allen took 
Katy out by himself, he was seen as a dutiful father, performing caregiving tasks usually reserved 
for women and attempting to fulfill a provider role through selling stickers. In this way, he also 
marked himself out as different from the stereotype of the black South African man who 
abandoned his children. In contrast, had Vijy been the one to take Katy out, her clothing and 
conduct would have invited much greater scrutiny and less sympathy. Allen hid the fact that he 
had a wife at home, thereby enhancing his sympathetic status. Vijy supported the idea that Allen 
was acting as a provider. She embraced the identity of a housewife, saying, disdainfully, that she 
did not need to go “run and beg” like the other women in the building because her husband 
“worked.” Katy was also an asset. She was a small, attractive girl child with an infectious smile, 
and her size and gender lent her a vulnerability that enhanced Allen’s paternal status and she was 
in little danger of being read as delinquent. The stroller was also a luxury item that indicated that 
wealthier patrons had seen fit to invest in Allen before, thereby paving the way for future aid. 
Tonton 
South African fathers were not the only ones who sought public support of their paternal 
projects. Tonton, like his girlfriend Nisha, was from Congo. Separately, they left Congo in the 
mid-2000s and made their way to a refugee camp in Zimbabwe. Finding the camp uninhabitable, 
they chose to forfeit their refugee status to come to South Africa in pursuit of more opportunities. 
In South Africa, Nisha’s asylum case was denied. Guided by social networks, they both landed in 
the large Congolese community in the Point neighborhood, where they ultimately met in 2011. 
Nisha had two small children, ages 2 and 4, with a previous boyfriend, and in 2013 she and 
Tonton had a son, Beni.  
As is covered more in Chapter 7, following democratic transition, South Africa saw a 
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rapid influx of immigrants from the across the Africa continent. By 2011, immigrants made up 
4.2% of the population, with 71% of those coming from other African countries. The swift 
arrival of African non-nationals—who overwhelmingly settled in cities—coincided with 
continued urban housing shortages, rising food and fuel costs, and aging electricity and transport 
infrastructure. It is not surprising that the South African poor, themselves from groups newly 
incorporated into the citizenry, railed against the presence of foreigners making claims upon a 
shrinking pot of resources. Immigrants were blamed for crime, housing shortages, 
unemployment, and a lack for services. Frustration with government inaction has been turned 
upon the bodies of migrants in frequently violent attacks throughout the past two decades. As 
one participant in the 2008 xenophobic riots said: 
“We are not trying to kill anyone but rather solving the problem of our own country. The 
government is not doing anything about this, so I support what the mob is doing to get rid 
of foreigners in our country” (Madondo 2008). 
 
However, anti-immigrant sentiments were not solely the purview of the poor. In his capacity as 
Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi stated: 
“South Africa is faced with another threat, that is the [South African Development 
Community] ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose 
where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country” 
(1997). 
 
It is both deeply ironic and not surprising that, a mere 11 years after the end of influx control, a 
black African leader would equate freedom of movement with national disaster. Indeed, present-
day patterns of exclusion and violence have historical antecedents in colonial and apartheid era 
“spatio-ethnic discrimination” (Landau 2011:5). I concur with Landau that “non-nationals’ lives 
parallel those of apartheid-era black labourers: omnipresent and economically active but 
nonetheless stigmatized and vulnerable to the whims of neighbor and state” (2011:8). It is in this 
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broader historic view that a comparative project such as the one undertaken in this chapter, 
becomes all the more important. 
Tonton’s family of five relied almost solely on his income for their needs, the demands of 
his provider role large. Prior to the birth of her eldest, Nisha had worked in many of the 
neighborhood hair salons, but presently could not earn enough to cover the cost of the chair 
rental and the cost of childcare for 3 children. Nisha tried to informally “make hair” with her 
previous clients, but Priscilla, the manager of the building where she and Tonton lived, was also 
a hair stylist and barred Nisha’s clients access to the building.  
Like many of his countrymen, Tonton worked as a car guard, watching cars and assisting 
drivers with parking or packages in exchange for small tips. Fortuitously, one of Tonton’s friends 
had his own vehicle and good connections. Together, these friends and two others would make a 
daily commute northward to a guarding territory in a very wealthy part of the city.  Though this 
commute meant that Tonton was often out of the house for 14 hours a day and had to purchase 
his own food, his earnings were about 1.5 times those of the car guards in the Point. Almost more 
important than the cash earnings, though, were the in-kind donations Tonton received. It was 
common practice that car guards would ask drivers for food, clothing, or odd jobs in addition to 
the R1 or R2 coin most handed over. Tonton was uniquely skilled at cultivating patrons. 
In his late 20s, Tonton was always smartly dressed, often in track suit pants or colored 
jeans and a branded T-shirt with immaculate white running shoes. Nisha made sure he had the 
trendiest twists or braids in his long hair. He looked far less scruffy than many of the other 
panhandlers the drivers would encounter across the course of the day and his mannerisms were 
equally refined. Tonton had a reserved demeanor that conveyed quiet observation and sustained 
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thought before action. Spare with words and ineffusive, Tonton could be off-putting, but his 
smile spread his full lips and transformed his face to one of openness.  
Though he knew very little English, Tonton did have a cell phone that took photos. He 
would show drivers photos of Beni and ask Sir or Ma’am for “food”, “clothes” or “nappies.” 
Tonton could answer questions about Beni’s name or age and had a stock of charming photos he 
could flip through for the interested driver. In his guarding territory, Tonton would often see the 
same drivers repeatedly and developed a rapport with them. Some, most often women, 
remembered the photos of Beni and would bring donations of clothes or toys. Tonton would then 
take photos of Beni in the clothes and sitting in one of his siblings’ laps to show the patrons later. 
This evidence of the donations well-used and the image of the playing children helped solidify 
the connection to his patrons and opened the door for future aid. Around Christmas, Tonton 
would come home with bags of men’s and baby’s clothing, toys, and diapers from his regulars. 
On days when he didn’t make it to his post out of illness or choice, his friends would deliver 
packages they collected “for the young father with the little ones.” The middle-class people 
whom I knew considered donations such as these, part of their Christian duty. Many complained 
about the constant solicitations they faced from street children at stoplights or the calls for aid on 
TV. Instead, they argued, they felt better giving in-kind donations to someone they “knew” such 
as their domestic worker or regular car guard, citing that such donations could not be used for ill 
such as drugs or liquor, as cash could. 
Though welcomed, the donations of clothes often caused conflict for Tonton and Nisha. 
Both were very fashion conscious and appreciated that the clothes were recognizably high-
profile and expensive brands. In contrast, Beni’s siblings had far fewer clothes, and Nisha spent a 
great deal of time and money trying to ensure they appeared equally well-dressed. On days when 
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Tonton didn’t work, Nisha would spend hours on her hair and makeup, and dressed in their 
finest, the family would walk the beachfront to see and be seen. As much as they loved this class 
performance, it invited requests from friends and neighbors who thought they had purchased 
Beni’s clothes. When Nisha or Tonton told the requesters that the clothes were donated, this was 
seen as an insufficient excuse not to share. Neighbors complained that either Nisha and Tonton 
were lying—citing their love of fashion and the other children’s clothes as evidence—or that 
donated clothes freed up resources that could then be shared. The very class positioning Tonton 
and Nisha craved obligated them to share with their neighbors in ways they could not afford. By 
refusing, Tonton and Nisha often alienated neighbors and contributed to Nisha’s feeling that they 
were unliked and unsafe as the “only” Congolese in the building. Such feelings of insecurity 
were more than the stuff of everyday worries, as the xenophobic attacks in 2015 attested.  
Tonton’s success rested on his skill in mastering the semiotics of the context in which he 
worked, knowingly deploying the appropriate indexes of proper fatherhood, caring for in his 
work and caring about in his “careful” photo displays. The neighborhood where he car guarded 
was trafficked by predominantly wealthy white people, most often women. In this context, his 
foreignness was an advantage. Though he was black, the fact that his minimal English was 
inflected with a French accent removed him from the category of a black South African man. A 
stereotype of black South Africans as lazy and reliant on handouts pervades white South African 
circles. Coupled with the idea that the preference given to blacks in hiring decisions—a notable 
reversal of apartheid era job reservation for whites—is a form of “reverse racism” renders a 
South African black man who car guards highly problematic. In contrast, as a Congolese man, 
Tonton would be interpreted as taking initiative. His impeccable grooming, which would no 
doubt appeal aesthetically to his patrons, would constitute further evidence of his good character. 
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Finally, his use of his cell phone—a technological status symbol—to attest to his fathering work 
marks him as in stark contrast to the South African father who “eats for himself.” 
The advantages of foreignness however are limited, as will be seen in Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion argued that hegemonic and dominant deviant masculinities impact 
heavily upon father’s efforts to secure resources to care for their children. However, the impact 
of these masculinities is not always straightforward, nor is it durable. Following the 1960s, the 
hegemonic and dominant deviant masculinities became increasingly important in both welfare 
cases and popular consciousness due to the international rise of psychology. In contrast to a prior 
emphasis on environmental conditions—unemployment, housing, religion—social work began to 
emphasize personality traits and psychological health as sites of aberration, and therefore, 
intervention. Furthermore, psychological conditions weren’t contained to the individual, they 
could affect others, most critically children whose characters were seen as especially 
impressionable. Social workers weren’t supposed to simply dispense aid, but to comment upon 
and cultivate certain moral dispositions in the beneficiaries of aid in the name of ensuring the 
psychological health of the future generation.   
In all of these cases, the men involved did not embody either the hegemonic or the 
dominant deviant masculinities of their respective times. They were immigrants, foreigners, 
seeking to insert themselves into a highly differentiated South African society. In the 1960s, the 
white population was presumed to have all attained middle class status and the coloured race 
group—despite a worsening economic position—was held to middle class expectations. The 
hegemonic masculinity in both cases embodied a hardworking father who affective commitment 
to his family was demonstrated through economic provision and robust discipline. The dominant 
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deviant masculinity, then, was the indifferent father who demonstrated neither care for nor care 
about due to both idleness and permissiveness. The feared result of the indifferent father was a 
generation of juvenile delinquents who lacked the character and the social tools to be productive 
members of society and who upended racial hierarchy by engaging in practices that were 
associated with other race groups.  
In 2014, anxieties centered less around the reproduction of a dominant race group as 
much as the viability of the new democracy. Hegemonic masculinity retained its providership 
component, but also included the affective commitments of caring about as indexed through 
physical presence. Dominant deviant masculinity took the form of the absentee father whose 
simultaneous physical and financial absence left a generation of women and children dependent 
on the state. The new nation was seen as in danger of collapsing due to the violence, 
hypersexuality, and financial irresponsibility of black fathers. 
In her article on “The Scandal of Manhood”, Posel calls attention to the intensity of the 
threat that the errant father was seen to pose to the new democracy because of his position as 
father. She says, “the source of the perceived threat to the moral order was at its very core: 
within the domain of the home, wielded by the head of the family and the father of the nation. 
The very pillar of the society was creaking” (2005:248). In many ways, the same can be said of 
the 1960s concerns about the indifferent father. At the very moment when the apartheid project 
of pulling poor whites into the middle class was thought to have been completed, the center of 
the Christian National moral order—family, religion, austerity, paternal authority—was unsound. 
This threatened the future of the apartheid project and the racial order.  
The intimate nature of the threat posed by the familiar insider takes on new connotations 
when used to evaluate and outsider, foreigner. In the case of James and Victor, their status as 
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white and almost white found them problematically incorporated as part of the national problem. 
Their foreignness did not afford them sufficient distinction from the threat of dominant deviance. 
Further, their shared poverty worked against them. More than providership, what they could offer 
was affective commitment. However, without financial contribution, this care was insufficient to 
garner them state support. The immigrants of 2014 encountered a very different set of 
evaluations. Their racial and ethnic difference, their foreignness, distanced them sufficiently 
from the South African absentee father such that they could leverage their affective commitment 
as worthy of support. A shift in hegemonic masculinity that valued emotional investment further 
helped their cause.  
The following chapter considers state led interventions taken in the democratic era to 
regulate absentee fathers. Over the course of two decades various state parties have worked 
toward reform of the Maintenance Court system. The efficacy of the Court became tied to 
various ideological projects such as cost recovery, curtailing male sexuality, cultivating male 
citizenship, and capacitating women’s ability to claim their newly acquired rights. However, 
though concerns about absentee fathers sat at the intersection of issues of money, sex, and 
kinship, there was an incomplete understanding about how economies of intimacy work in South 
Africa. The following chapter offers a corrective.  
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Chapter 6 - The “Maintenance” of Family: Mediating Relationships in the South African 
Maintenance Court   
 
Cebo sat with her body held tensely upright, furiously texting and restlessly sweeping her 
eyes around the rows of chairs filled with women, waiting. A smartly dressed woman in her 
thirties, Cebo was one of eighty women that day who, with luck, would have their cases heard by 
one of the four maintenance officers in Durban’s Maintenance Court. These Courts bring 
estranged, unmarried parents together for the purpose of enforcing the Maintenance Act, which 
requires both biological parents of a child, regardless of their marriage relationship, to contribute 
financially to the raising of that child.1 The act and, by extension, the Court are primarily 
concerned with the financial relationship between parents, yet the transaction of money from a 
father to a mother that ideally results from a Maintenance Court hearing is but one part of 
broader economies of intimacy that mothers and fathers must negotiate—systems of exchange 
that include money, affection, labor, and sex (Cole 2009). Women like Cebo, raising children 
without paternal support, participate in these exchanges as they assemble a network of 
relationships to support themselves and their children—in other words, a functional family. 
Cognizant of the rules of reciprocity that govern these exchanges and the composition of their 
own social network, women make complex calculations about how and whether to use the 
Maintenance Court.  
Cebo had had two young children with her previous boyfriend, Fikile, who lived in Cape 
Town with his parents. At one point, Cebo, too, had lived with them, cared for his parents, and 
                                               
1 Maintenance procedures for formerly married parents are outlined in divorce proceedings and renegotiated in divorce courts. 
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provided the home with domestic labor. Three years ago, though, the couple separated after the 
birth of their second child, and Cebo, without a job or a home, took Fikile to the Maintenance 
Court. For eight months, until Fikile lost his job, the security company where he worked 
deducted payments from his wages. After the payments ceased, Cebo moved back to Durban to 
live with her mother, who could help with the children. A year went by, in which Cebo found a 
job and lived in a flat of her own, near her mother. At that time, she and Fikile reconciled, and he 
moved into her flat, but after a few months, the couple split again, and Fikile moved back to his 
parents’ home and sought work there. Angry at the breakup and Fikile’s distance, Cebo returned 
to the Court, where I met her, to renew the three-year-old maintenance order.  
Over time, Cebo’s goals for her family had changed, and with it, her relationship to the 
Court. In her first trip to the Court, she explained, she was desperate, suddenly finding herself 
with two children and no income or home of her own and, still in Cape Town, far from her 
family. Though Fikile no longer spoke to her, she could still occasionally call on his family for 
help with child care or to transport the older child to school. Together with the maintenance 
payments, this help made the situation livable for her. Later, when the payments ended, relations 
with Fikile’s family soured because they blamed her wage garnishing for tarnishing his 
reputation and causing his subsequent job loss. Seeking help from her own family, she found 
enough support that she felt that the hassle and acrimony weren’t worth the possible monetary 
gain of pursuing a maintenance claim from Fikile’s family in his stead. After Fikile moved back 
in with her, he still did not pay maintenance, but their burgeoning relationship, his assistance 
with child care, and the income from her own job, kept her out of the Court. Over time, they 
began to argue over what she felt was an unfair double burden of her wage earning and domestic 
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labor. When their relationship ended, she returned to the Court, enraged and seeking to make 
sure he “took on his fair share” of child-rearing duty.  
This chapter examines the decisions that women like Cebo—unmarried, underprivileged, 
and black African—make about whether to use, threaten using, or avoid the Maintenance Court 
and situates them within women’s larger projects of constituting a family for themselves and 
their children. Cebo is part of a subset of a large demographic group of poor single mothers in 
South Africa. The women of this subset have children with wealthier men who are often formally 
employed, thus allowing them to make use of the Maintenance Court, if they so choose.  
In the context of the Point neighborhood, most frequently the women with whom I 
worked lived together with other women or new boyfriends. The former partner most often was 
not a resident of the neighborhood. However, on two occasions, the father worked in the Point 
and my respondents were at pains to explain to the police offers issuing the subpoenas just where 
and how to ensure a meeting with the men. Despite this, relative, proximity, there was little 
paternal cooperation in child rearing, in keeping with larger trends in the country. In a national 
research study in 2012, researchers found that 69 percent of black African children lived without 
their fathers (Hall, Meintjes, and Sambu 2014).2 Oftentimes these non-resident men were 
themselves unemployed and this condition shaped their engagement with their children. In the 
small number of cases that form the basis for this chapter, these fathers were at least occasionally 
employed and for various reasons chose not to direct some of their earnings to support their 
child(ren). The expanding demographic category of the “female headed household,” while not 
                                               
2 Unmarried black parents have comparatively low rates of cohabitation: 23 percent, compared to 59 percent for whites (Hall and 
Posel 2012). Hall, Meintjes, and Sambu (2014) found that “just over a quarter (27%) of all African children do not live with 
either parent and a further 42% of African children live with their mothers but without their fathers.” The number of children who 
live with both biological parents in the same household presents an even starker comparison: 28 percent for black children, 81 
percent for Indian children, and 77 percent for white children (2014). 
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new, prompted national concerns about the physical, emotional, and economic absence of men 
(DSD 2012). 
A full discussion of the factors that contributed to this demographic reality has been 
covered more extensively elsewhere in this dissertation. In review, a number of studies attribute 
current family configuration to the destructive impact of a century of labor migration and 
apartheid-era legislation that split families between the rural areas and the urban workplace (see 
Hosegood, McGrath, and Moultrie 2009 for a review). The historical literature reveals how 
families navigated the migrant labor system and the “patriarchal bargain”—women’s willingness 
to maintain a rural household in exchange for the economic support and social status provided by 
a migrating husband—served to hold families together in the midst of a great deal of social and 
economic tension (Bozzoli 1991; Hunter 2009; Mayer 1961; Murray 1981; Preston-Whyte 
1978.) Demanding a different periodization, other scholars suggest that it was the decline in 
migrant jobs in the context of high unemployment has made marriage inaccessibly expensive and 
men less able to take on the role of provider (Campbell 1992; Casale and Posel 2010; Denis 
2006; Hunter 2004, 2010; Walker 2005a, 2005b). Still others note that household configuration 
may also represent an active choice on the part of women to avoid long-term relationships—and 
the accompanying labor--with men who cannot or do not contribute to the household (Rice 2017; 
Walker 2013). 
This chapter once again focuses on those “female headed households” -–the women who 
raise children in South Africa’s current context of economic and relational insecurity. I situate 
the Maintenance Court as one tool among a range of strategies that women like Cebo draw upon 
for assembling a network of kin, friends, and lovers in an attempt to constitute a supportive 
family for themselves and their children. It is widely known that the Maintenance Court is 
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plagued with problems and is often ineffective, especially when fathers are unemployed or do 
not receive a pay slip.3 Often aware of these challenges, women continue to view the Courts as 
an important part of their toolkit to achieve ends that are not solely about maintenance money. I 
demonstrate the temporal, relational, and institutional complexities women must take into 
account as they determine how the Court contributes to their efforts to build and sustain their 
family.  
My ethnographic data reveal that women’s choices about how to engage the Court arise 
out of a variety of motivations, which often shift over the duration of a parental relationship. In 
this decision-making process, the potential monies received from a Maintenance Court process 
are often less important than their effects on women’s affective and sexual relationships. For 
those who do pursue an order, women see potential payments as representative of an emotional 
reconnection with an errant father, or as a symbolic redress of his abandonment of his 
responsibility. For those who avoid the Court, the rationales are all the more complex. Some 
women fear that the inevitable antagonism produced in a court process will thwart any possible 
reconciliation between the parents or, at least, a positive relationship with the child. Others shun 
any contact with the father for themselves or their children, often because of a history of 
domestic violence. A final category of women reveals that even a successful court process can 
have problematic relational effects. These women do not pursue orders because they seek a 
relationship with another man who will interpret her receipt of maintenance money as enabling 
the father access to her sexuality.  
                                               
3 In the event that a father is unemployed, the court cannot mandate that he pay maintenance—a great weakness for women in 
the context of high unemployment. The court can mandate that he submit regular documentation that he has been looking for 
work, but family and friends can easily supply signatures for these forms. In these situations, the act stipulates that the duty of 
support can pass on to his parents, and the mother may lodge a maintenance claim against them; however, I have never seen this 
provision used, except as a threat. 
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Research on child-support decision making in other, wealthier countries (Huang and 
Pouncy 2005; Laakso 2002; Meyer, Cancian, and Chen 2015) reveals many of the same 
motivations for or against using the Court.4 However, the particular relationships among sex, 
money, labor, and love in South Africa demand new understandings of the economies of 
intimacy that shape women’s actions. Research on maintenance in South Africa shows that men 
default on maintenance payments in part because they create incomplete exchanges in which 
women do not reciprocate money with sexual favors (Khunou 2012). Focusing on women users, 
this chapter contributes to scholarship on maintenance and child support by highlighting how 
women employ an understanding of the interrelationship of money, sex, and affect in their 
interaction with the Court. To untangle this interrelationship, I draw upon sociological and 
anthropological literature on transactional sex.  
Below, I argue that the reciprocal effect of money upon sexual and affective relationships 
is critical to understanding black women’s use of the Maintenance Court in their efforts to 
constitute a family. Black women raising children without fathers are being targeted as part of a 
larger state effort of “family strengthening” (Department of Social Development 2012). These 
women are engaged in their own projects of family making, which help them survive a 
demographic reality of economic and relational insecurity. Part of the logic informing their 
strategies—that of the relationships among money, sex, and affect—is not present in official 
discourse on even the most diverse of family forms, yet, informed by this logic, women’s actions 
                                               
4 Research in the United States found that women with positive relations with the father avoid court proceedings because they 
worry it will antagonize the father and lead to reductions in informal economic support (Edin and Lein 1997; Laakso 2002; 
Lerman 2010; Nepomnyaschy 2007; Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2010; Pate 2005a, 2005b; Waller and Plotnick 2001), 
reductions of support in the form of child care (Brown and Brito 2007; Brown and Cancian 2007; Meyer, Cancian, and Chen 
2015; Pate 2005a, 2005b; Sano, Richards, and Zvonkovic 2008; Waller and Plotnick 2001), and reductions in a father–child bond 
(Edin 1995; Grall 2000; Nelson 2004; Pate 2005a, 2005b; Sano, Richards, and Zvonkovic 2008). Conversely, others found that 
mothers avoided court proceedings because their relationship with the father had been negative (e.g., abusive) (Dail and Thieman 
1996; Edin 1995; Harris 2015; Waller and Plotnick 2001). Finally, as in South Africa, a lack of information about the system on 
the mother’s part (Edin 1995; Harris 2015) and the inability of the father to pay were noted reasons for not pursuing a case 
(Harris 2015; Huang and Pouncy 2005; Lin and McLanahan 2007; Sano, Richards, and Zvonkovic 2008). 
 206 
are having real demographic effects on their own families and their children’s fathers. This 
chapter raises questions about the effects of economies of intimacy on family formation. An 
understanding of these relationships is critical to understanding poor women’s lives in South 
Africa today.  
This chapter primarily draws upon six months of fieldwork at Durban’s Maintenance 
Court, observing intake interviews, mediation sessions with maintenance officers, hearings with 
the magistrate, counseling sessions between clients and attorneys, and—often the most 
revelatory—the conversations of women during long periods of waiting in the Court’s halls. 
These observations allowed me to identify patterns in how cases were structured and progressed, 
how the Maintenance Act was implemented in practice, and what interactions between women 
and attorneys or Court staff looked like. Observations were contrasted with fifty-three in-depth 
interviews with intake counselors, maintenance officers, attorneys, legal aid staff, and a core 
group of twenty-five black women who either were seeking maintenance or had decided not to 
pursue cases. Women outside the Court, who did not utilize it, were a ten-person subset of the 
larger research cohort that I followed for a year. These ten women had previous partners who 
were employed and therefore could entertain using the Court. Though South Africa is a racially 
and culturally diverse society, with a small, but growing, black middle class, the demographics 
of the mothers in the study reflect the population in the Court in 2014: poor, young (between the 
ages of 18 and 40), and black African.5 Of the twenty-five women whose stories inform this 
chapter, only four had formal part-time jobs. This demographic composition mirrors what other 
researchers on the Court found in other parts of the country (Khunou 2012; Mills 2004).  
                                               
5 Only a small proportion of South Africans would not consider themselves poor; however, the poorest of the poor, who often 
live in rural areas, usually do not make use of the maintenance court either, because courts are too challenging to access in rural 
areas, or because the fathers of their children are also poor and a case would be moot. 
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Family Strengthening and a ‘Culture of Nonpayment’  
The Maintenance Court is a critical part of South Africa’s family policy framework, 
which seeks to address a perceived “family disintegration” by “strengthening families,” 
specifically, by making them more economically stable (Department of Social Development 
2012:3,23). The language of family decline, by no means new, is currently concerned with black 
children growing up in households headed by unmarried women and the prevalence of “absentee 
fathers” who do not contribute money or labor to their children’s care (Department of Social 
Development 2012:18). As we have seen in previous chapters this privileging of a middle-class 
nuclear family model reflects an ahistorical misrecognition of both the flexibility of family forms 
and the labors—primarily of African women—to maintain the functioning of families, often in 
the absence of men (Delius and Glaser 2002; Hunt 1999; Hunter 2010; Krige 1936; Mager 1999; 
Moore and Vaughan 1994). Recall the experience of Grace in Chapter 3, also an unmarried 
mother with an unsupporting former partner. Her efforts to compel her previous partner to 
contribute were taken as disregard for and abandonment of her children. In 2014, poor single 
mothers are more often interpreted as both the victims of hypersexual and negligent men and 
irresponsible in their birth control choices (see Figure 6.1 and Chapter 5). However, rather than 
viewing these women as in need of rescue, proponents of the Maintenance Court system, instead 
frame them as capacitated to act as a powerful corrective force to the ills of family decline.  
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Figure 6.1: Excerpts from the brochure "Maintenance and Child Support: A Shared Responsibility"6 
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A well-functioning Maintenance Court, which ensures that men financially support their 
offspring, is seen by South African policy makers as important for two reasons. First, it 
empowers women to demand financial support for their children—theoretically a desired 
outcome for the state and mothers. Second, fathers who support their children privately relieve 
the burden on the state to support them. This is of no small import, as constitutional and 
international commitments to reducing the vulnerability of children have been met primarily 
through the child support grant (CSG) which takes up 3.5 percent of the national budget 
(Republic of South Africa 2015).  
Despite the extent of the state’s social assistance spending, government officials have 
remained ambivalent about the system (Seekings and Nattrass 2011). On the one hand, the ANC 
has claimed that it has made progress in reducing poverty through income redistribution and the 
provision of basic services (ANC 2009). But, at the same time, an ideological shift has taken 
place away from an older rights-based model to a developmentalist paradigm in which “too 
much” spending on social assistance can, as one minister said, “entrench the culture of 
entitlement” that poor South Africans are thought to have (DSD 2006; Meth 2004; Molewa 
2010). 
Over the past two decades, a series of cost-recovery plans to compel people to pay for 
services have been launched in an effort to recoup the economic costs and mitigate the purported 
ideological pitfalls of such extensive social spending. In some cases, the technologies were quite 
material, such as the pay-per-use water meters that discipline poor South Africans into water-
conserving and rates-paying citizens (von Schnitzler 2008). Others were more ideological, such 
as the Masakhane (“let us build together”) campaign which sought to transform a perceived 
                                               
6 Developed by Educational Support Services Trust and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development in 2003. 
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“culture of non-payment” associated with thirty years of apartheid-era resistance that involved a 
refusal to pay taxes, rents, and utility bills. The campaign focused on educating people on their 
rights and responsibilities as citizens by retooling the payment of taxes and utilities to signify a 
form of democratic participation. But this retooling took place alongside what, for many, was a 
decline in their economic position, and few were willing to take on these new financial 
responsibilities. Partially as a result of this economic shift, the Masakhane campaign was largely 
a failure. But, the logic of the campaign—and its emphasis on payment as indexing good 
citizenship—remained. 
The emphasis on economic participation as civic duty is also part of the new 
government’s policy on families. Again, previous chapters revealed that while this fiscal 
emphasis takes a particular form in the post-apartheid era, the orientation is not itself new. The 
policy goals as articulated in the 2012 White Paper on Families is to foster families to be 
“economically self-sustaining” so that their “members are able to contribute effectively to the 
overall development of the country” (2012:8). The role of state welfare was envisioned to afford 
citizens, “the opportunity to play an active role in promoting their own well-being” (DOW 
1997:59). This orientation is quite different from a redistributive model as articulated in the 
guiding document, the Freedom Charter, which states “The people shall share in the country’s 
wealth!”7 So it is that the problems of families are that they are dependent on government grants 
instead of contributing to development, as proper citizens should. Of course, both the concepts of 
“family disintegration” and a “culture of nonpayment” are highly racialized and gendered 
(Department of Social Development 2012:3). Concerns about marital decline are directed less at 
                                               
7 Originally written by the South African Congress Alliance (an umbrella group that included the ANC) in 1955, the Freedom 
Charter articulates the guiding principles of the struggle against apartheid and was revisited upon democratic transition and 
multiple times since as a reminder of what a properly liberated nation should include.  
. 
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the 67% marriage rate amongst whites than at the 24% marriage rate amongst black Africans 
(Posel et al. 2011). While characters of multiple races are represented in the comic in Figure 6.1, 
the primary story depicts the plights of Nomvu a recognizably black African woman and her 
non-white lover, Mike. Black fathers are described as “absent”, not simply because they do not 
live with their children—as many have not done for the past hundred years of labor migration—
but because they do not pay for their children (DSD 2012:19). Under these terms, the solution to 
the problem of unsupported children becomes an enforcement of the presumed support 
obligation of biological parents by both obliging mothers to bring fathers into the Court and by 
compelling fathers to pay. 
The obligation to support a child cannot be taken as given, but must be understood as 
something produced in a specific socio-cultural and historical context. Many years of scholarship 
on kinship in Southern Africa have noted that social and biological parenthood are not 
necessarily coterminous and different categories of people may participate in supporting a child 
(Armstrong 1994; Krige 1936; Schapera 1940; Preston-Whyte 1974). But within this 
heterogeneous landscape of care, South Africans frequently emphasize the support obligations of 
biological parents (Jewkes et al. 2012; Madhavan et al. 2008; Morrell and Richter 2004; Walker 
2005).8 The malleable yet naturalized nature of this discourse makes it an ideal mechanism for 
the supporters of the Maintenance Court to mobilize in “responsibilizing” parents.  
Historically, the state maintenance grant (SMG) and the Maintenance Court were closely 
connected and understood as two prongs of a single system. Women were not eligible for an 
SMG unless they could prove they had tried and failed to obtain maintenance through the Court. 
The CSG does not have such requirements and efforts have been made to delink it from the 
Maintenance Court (Lund 2008). However, as we have seen, the two remain closely intertwined 
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in the minds of policy makers. In 2002, the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System 
of Social Security reported that:  
“despite being plagued by problems, . . . the private maintenance system is an 
important system and as a result it should not be discarded. There is a legal and 
moral duty on the part of both parents to provide for their child[ren]. . . . The 
state’s duty to provide enters the picture only when parents are unable to 
provide—not because they do not want to” (Taylor 2002:58). 
 
Here it is clear that fathers’ non-payment is assumed to arise not out of necessity, but out of 
personal inclination, in this case interpreted as a moral failure. The Maintenance Court is seen as 
an important mechanism for ensuring that the state not end up footing the bill for the 
irresponsible choices of fathers.8  Thus, as one Parliamentarian said, the Maintenance Court 
should seek to “strengthen families and put the government out of business” (PMG 1999). 
Notably, invisible in all of this discourse, is that the disciplinary potential of the Court relies on 
the motivation and persistence of women to bring a case.  
Maintenance in South Africa: Background and Process  
The democratic transition led to an increased legislative commitment to empowering 
women, though often in name only (Hassim 2006; Walker 2013). A reform of the private 
maintenance system—widely understood to be ineffective, racially discriminatory, and 
burdensome for women—was understood as an early step (Burman and Berger 1988a, 1988b; 
Lund 2008). In 1997, the South African Law Commission made a preliminary review of the 
system and outlined recommendations for its reform, the first of which was an interim 
amendment of the Maintenance Act of 1963 to improve issues of implementation and 
equitability and to ensure compliance with the 1996 constitution and South Africa’s international 
                                               
8 As a reminder, while any caregiver of a child may apply for a grant—male or female, kin or nonkin—96 percent goes to female 
caregivers, the majority of whom are mothers and grandmothers who care for children without the assistance of fathers (Vorster 
and de Waal 2008). 
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commitments.9 In its present incarnation, the maintenance system is governed by the 
Maintenance Act of 1998 and the Maintenance Amendment Act of 2015. These acts are meant to 
facilitate the legal enforcement of the common-law duty of parents to financially contribute—in 
an amount proportionate to their respective incomes—to the provision of their dependents’ food, 
clothing, accommodation, medical care, and education. In this legislation, the Courts are 
intended as a “user-friendly, one-stop” site for unmarried women to seek maintenance without 
the need of a lawyer, but the realities are quite different (Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2003).  
To understand the changes made in 1998, let us first examine the process of procuring a 
maintenance order. In many ways, the structure of the process remains the same today as it was 
in 1963. To begin the process, the claimant, for ease here called the mother, must complete and 
submit to the court clerk an application for maintenance order, often requiring translation, of 
both the legal language and the English text (Singh, Naidoo, and Mokolobate 2004).10 This form 
requires that she have the father’s full name, identification number, home or work address 
(preferably both), and telephone number—no small feat, given the estrangement that invariably 
precedes a claim (Budlender and Moyo 2004). Upon receipt of the application, the Court sets a 
date and notifies the father that he is required to attend. In some courts, the mother is forced to 
notify the father herself, sometimes risking personal injury; in others, she might participate in a 
“point out,” where she identifies the father to an accompanying police officer, who serves the 
                                               
9 Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that all citizens have the right to health 
care, food, water, and social security, and section 28 provides that every child has the right to family care or parental care and to 
basic nutrition, shelter, and basic health-care services. Both are affected by the provision of parental maintenance. South Africa 
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) on December 
15, 1995, and signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on November 20, 1998. Earlier, on September 30, 1990, South 
Africa signed the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection, and Development of Children, which does not specifically 
address maintenance, but in point five declares that committed countries will ensure respect for the role of the family in providing 
support for children. 
10 Updated copies of all forms can be found at http://www.justice.gov.za/forms/form_mnt.htm. 
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subpoena (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012). On the appointed date, provided both 
parties are present and possess the necessary documentation of their assets and expenses, both 
meet with a maintenance officer to determine the proportional funds available from each parent 
for the approved expenses for the child. If the parties can agree on a maintenance amount, it is 
outlined in a maintenance order—a legally binding document, signed by both parties. If the 
parents do not agree, or if the father does not appear on the appointed day, the case goes before a 
magistrate for a formal hearing, where both parents will give evidence regarding their financial 
situation. In the case of a father’s continued absence, the magistrate can issue a warrant for his 
arrest (often not enforced without pressure from the mother), or, after ten days of nonpayment, 
can enforce an order by garnishing his wages or attaching his property and debts. The result may 
be that, for a time, the man complies with an order through regular payments. In the likely event 
that he fails to pay, he may be subject to a fine and imprisonment for up to a year; however, the 
mother must report and document the default and initiate a separate court process, often drawing 
out several months. Understandably, it is not uncommon that maintenance arrears often reach 
into the thousands of Rands, with little hope of payment (Witbooi 2002). The 1998 act came 
about in a period when political pressure did not allow time for a complete overhaul of the 
system (Wamhoff and Burman 2002). Instead, it was a stopgap measure to repeal an earlier 
instantiation, the 1963 act, and address the most problematic parts of the prior system— the 
burden of proof shouldered by women in lodging a claim and the virtually complete lack of 
enforcement of a maintenance order, often as a result of nonimplementation of the 1963 act 
(Budlender and Moyo 2004; South African Law Commission 1997).  
The 1998 act provided for several improvements to this process. A critical one was the 
creation of the position of maintenance investigators, whose job it is to relieve the burden on 
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mothers by investigating the fathers’ whereabouts, financial position (such as businesses or 
property he might have registered in someone else’s name), or reasons for a change in status 
(such as job loss), and to take statements from relevant witnesses who can inform a maintenance 
inquiry. The 2015 amendments sought to enhance the reach of maintenance investigators by 
giving them access to cell-phone databases and the assistance of credit bureaus to track fathers 
down (South African Press Association 2014). The positive impact of this position cannot be 
overstated.  In courts where they have been appointed investigators are overburdened with cases 
and the challenge of tracing often undocumented activities (Coutts 2014; De Jong 2009; 
Mamashela 2006). 
A second change to aid the enforcement of orders is that attachments of property, debts, 
and garnishment of wages can now be done within the Maintenance Court, whereas before it 
required a separate conviction of the man for default (South African Law Commission 2014). 
Unfortunately, these powerful enforcement mechanisms are still fraught with inefficiencies. 
Wage garnishment creates a large burden for employers, can result in retributional dismissal, and 
has to be reinitiated in the event of a job change (Singh et al. 2004). Further, garnishment is 
effective only when fathers are working in sectors steeped in bureaucratic documentation—for 
example civil servants. For those in other sectors, such as taxi owners, who may make a 
considerable income but collect no pay slips, wages cannot be garnished. The Department of 
Justice has attempted additional measures, such as partnering with taxi associations, to enhance 
compliance with the Court (Wamhoff and Burman 2002; Jeffery 2015). While attaching property 
may motivate some men to produce payments, many develop strategies to avoid such measures, 
such as selling assets to others. Also, to attach property, women must pay a sizeable fee upfront 
to the sheriff to both attach and subsequently store the moveable goods (Mamashela 2006). Such 
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payments are not possible for many women applicants. Finally, all these attachments are 
effective only to the extent that they are used by court officials—which varies greatly by court. 
A third improvement is the allowance for granting maintenance orders by default in the 
event that men do not attend a maintenance hearing, thus reducing delays in the process. The 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has implemented two electronic payment 
systems to help facilitate the delivery of payments and theoretically reduce the labor of court 
personnel. In 2006, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD) rolled 
out the Justice Deposits Account System (JDAS) and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) system 
that is now operating in all but one Maintenance Court (De Jong 2009). JDAS is an electronic 
financial system utilized to administer bail, fines, and maintenance monies received by 
magistrates’ courts, which can be paid using EFT. EFT has reduced the need for beneficiaries to 
wait in long lines to collect their payments and has freed up court staff time. Problems with the 
recording of account numbers have meant that payments have been sent to the incorrect 
beneficiaries or have been processed late, but overall the systems have improved efficiency 
(South African Law Commission 2014).  
In light of these reforms, the question becomes: if compelling fathers to support their 
children financially is ostensibly so beneficial to the state and to women, why then might women 
who could take men to the Court choose not to? One answer, captured well by research on the 
Court, is that, despite reform efforts, the Maintenance Court remains fairly ineffective (De Jong 
2009; Mamashela 2006; Singh, Naidoo, and Mokolobate 2004; South African Law Commission 
1997, 2014). While the 1998 act enlarged the powers of the Court to enforce maintenance 
payments and created policies and positions to relieve the burdens on applicants, problems of 
procedural ambiguity, insufficient training, resources, and manpower, and discrimination persist 
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(De Jong 2009; South African Law Commission 2014). Women still bear the overwhelming 
burden of labor in lodging a claim for payments that are consistently below their needs and are 
frequently defaulted on (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012). In the intervening years, 
an impressive amount of research and resources have gone into reform of the system, and 
legislative amendments to improve the Court’s capacity are ongoing.11  
Following the 1998 changes, reform of the maintenance system again became a national 
priority when, in 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled that the logistical problems of the 
Maintenance Court hobbled the good intentions of the act and constituted a failure to meet the 
constitutional obligation to protect the rights of women and the best interests of children 
(Bannatyne v. Bannatyne; Clark 2005). Scholars and activists—an often overlapping category in 
South Africa—produced research outlining the problems of the system and suggestions for 
reform.  
A central theme in the literature is the ineffectiveness created by insufficient funding for 
the private maintenance system. Instances include problems of understaffing, both of 
maintenance officers and investigators (De Jong 2009; South African Law Commission 2014; 
Wamhoff and Burman 2002), insufficient training of maintenance officers and investigators 
(Budlender and Moyo 2004; Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012; De Jong 2009; South 
African Law Commission 2014), and insufficient court resources, such as offices, computers, 
plugs, and phones (Budlender and Moyo 2004; Coutts 2014; De Jong 2009).  
                                               
11 Operation Isondlo (isiZulu for an alimony or maintenance payment) was a three-year project launched in December 2005 by 
the DOJCD to capacitate the maintenance courts. The DOJCD also launched the Maintenance Turnaround Strategy, which 
conducted trainings, bought cameras for the courts, and initiated EFT and mediation procedures. At writing, the South African 
Law Commission is still finalizing its review of the entire maintenance system. Recent legislation that has gone into effect allows 
the cellphone tracking of maintenance defaulters, the issuing of interim orders, and the blacklisting of defaulters on credit 
websites—a ruling that attracted extensive legislative debate. 
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A second theme is that many of these problems of funding have led to challenges in 
implementing the 1998 act. These include the facts that maintenance officers and investigators 
do not use the full scope of their power as per the act (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
2012; Coutts 2014; De Jong 2009; Singh, Naidoo, and Mokolobate 2004), maintenance orders 
and procedures vary greatly among courts (Budlender 2005; Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry 2012; Grieve, Moses, and Barberton 2005; South African Law Commission 2014; 
Wamhoff and Burman 2002), maintenance issues are seen as a nonpriority for court staff 
(Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012; South African Law Commission 2014; Wamhoff 
and Burman 2002), and a lack of staff causes long delays, making women wait all day, only to be 
told to return the following day, for cases that drag out for years (Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry; Singh, Naidoo, and Mokolobate 2004; Wamhoff and Burman 2002).  
A final theme is the challenges women face directly, including discrimination, disrespect, 
and a lack of discretion from court staff (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012; Mills 
2004; Singh, Naidoo, and Mokolobate 2004), corruption in the form of missing or misplaced 
files (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012; Coutts 2014), insecurity in relation to violent 
former partners (Community Agency for Social Enquiry 2012; Khunou 2012; Mills 2004), and 
insufficient or incorrect information about rights in relation to the system (Community Agency 
for Social Enquiry 2012; Wamhoff and Burman 2002).  
Given the numerous challenges with the private maintenance system, women’s reluctance 
to engage with it because they find it an exercise in futility has been well documented by 
researchers, yet even if and when the awarding and payment of maintenance ran smoothly, my 
research reveals, the transaction of money from men to women has complicated relational 
effects. The findings in this chapter contribute to these literatures, first by situating the decision 
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to pursue maintenance in larger projects of family making, and second by considering how that 
project is shaped by the interrelationship of sex, money, affect, and power—what Cole calls 
economies of intimacy (2009).  
Economies of Intimacy  
The lives of the women covered in this research are pervaded by economic and relational 
insecurities that shape their abilities to constitute a family in their terms. As others have noted, 
women adamantly seek an idealized family built around a monogamous marriage of romantic 
love, one that adheres to normative gender roles of male economic provision and female 
domestic care (Ashforth 1999; Hunter 2009, 2010). In this ideal, women achieve economic 
stability, affective care, paternal support for their children, and sexual fulfillment in a single 
relationship, yet the reality is that few men have the economic means to support a family, and the 
men that do—as well as the women who seek relationships with them—rarely practice 
monogamy. It is a context in which neither the income from labor nor the support from a partner 
can be counted on to be exclusive or enduring—the two issues, of course, being closely linked. 
Because of the confluence of these two insecurities, women must build a functional family by 
seeking economic stability, affective care for themselves and their children, and sexual 
fulfillment from different relationships that also change over time.  
Women assemble around themselves a network of relationships that, like all families, are 
bound together by reciprocal obligations that include various assemblages of money or gifts, 
emotional support and affection, domestic labor, and sex. Systems of exchange as processes that 
bind people into relationships of mutual obligation that are enduring and laden with culturally 
and historically specific meaning have been at the center of a long tradition in anthropology and 
sociology, stemming from Marcel Mauss ([1924] 2000 ) and Arnold van Gennep (1960). It has 
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been well documented that in South Africa, as well as elsewhere in Africa, men and women 
foster networks of obligation—“ties of dependence”—with one another through the exchange of 
sex, labor, love, and material support (Swidler and Watkins 2007; Verheijen 2013). This is a 
system of exchange whereby the giving of gifts or money, most often by a man to a woman—
which serve to demonstrate and constitute emotional attachment—engenders and obligates the 
receiver to some form of reciprocity, usually sexual (Cole 2009; Hunter 2009). Conversely, 
sexual favors and other “comforts of home,” such as domestic labor and caregiving, themselves 
valued, demand the reciprocal sharing of material resources from those who have enjoyed them 
(Leclerc-Madlala 2003; White 1990). But the simplicity of the above summary belies the 
variability of such exchanges and the complexity and delicacy involved in their negotiation. For 
the relative values and terms of such exchanges are always relationally contingent, and their 
affective power means that an inappropriate reciprocation can be emotionally hurtful and 
relationally damaging. For example, if a boyfriend were to suddenly offer gifts of a lesser value, 
or if a girlfriend were to welcome a traveling boyfriend home with a meal of only rice and gravy, 
these acts would engender not only painful feelings of rejection, but also suspicion that feelings 
of affection, and therefore allegiance, may have strayed.  
Men’s and women’s choices to enter into such exchanges are constrained by their 
historical, cultural, and economic position and an environment of highly unequal power 
relations, rampant sexual violence, and pervasive HIV. With this context in mind, both parties 
can benefit from choosing to participate in these exchanges. For men, most often the funders, the 
giving of resources to multiple partners affords prestige and an elevated masculine social status, 
moral legitimacy for their redistribution of resources and the avoidance of witchcraft 
accusations, sexual satisfaction and the comforts of home, and social insurance in the form of a 
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person they can call upon in the future (Ashforth 1999, 2005; Hunter 2005, 2010; Swidler and 
Watkins 2007; White 1990; Verheijen 2013). For women, their choice to couple takes place in a 
cultural context in which women are expected to be partnered—ideally, wed—and the 
unattached woman attracts accusations of disobeying culture, husband-snatching, or prostitution 
(Rice 2017; Verheijen 2013). Furthermore, there are a number of ritual and kin-based tasks that 
only males are supposed to carry out and while such cultural dictums can be bent, not without 
social consequence. In addition to the social benefits of conforming to cultural norms, depending 
on the dynamics of the exchange, women also have the potential to gain access to material 
resources, a source of occasional child-care labor and affection for their children, affective care 
for themselves, a patron they can call upon in desperate times, and (ideally) sexual fulfillment 
(Cole 2009; Leclerc-Madlala 2003; Swidler and Watkins 2007; Verheijen 2013).  
Women in my research participated in the exchange of sex, money, and affective support 
toward a variety of ends. Some engaged in the more direct forms of exchange of material 
support—for anything from food, clothing, cell minutes, to perfume or liquor—for sexual favors. 
Others had sexual partners—often called Ben Tens—whose explicit role was purely for the 
pleasure of the sexual experience.12 Many women, in addition to other men, had a primary 
partner, with whom they felt the closest affective connection or who provided the best form of 
social father for their children. All these relationships were exchanges that fostered ties of 
dependence in which the participants could make future claims upon one another for sex, money, 
labor, or affective care.  
                                               
12 Named after a children’s television program, Ben Tens are usually younger men who rarely contribute economically to the 
household, but—critical for women’s self-worth—engender in their partners a sense of desirability and an identity outside of the 
maternal caregiver. 
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The Court’s Place in the Project of Family Making  
Cebo and Fikile’s story, in the opening vignette, reveals the ways in which the women, 
men, and children who enter the Court are situated in a web of social ties whose bonds are 
reinforced through exchanges of money, sex, love, and labor. The terrain of this network is 
always in flux, as jobs are lost and found, family members die, children are born, new boyfriends 
are brought into the picture, or old relationships break apart. Despite this changeability, the bond 
between parents is a relatively durable one, which allows women to make claims upon the 
resources of a man far longer than in a purely sexual relationship (Guyer 1994). Thus, in 
deciding whether to pursue a Maintenance Court case, my respondants accounted for past 
connections and ruptures, present needs, and future expectations within economies of intimacy.  
Critical to women’s decision to enter the Court were the social meanings given to the 
payment and nonpayment of maintenance monies. Given the goals of the Court, women who 
considered a case began with a financial question: whether money could be obtained from such a 
process. For the women who saw a case as anything more than a threat, relations with the father 
and his family were often so poor that they could not lobby for support another way. Women 
then considered whether he was working or had property that the Court could seize and sell. If 
money could be attained, women assessed the value of that money in relation to the social 
meaning given to it and the possible effects of pursuing a court order. If the woman had lost or 
severed all contact with the father, initiating a case could forge a connection where one was 
lacking and, as some women hoped, induce the father to have a relationship with the child.  
However, bringing a case almost invariably resulted in angering the man, which could 
worsen an already poor relationship between the man and the woman and, in the worst-case 
scenario, result in a refusal to pay coupled with violence. Further, women feared it could alienate 
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the father from his offspring. Whether the payment of maintenance money engendered feelings 
of affection or anger from the father, its meaning within economies of intimacy had further 
complicated effects. For even if the process results in payments from the father, a woman’s 
acceptance of them could obligate her in his eyes, or the eyes of others, to reciprocate with 
sexual favors. My informants weighed the value of these possible effects, and carefully assessed 
their feelings about the father, their financial situation, what they perceive the father’s financial 
situation to be, their support network, whether they have romantic (or other) attachments, and 
what their hope was for the future relationship among themselves, the father, and their offspring.  
For the women with whom I worked, attempts to secure child support in any form were 
rarely purely rational calculations, but instead were emotionally fraught, sometimes 
contradictory attempts to negotiate a broad and shifting relational field. The rupturing of ties 
with their children’s fathers was usually painful. Even when their children were not entirely 
“planned,” all the women at some point had embarked with their ex-partner on a collective 
project of raising them. During that time, his financial support had been an indication of his 
emotional attachment and commitment to their partnership and their offspring. The loss of 
affective care and financial support was often taken as a sign that the mother and the offspring 
were considered unworthy of his love.  
When communication had broken down with an ex-partner, some women sought a court 
order, not only out of financial need, but also in the hope that through the process, an amicable 
relationship could be restored and future payments might again index an emotional bond. Such 
hopes, though improbable, were not entirely unfounded. Indeed it is the outcome promoted by 
court brochures such as in Figure 6.1. Additionally, some maintenance officers saw it their role 
 224 
to counsel couples and reconnect them, but their successes were few.13 As Goldblatt notes, 
“many men and their families regard maintenance claims against them as an attack” (2006:249). 
Typically, the Maintenance Court hearings I witnessed were sad, angry affairs, filled with 
explosive and bitter accusations of infidelity, poor parenting, or lack of visitation. Most 
maintenance officers, instead of engaging in their content, struggled to sideline such emotional 
battles in the twenty minutes they had to foster an agreement on payment amounts.  
Frustrated and wounded, many women cried throughout the day, saying, “I don’t 
understand why he is not paying; he was such a good guy.” In interviews after, they expressed 
shock and hurt at the anger that surfaced in the hearing, as men railed against having any 
relationship—economic or otherwise—with them. The hearing concretized women’s feelings of 
abandonment, and many were haunted, later, by the “vicious words” that had been hurled at 
them. Many women spoke of their choice to pursue a court case with chagrin, saying when the 
payments stopped coming, as they so often did, they had been left with neither love nor money:  
“Seeking maintenance is . . . time-consuming . . . and emotionally draining, and 
for what? You go up and down, up and down, and what? Now he will not answer 
my calls. [She sighs.] What must I do? I do wish we were a complete family, but I 
don’t sit on it. I don’t want to be depressed because of the choices I have made.”  
 
Arguably, the women who experienced the greatest success in the Court were those who, 
as in Cebo’s final visit, viewed the court process as a means to achieve vengeance for perceived 
mistreatment. This is not to say that monetary need was not a part of their case, but—like their 
ex-partners—they came to the hearing angry and felt empowered by the idea that the law was on 
their side. The rage that men exhibited in a court hearing, to them, was an indication that they 
                                               
13 Couples can receive mediation if they are referred to the family advocate, but such referrals are rarely made, and often men do 
not attend. It is worth noting that in its Maintenance Court pamphlets, the DOJCD promotes this idea that men who have been 
estranged from their children will be incited to take an interest in their child because they are compelled to pay money; however, 
I have yet to see such an effect. 
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were being taught a hard lesson. Women like twenty-three-year-old Gladness, who had a well-
elaborated discourse about women’s rights, saw the Court as a disciplining force, which helped 
reestablish justice for women. She was purportedly duped into taking on debt to finance her ex-
partner’s auto repair business because she held a job as a domestic one day a week and was thus 
more creditworthy. The business was supposed to be a step toward a future she and her partner 
were building together, but when it fell on hard times, he took the tools and ran, leaving her and 
their two-year-old son at the mercy of a local loan shark, who lived in the neighborhood of the 
single room she rented in the inner city. She said,  
“These South African men are running away from responsibility. They want no 
strings attached. Us girls suffer the consequences. Us women have to say no or do 
something.” 
 
 Gladness felt that action—in the form of a court case—was a way of demanding the respect she 
felt had been denied her and was necessary, both for reclaiming her own self-worth, and as a 
lesson for her young son.  
Such a sentiment was echoed in 2012 by Phindi, who had felt powerless within an 
abusive relationship and found the Court to be a forceful corrective to a gendered power 
imbalance (see also Khunou 2012). She had come from a rural area to live in Durban and had 
been swept off her feet by her previous partner, who owned a pawnshop and wooed her with 
promises of a carefree life. He had been a heavy drinker, and with a complicated pregnancy and 
subsequent postbirth confinement, she had been less willing and able to keep up with his social 
and sexual demands. She grew increasingly fearful for her own and her daughter’s safety until 
she moved in with a girlfriend from church, who encouraged her to start a case. She said, “Men 
always pay with their mouths. To get them to put their hand in their pockets, you must come with 
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a gun.” Phindi felt that the impersonal, public space of the Court gave her the authority to stand 
up to her former partner and demand the money she felt was rightfully owed to her daughter.  
For women like these, feelings about process often hinged less on the payments than on 
their experience in Court. In the case of Gladness, whose ex-partner never appeared for a 
hearing, the magistrate garnished his wages, and she left feeling validated and empowered. 
Phindi, however, felt pressured by the maintenance offer to accept an amount far lower than she 
needed. Her experience left her feeling disappointed and betrayed by a system that failed to 
protect her.  
Other women, highly cognizant of the emotional estrangement and economic 
disappointment that often resulted from the Court process, chose not to utilize the Court at all or 
to not return to it after fathers defaulted. For women like Thandi, the thin hope of a future 
relationship with her child’s father shaped her considerations. Though he had found work and a 
new relationship in a distant city, she felt the potential relationship was more valuable than the 
uncertain economic gains and inevitable emotional discord a maintenance hearing could bring.  
BG: Does he give you anything?  
T: When I asked him for money, he says, “at the end of the month,” but it never 
comes.  
BG: Will you take him to court?  
T: Hmmmm, no. I want us to be a family. This other woman, she’s not 
good….When this job is finished, he’ll come back, and we can stay nicely 
together.  
BG: Oh?! [surprised] 
T: [Laughing] But, you know, if I go to the court, there will be no cows [marriage 
proceedings].  
 
This decision was no doubt influenced by the fact that Thandi herself was working, and she was 
living with her sister, who had a “good job,” so she had a modicum of economic security, which 
left her free to indulge in dreams of marrying her children’s father. At another time and under 
other circumstances, she may have chosen differently. But, more important for this consideration 
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is that women like Thandi echoed what other scholars have found (Cole 2004)—that 
relationships between unmarried mothers and fathers are not simply sexual, but are often seen as 
potential marriages. The cows in Thandi’s statement were the metaphorical or actual cattle that 
men’s families give to women’s families in marriage negotiations. As infrequent and 
inaccessible as marriage was—as affirmed by Thandi’s laughter—it remained the sought-after 
ideal (Hunter 2010). Thandi and others like her felt that initiating a court case jeopardized the 
hope for that ideal, however unlikely it may be.  
Others who avoided the Court saw a court case as not only a threat to their future 
relationship with their children’s father, but also as an impediment to their child’s relationship 
with his or her father. In these cases, the desire to foster a nurturing relationship between the 
father and the child kept them away from the Courts. When I met Thuli, in her late thirties, she 
had a new boyfriend, who, though he bought her clothes and cell-phone minutes, was 
uninterested in Nothi, the daughter Thuli had had with Mvu. Mvu had met Nothi a few times 
when the girl was small, but they had lost contact over the years. Now that Nothi was a teenager, 
she and Mvu had recently found each other on Facebook and had begun spending time 
together—a fact about which Thuli was immensely pleased and did not want to disrupt:  
“He doesn’t send money and stuff, [and hasn’t for some time,] but I don’t force 
the issue. . . . I want him to have a relationship with her. I didn’t have a 
relationship with my father. I want to be a family and for him to spend time with 
her. You can’t make someone love you or be there if they don’t want to.”  
 
To Thuli, the making of “a family”—meaning, for her, a warm father–daughter 
relationship—was something a court case would endanger. Thuli’s situation is emblematic of 
many women who cultivate multiple relationships to serve a variety of ends. With her new 
boyfriend, she found an element of economic support—which had to be supplemented through 
other labor and relationships—and a sexual relationship that may have been pleasurable to her, 
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but the new boyfriend did not demonstrate the affective care for Nothi that Thuli prized and 
which she hoped to retain in Mvu.  
Another group of women avoided the Court because they did not want a relationship of 
any kind with the father of their child. These were often relationships with a history of domestic 
violence, and, in contrast to Phindi, they did not feel the Court would protect them from future 
abuse (Khunou 2012). As one woman said, “the first one, I could not go [to court] because he 
would kill us if he saw us; the second [man], I would kill him.” Such concerns were by no means 
unfounded, as there have been incidents where men have violently attacked women during 
maintenance hearings, and maintenance officers often have the additional role of acting as 
bouncers. Further, these women often did not want their ex-partner to have any place in their 
child’s life, because he was either a bad influence, or a source of emotional pain, or both. As, 
Nomusa said, “I do not want my son to know him. What might he learn? To have children and 
abandon them?” Though the payment of maintenance has no legal relationship to privileges of 
access to the child, my interlocutors expressed that if a man were paying, they would feel 
compelled to let him visit his child, regardless of how bad an influence he might be. To open a 
case, these women expressed, was to submit themselves and their children to the likelihood of 
disappointment and the feeling of rejection all over again.  
A final group of women I wish to consider were those who chose not to use the Court 
because to do so would impede their relationship with another man. For these women, or more 
importantly, for their new partners, the bond created through maintenance payments was a form 
of unpaid debt that, in principle, could give ex-partners a legitimate claim to sexual favors from 
the woman. I first became aware of this when my thirty-four-year-old research assistant, Zama, 
told me she would not seek maintenance from the father of her first two children because she 
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was “moving on in love” with a new boyfriend, Thabo. Initially, I thought Zama was affirming 
Thabo’s care and support of not just his own child, but of all three children. However, Zama 
elaborated to say her choice was instead based on a concern for the jealousy Thabo would feel if 
she continued to receive money from her previous partner. She suggested she needed to be 
“finished, finished”—as in to sever all ties—with her ex-partner to build a future with Thabo.  
Zama’s decision is legible in a context in which it is widely understood that material 
contributions require reciprocation through sexual favors. Though it is not uncommon for young, 
unmarried women to have relationships with multiple men that involve different forms of 
material exchange, the practice continues to be frowned upon by men (Hunter 2009; Pettifor et 
al. 2012; Strebel et al. 2013). A handful of my informants had new boyfriends who disapproved 
of a continued connection with a prior lover, though the connection was a transaction of money 
mediated by the Court. Underlying this disapproval was first the notion that economic support, 
no matter how achieved, bore traces of an emotional commitment (Garey and Townsend 1996; 
Hunter 2010; Jewkes et al. 2012; Jewkes and Morrell 2011). Given that a man faced few legal 
repercussions for nonpayment, compliance with payment indicated other motivations.  
Second, many understood women’s acceptance of maintenance money as creating a debt 
that entitled the giver to some form of reciprocity, most likely sexual favors. To these 
disapproving boyfriends, the presence of this unpaid debt was akin to a form of infidelity: the 
woman to whom they wished to have exclusive sexual access had outstanding sexual obligations 
to another man (Ashforth 1999). The fact that a state body such as the Court had mediated these 
payments, for these men, did not cleanse the money of its burden of reciprocity. Regardless of 
whether the new boyfriend had any intention of supporting children by another man, the residue 
of infidelity was intolerable to them. Some new boyfriends also disapproved of women’s 
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spending money from him on children from another man. To continue to receive money from the 
boyfriend, many women used a common strategy of sending the children to live with other kin, 
whom they will occasionally pay, so as to not muddy the waters of obligation. 
Given the interconnectedness of sex, money, and affective commitment, these women 
found that the specter of obligation produced by maintenance payments hindered their attempts 
to build a relationship with another man. Notably, through its provision of grants, the state was 
often called a de-facto father. However, receipt of the CSG created no such obligation. Thus, for 
women with good prospects elsewhere, seeking maintenance from a previous partner may not be 
worth the entanglements of debt—whether they intended to fulfill them or not.  
Conclusion  
The above considers one small piece of the large and complex puzzle of family life in the 
new South Africa. Since democratic transition, reform of the maintenance system has been an 
important strategy for ensuring the rights of women and children. Strengthening the system has 
been a critical governmental response to shifts in the composition of the family as marriage has 
become inaccessible, childbearing frequently occurs outside of marriage, poor mothers 
increasingly rely on government grants, and fathers, often unemployed, participate less in the 
physical, emotional, and economic lives of their children. Yet despite a great deal of research, 
activism, policy making, and notable improvements, the maintenance system continues to 
founder in its ability to transfer money from the hands of fathers to those of the women who 
provide daily care for children.  
Many problems stem from budget shortfalls and ideological oversights that have hindered 
the implementation of some fairly progressive policies. Documents such as the 2012 White Paper 
on Families and the South African Law Commission’s 2014 report on the maintenance system 
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call for such radical actions as exploring forms of maintenance other than monetary payments to 
involve fathers who cannot afford to pay and community-based punishments for maintenance 
defaulters that emphasize correctional supervision and community service. We have yet to see 
the extent to which these can be realized within the institutions with which women regularly 
interact and the effects they will have.  
This chapter has considered a different, but related issue. Though the deficiencies of the 
Maintenance Court have certainly affected women’s engagement with it, concerns about whether 
or not they will receive money for their labors is not women’s only consideration. My data have 
shown that maintenance payments are part of larger economies of intimacy that women must 
account for when deciding whether to pursue a case. Women are aware that even if a court case 
is effective and she receive payments, receipt of them may negatively affect other relationships 
upon which she relies. Therefore, women must carefully assess the complexities of the social 
network that provides them with money, sex, labor, and love (today and into the future) and the 
cultural conventions that govern such exchanges, to determine the relative value of maintenance 
money.  
Such findings are critical because consideration of these economies of intimacy upon 
which women rely are rarely, if at all, a part of policy concerned with alleviating women’s 
poverty. The exception to this are the discussions about reducing the spread of HIV. However, 
these frequently rely on a trope of protecting “vulnerable women” who are susceptible to 
infection because they are “driven to exchange sex for gifts by virtue of their economic 
destitution” (Ashforth 2014:214).14 Yet research such as the above chapter details and such as 
                                               
14 By framing women as victims, activists, researchers, and aid workers could give a socially-palatable answer to the question of 
why even in the face of HIV awareness and safe-sex knowledge, women and men often did not change their sexual practices. 
Women’s victimization also offered a new course action in the form of women’s empowerment programs which have become the 
de rigeur form of intervention in the last decade.  
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that conducted by Verheijen in Malawi demonstrate that women’s choices surrounding sex and 
money are far more complicated than simple evaluations of economic necessity (2013 also 
Mojola 2015). Nevertheless, such exchanges have become essential to women raising children 
on their own in the context of South Africa’s relational and economic uncertainty. Further, 
economies of intimacy and the cultural conventions that govern them have profound effects on 
family formation that are not yet fully understood yet are essential for any policymaking around 
“strengthening families” or poverty alleviation.  
This chapter suggests that the cultural meaning given to the gifts and exchanges that 
solidify relational bonds are a product of their political and economic contexts. This demands a 
reconsideration of the many ways in which people are making family under conditions of 
material poverty. In the present context, where exchanges of bridewealth to solidify a marriage—
a long-time topic of inquiry for anthropologists—are less possible, what forms of exchange now 
solidify the bonds of family? How are these exchanges managed, and what conventions have 
arisen? Where co-residence is not a given, what form do intimate family bonds take, both 
vertically—between children and their caregivers—and horizontally— between mothers and 
their partners? By seeking to answer such questions, we would gain a far richer understanding of 
how family forms have responded to new political economies. 
The next chapter considers marital exchanges in a rather different context—namely 
between South African women and men who have migrated from other parts of the African 
continent. Here, the rituals of ilobolo are central to social transformation that women seek to 
become different kinds of persons and citizens. However, such marriages come with social costs. 
These marriages, formalized in the midst of intense xenophobia, offer another perspective on 
how women and men go about their projects of social reproduction, or, making a family.  
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Chapter 7 - They come to take our women and our jobs”: Migrants, Marriage, and 
National Belonging 
 
Zandi was in the midst of a difficult visit home. She had returned to her rural township to 
tell her parents that while she had been away at university in the city, she had become pregnant. 
The pregnancy was an issue, but almost more so the conditions surrounding it. Zandi's father had 
gone against the cautionary advice of his neighbors who said that education in the city only led 
to trouble and very little learning. Then there was the issue of the boy. This was not just any boy. 
Zandi had met him in 2009 when they were working at a beachfront restaurant together. Their 
courtship began not with long conversations, but with English lessons. Zandi was moved by the 
fact that her coworkers mistreated him because he was from Burundi. "Burundi!", Zandi's father 
had said when she told him about the father of her child. "Where did you meet someone from 
Burundi?!" It was a far cry from the rural Eastern Cape. Zandi had met Touissant because she 
was living, as many students did, in the heterogeneous Point neighborhood where immigrants 
from all over the continent lived alongside various racial and ethnic groups from across South 
Africa. Much to Zandi's relief, her father did not berate her for having a relationship with "a 
foreigner." Instead, he asked that Toussaint offer inhlawulo.  Sometimes translated as “damages” 
this a payment made by a man to a woman's family to restore honor to an unmarried woman he 
has made pregnant. It also serves to transfer the Toussaint swiftly agreed, eager to begin 
marriage negotiations.  
The relative ease of her father’s acceptance, however, was not a harbinger of how others 
would react. During the same visit, an old friend came by to see Zandi. "Hawu!", her friend had 
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said, "Are you not scared if this guy can make you pregnant and then leave you with the children 
and run away to his country?" Her scorn revealed her underlying judgement. Zandi replied 
quietly, "No, I am not scared of that." Her friend continued to press the question, insinuating that 
Zandi should be very concerned and ashamed to have taken up with such an unreliable category 
of men such as foreigners from Africa. After a pause, Zandi asked her own question,  
"Isn't it you have a baby?"  
"Yes,"  
"How old is the baby?"  
"Two years,"  
"And where is the father?" Zandi landed the question pointedly. 
 
The answer came much quieter now, "I don't know". In the retelling of the interaction, Zandi 
continued, "[Her] boyfriend stays there, you can see the house where we are sitting," she pointed 
out an imaginary window, "but he can't come and support [the baby]...(she sighed) People they 
make people pregnant and run away...So if it happened to me, it won't be new. It is what is 
happening here, even now."    
Here Zandi offers a pointed commentary on the landscape of intimate relationships in 
South Africa today. As previously discussed, in the span of a generation, rates of marriage have 
dropped dramatically to the point that marriage is now the, highly prized, exception rather than 
the norm. Though fertility has declined, children are cherished and childbearing remains an 
important maker of social adulthood. The collapse of waged labor has meant that not only are 
men unable to formalize marriages through the exchange of ilobolo or bridewealth, many also 
struggle to send money home to their children who, overwhelmingly live with their mothers. 
Thus, as Zandi notes, the idea that a man could “make you pregnant and then leave you with the 
children and run away” was not an imagined nightmare, but an everyday lived reality for many. 
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In her conversation with her friend, Zandi argued that a relationship with a foreigner was 
no more a source of fear or shame than a relationship with a local man. However, Zandi and the 
others like her were well aware that these were not equivalent relationships and they did not 
enter into them lightly. Thuli, a Zulu-speaking women also married to a Burundian man, 
described her initial doubts: 
When he asked me out, I was scared of dating foreigners because, first, I was new 
in Durban. People used to say terrible things about foreigners, that they are selling 
drugs or criminals. I never wanted to associate myself with that kind of people. 
Local people also say bad things about you when you are dating a foreigner. 
Things like you are a bitch, you are dirty, you like money, you are a prostitute. 
So, I was afraid of being seen with him. 
 
These everyday forms of discrimination also had high stakes counterparts. Since South 
Africa opened it borders to immigration in 1994, the country has been racked with a new form of 
violence and discrimination, this time targeting black bodies from outside the country. In this 
period, South Africa transformed from a “refugee-producing to a refugee-receiving country” 
(Warren 2015). Between 2006 and 2012 South Africa accepted the highest number of asylum 
seekers of any country in the world (UNHCR 2012).1 In 2011, immigrants made up 4.2% of the 
population, with 71% of those coming from the African continent (STATSA 2011).2 In addition 
to the relative economic and political stability South Africa offers, the post-apartheid ideals of 
equality and nondiscrimination enshrined in the Constitution have produced some of the most 
progressive asylum laws in the world (Warren 2015). Whereas in other countries, refugees are 
forced into overcrowded camps, in South Africa migrants who have applied for asylum can live 
and work anywhere in the country until their refugee status is finalized. On paper, asylum 
                                               
1 For comparison, in 2009 South Africa received 222,300 asylum claims as opposed to the US which received 47,900 the same 
year (UNHCR 2012). 
2 The 2011 census found that 2,199,871 documented immigrants were living in South Africa with a total population which then 
stood at 51,770,560 (UNHCR 2012). Though an exact number of undocumented immigrants is not known, a conservative 
estimate is that there were 500,000 in 2011. It is likely that these numbers are higher now given the political and economic strife 
on the continent (Warren 2015). 
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seekers and refugees are entitled to the same basic rights as citizens (Landau 2011). Of course, 
lived reality is much different. 
The question of whether or not an immigrant, such as Zandi's husband Touissant, is in the 
country "legally" is both difficult to answer and, at times, irrelevant. The Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA), the governmental body in charge of overseeing immigration, has a conflicting 
stance towards documenting immigrants (Amit and Kriger 2014). On the one hand, the 
department seeks to keep track of how many migrants are in the country. On the other hand, by 
documenting their presence, the Department imbues migrants with certain rights, which goes 
against a second goal of limiting the number of migrants through deportation. Thus, many 
migrants who have presented themselves for registration have been refused documentation so 
they may be deported later. In 2007, South Africa was a world leader in the number of 
deportations (Landau 2011:3). Furthermore, even those who do possess legal documents— 
documents that entitle them to work and study, to access health care, to open bank accounts, and 
to a life free from the threat of arrest or detention—have been beaten, harassed, their papers torn 
up and, deported (Amit and Kriger 2014). Xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 also resulted 
in the injury and deaths of hundreds of immigrants, those who married them, and those who 
sought to defend them. 
This chapter considers why women like Zandi and Thuli are willing to tolerate derision 
and submit their intimate lives to the threats of violence to enter into these binational marriages. 
How do they understand their partners as husbands or as fathers vis a vis South African men? 
How have these marriages reconfigured their relationships to kin, to their community, and to the 
state? Though such marriages are still infrequent, answers to these questions reveal the 
possibilities and limits of black women’s citizenship in the new South Africa.  
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To begin answer these questions, I offer a key context to the quote that begins the title for 
this chapter. As we are seeing erupt across the globe, in South Africa foreigners have become the 
scapegoat for the economic and political ills of the country with everything from crime to rent 
inflation to a lack of public services blamed on their presence (Warren 2015). 
However, three unique features give the anti-immigrant rage in South Africa its specific tenor. 
First, is South Africa’s history of nation building which across multiple governments, has in 
every case been predicated on exclusion. I concur with Landau that the South African state has 
rejuvenated apartheid-era forms of spatio-ethnic political discrimination once reserved for black 
South Africans, now deployed upon the new outsider to be denied legal identity: the non-national 
(2011). Like black South Africans under apartheid, the presence and labor of non-nationals are 
critical to the functioning of the South African economy. While no less true in the present 
context of economic decline, the argument that immigrants are a drain on housing and public 
services is also a reproduction of apartheid arguments for prohibiting permanent African 
settlement in urban areas. Excluding immigrants from full access to such services maintains their 
status as cheap, disposable sources of labor.  
This leads to the second feature. Like most migrants around the world, foreigners in 
South Africa are more frequently employed in more precarious, lower-paying, and hazardous 
jobs that locals are unwilling to take. This has contributed to a situation where, quite unusually, 
foreigners have a significantly higher employment rate—albeit in the informal or grey market— 
than their local counterparts (Budlender and Fauvelle-Aymar 2012).3 This relative economic 
success gives foreigners a contradictory social position as they occupy low status jobs but enjoy 
                                               
3  This statistic is all the more surprising because it holds a number of variables that constitute “immigrant advantage” constant. 
Budlender and Fauvelle-Aymar found that “a foreign-born migrant with the same age, gender, and level of education, belonging 
to the same population group and residing in the same place as a South African, has a higher probability of being employed than 
a South African non-migrant. This is a very unusual finding, as in most developed countries where data are available, the rate of 
employment for foreign-born migrants is a lot lower than for local workers” (2012). 
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greater wealth and the prestige that comes with it (Tafira 2010). Thus, they are doubly vulnerable 
to the vagaries of state harassment and neighborly jealousy. 
Furthermore, not only are foreigner men able to garner some earnings, they also choose 
to use these earnings to formalize marriages, occasionally, with South African women, the 
import of which I will discuss in a moment. It is no surprise then that black South African men—
overwhelmingly unemployed, poor, and unmarried—feel enraged and cheated out of the 
promises that democracy was supposed to bring. In a context of widespread unemployment 
where low earnings also hinder the solidification of intimate relationships through marriage, non-
nationals’ employment and marriage to South African women is an obvious source of frustration 
and jealousy. Their frustration and jealousy finds its voice in the constant critique that foreigners 
“come to take our women and our jobs.” However, at issue is not simply work and love. 
It is a well-worn trope that foreigners plagued by police harassment and political 
insecurity would seek out marriages with local women to solidify their claims to the polity. 
However, this does not answer why South African women would agree to be “taken.” I argue 
that, in a strange reversal, black South African women marry foreign men to gain access to adult 
status, social inclusion, and, ultimately, a fuller form of citizenship within their own nation state. 
I contend that in contemporary South Africa full social citizenship includes an amalgam of newly 
available forms of state recognition and welfare provisioning undergirded by other forms of 
social belonging and adult personhood that are unavailable to poor black women and men in the 
present moment. Thus, as women rework the meaning and access to these various spheres of 
belonging through their intimate relationships, they also serve to rework the very definition of 
citizenship in South Africa today. In short, the intimate domains of sex and reproduction are, 
today, a key site where political belonging is constituted and in this particular case, black South 
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African women are gaining political belonging through marriage to foreign men. Nonetheless, 
the forms of inclusion women gain in these trans-national marriages comes at the price of other 
forms of marginalization and exclusion that cannot be overlooked. These tradeoffs reveal the 
limits of current redefinitions of citizenship. 
Point Partnerships 
The experiences of these women are shaped by the context in which they live. The Point 
neighborhood is a highly heterogeneous space and is known for a high concentration of non-
nationals. The Point has been one of the few spaces in Durban where immigrants can safely live 
and work. As such, there is a high concentration of non-nationals living alongside native South 
Africans. Critically, in terms of shaping ideas of belonging, the Point is considered a transitory 
neighborhood in which few people lay claim to long-term residence and ownership. This 
enhances feelings of mistrust amongst community members and overall there is very little sense 
of neighborhood solidarity. On the other hand, it also mitigates internal discord over “insider” 
and “outsider” identities as found in other heterogeneous urban spaces such as Alexandra in 
Johannesburg. Thus, when anti-immigrant attacks did take place in Point in 2015, the instigators 
were not from within the neighborhood, but from the townships beyond. 
The woman I worked with met their husbands—at work, in their buildings, through 
friends—because they were living in this neighborhood. Many of the women did not like the 
neighborhood because if its high density and high crime rate and said it was not a place they 
wished to raise children. However, because of the trans-national nature of their union, they had 
to continue to live in the neighborhood both to be closer to their husband’s work and out of 
concerns of safety. Though there was still discrimination in the Point, there was greater tolerance 
in the presence of so many non-nationals and those who chose to live among them. 
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The women in this chapter comprise a sub group of 12 women out of my larger group of 
interlocutors. The women hail from a mix of South African Zulu and Xhosa backgrounds. The 
majority of them (11) are married to immigrants from Burundi and converted to their husband’s 
religion of Islam. The twelfth is married to a Christian Tanzanian. The women range in age from 
25-35, as do their husbands. Their husbands predominantly arrived between 2006 and 2010. 
Most of the women knew one another from attending Madrasa classes together. There is also a 
close-knit Burundian immigrant network of which their husbands are a part and some of the 
families socialize together.  
Burundian migrants to South Africa are a small percentage of total immigrants. The UN 
estimated a total of 5,227 in South Africa in 2015 (2015). Furthermore, Muslims comprise only 
2.5% of the population of Burundi. However, due to a disproportionate level of political 
ascendance among the Muslim population in Burundi, many more Muslims have felt the effects 
of the political turmoil of the early 2000s are immigrated. For those that come to South Africa, 
many seek out Durban as a place to reside, in part, because there is a large, centralized, Muslim 
population and a mosque within the Point neighborhood. The climate is also more temperate than 
Johannesburg or Cape Town. 
Citizenship, Personhood, Belonging 
This chapter makes important contributions to scholarship on migration and marriage. 
For my purposes, the bulk of this scholarship can be broken up into two strains. The first 
involves men who migrate from poorer countries to wealthier countries in order to support 
marriages and wives they have left in their country of origin (for Africa this includes: Cole and 
Groes 2016; Hannaford 2017; Ikuomola 2015; Mercer Page and Evans 2008). My respondents 
were well aware of the possibility that they could be secondary wives to a primary marriage their 
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husbands had in their natal country. They spent a great deal of energy corresponding with in-
laws and members of the sending community in an attempt to confirm the existence of these 
other families. To date, none have been revealed.  
The second, larger, strain of scholarship pertains to women who migrate and marry men 
in a wealthier receiving country (For Africa: Cole 2014a-c; Cole and Groes 2016. For other 
locations: Constable 2003; Faier 2009; Freeman 2011; Fresnoza-Flot 2017; Sirijit 2013; Sirijit 
and Angeles 2013). Despite the relatively larger size of this strain scholarship, a far smaller 
number of studies focus on the inner-workings of the marriages and, notably for me, the status 
change that the spouses native to the receiving country enjoy (Cole 2014a-c; Faier 2009; 
Fresnoza-Flot and Merla 2018). Further, as Dahles (2009) and others have noted, research on 
transnational (and binational) marriage overwhelmingly looks at the experiences of women with 
only a few exceptions (e.g. Lafferty and Maher 2014; Thompson, Pattana and Suriya 2016) 
however these are interested in men from wealthier countries to poorer ones.  
This chapter is also predominantly concerned with the experience of women. However, in 
this case women are the indigenes of a (comparatively) wealthier receiving country who choose 
to marry a reviled foreigner man. While issues of belonging, exclusion, power, economics, and 
affect pervade all of this scholarship, the differences of gender, race, and origin in my case have 
profound implications for how these couples navigate their joint projects of social reproduction.  
At stake in discussions of citizenship are peculiarities about the ways in which it is 
operating in South Africa today. In 2014, when I asked my friend, Sthembile, a longtime 
political activist, what she wished for in her life, she said simply, “a job where I can be able to 
get a salary that will be enough to support myself and my family.” It matters that Sthembile’s 
greatest wish was for a job to support her family. Her desire was articulated not simply a matter 
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of survival but as a concern of social reproduction. Sthembile was not simply concerned with 
preventing hunger or cold, illness or death she was concerned that her parents have security in 
their old age or that her children could go to a good school. In short, she envisioned a job as a 
means to shoring up the relationships that were important to her life.  It was insecurity in this 
reproduction that led Sthembile and other black women like her to say that they felt excluded 
from citizenship in the new South Africa.4  
How is such a thing possible? In one sense, the question of what is the meaning of 
citizenship in South Africa was answered in 1994 when democratic transition replaced minority 
white rule with universal suffrage. The new constitution—globally recognized as one of the most 
progressive and inclusive guiding documents—offered to all citizens a radical expansion of 
rights including the right to non-discrimination on the basis of race, gender, sexuality, age, 
culture, in addition to socioeconomic rights to housing, health care, food, water, and social 
assistance. This was the guiding principle of a better life for all- a rainbow nation of tolerance 
and shared prosperity. 
Unfortunately, in the democratic moment, the majority of South Africans are 
overwhelmingly poor. Not simply poor, but lacking the very basic housing, health care, food and 
water the new constitution guaranteed. The rapid success of a small but highly visible black 
middle and upper class fuels the feeling for many that they have been left out of the promises of 
liberation. In other words, the supposedly universalist character of liberal citizenship was deeply 
exclusionary of the very persons it purported to include.  Despite the intensity of discrimination 
                                               
4 In the past two decades, there has been an efflorescence of scholarship on the “crisis of social reproduction.” In Africa, this 
scholarship centers around youth unable to transition to adulthood see Alber, van der Geest, & Whyte 2008; Christiansen, Utas & 
Vigh 2006; Classen 2013; Cole & Durham 2008; Comaroff & Comaroff 2004; Hansen 2005; Hunter 2010; Mains, Hadley & 
Tessema 2013, 2007; Masquelier 2013, 2005; Mbembe 2008 [2001]; Prince 2006; Roth 2008; Vasconcelos 2010; Vigh 2006; 
Weiss 2004). I am not just concerHassned with adulthood as it affects social reproduction, but social reproduction as it shapes 
people’s notions of citizenship. I also join with Jones (2009) to emphasize that blockages should not be taken as stasis but should 
provoke scholars to attend to how people forge alternative means or ways to work around the blockage.  
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against foreigners both socially and politically, it would be incorrect to assume that the lines of 
demarcation between deserving insiders and threatening outsiders lie solely along national 
borders. Indeed, short of deportation, many poor South African citizens suffer similar exclusions: 
denial of legal status and documentation; harassment, arrest, and detention; and obstructed access 
to constitutional rights, state services, and legal due process (Landau 2011).5 The state and 
popular marginalization of poor South Africans leaves them in a tenuous position vis-a-vis their 
own citizenship.6 This has led one scholar to claim, “[the poor] are considered to be less than 
fully entitled members of the South African polity. What separates non-nationals from citizens is 
the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically institutionalized and socially legitimate” 
(Landau 2011:8). 
To understand the effect of women’s kinshipping labor on producing their citizenship 
requires a definition of citizenship that goes beyond simply legal enfranchisement. I use 
citizenship to include a broader sense of national belonging and social personhood that takes the 
nation state to be one in many nested and overlapping layers of belonging. These may include 
space-based, local communities, ethnic or racial identity groups, or supra-national groupings all 
of which comprise citizenship (Avineri and Shalit 1992; Daly 1993; Marshall 1950; Phillips 
1993). Thus, citizenship here is conceived of as “multi-layered” or constituted and negotiated 
within these various spheres or layers, each within their own context (Yuval-Davis 1999). 
                                               
5 Notably, police target people for deportation on the basis of appearance (darkness/lightness of skin), language, and 
documentation. Using this profile, a not insignificant number of South Africans belonging to linguistic minorities have been 
deported as well. 
6 Statements such as this one is not to overlook the fact that South Africa’s investments in poverty alleviation are higher than any 
other developing country (Ferguson 2015). However, despite enormous spending in cash transfers, education, and housing 
construction, South Africa remains a global leader in inequality measurements (World Bank 2016). Key assets such as profitable 
land, quality education, and integrated housing remain out of reach for poorpeople, who make up an increasing proportion of the 
country (Gelb 2008). 
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Belonging to these groups, in Feldman’s terms, is achieved via the possession of immutable 
(gender, race, nationality) and mutable (class, language) characteristics that often underlie 
regulatory categories; as well as through personal actions (caring for elderly kin or sending 
nieces and nephews to school) that shape emotional attachments and mutual obligation (2016). 
Once more, citizenship as asocial process, is rendered visible. 
In this chapter, a key component of belonging is belonging as fostered through the 
creation and the maintenance of social relationships—the meeting of obligation, the practice of 
social reproduction. Here I am concerned with spheres of belonging and social personhood that 
cohere around the family and are cross-cut by race, gender, and class. I focus on black women’s 
belonging to a kin group or network of relationships of obligation with blood and non-blood 
relations, belonging in a cultural group—here both Xhosa and Zulu, and to the larger nation of 
South Africa.  
In the post-apartheid moment, while women gained political franchise and access to an 
abstract notion of rights, they lost previously available means of social reproduction and social 
belonging, namely marriage and work. Thus, at the same moment that capital and regulation 
have been privatized, so too have the paths to social and political belonging been privatized. By 
this I mean, they are mediated and negotiated at the micro political scale of the interpersonal and 
the intimate. In short, it is in the space of intimate relationships that people are actually creating 
citizenship. 
Marriage, Personhood, Belonging 
In order to understand why someone like my friend Zandi would choose to marry a 
foreigner and submit herself to various forms of personal and political violence, requires a more 
robust definition of what exactly full social citizenship entails. A definition that accounts for the 
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critical work done at the scale of interpersonal, intimate relationships such as that between Zandi 
and Touissant. It also requires situating this work as part of larger shifts in the political economy 
of intimacy. Though the contours have changed in critical ways across the last century, black 
women’s status in these three spheres—kin group, cultural group and nation—has been mediated 
by the institutions of marriage and wage labor. 
Among Zulu and Xhosa people, marriage marks a critical part of the social transition 
from adolescence to fully recognized adulthood with the accompanying forms of respect and 
responsibility (Liebenberg 1994; Cook 1931; Guy 1990). By creating an umuzi (umzi) or separate 
household, sons become umnumzana the head of household, a man of worth and status (Hunter 
2010). These men fulfill their obligation--to their living family and to their ancestors—to 
continue the lineage through marriage to a umakoti (bride/daughter in law) who in turn is 
obligated to care for her husband and mother in law and the necessary children. 
Prior to colonialism, such marriages were solidified through the exchange of gifts, the 
most notable being the ilobolo or bridewealth of cattle given from the family of the husband to 
the family of the bride. However, since the early 20th century, settler land dispossession reduced 
fathers’ capacity to raise and give cattle for sons’ marriages. Instead, an increasing dependency 
on cash drove sons into a wage economy hungry for labor. Ilobolo and the marriages it solidified 
became tied to son’s earnings through the migration to cities, upending gendered and 
generational hierarchies.  
In the segregationist and apartheid eras, black women’s national belonging was severely 
limited and linked to the status of working men. Though men were desired in cities for their 
labor, successive white governments sought to limit men’s claims to urban life granting them 
only temporary residence in the city and confining them to be housed in single-sex hostels. The 
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critical work of social reproduction—birthing and raising of children, growing of food, caring for 
the elderly, and honoring the ancestors—was done by women living on rural reserves. By virtue 
of their waged labor, black men gained partial membership—the membership available to 
them—in the polity. Black women, by contrast, were barred from entering the city legally as 
workers and in a colonial reworking of customary law, were labeled as legal minors, unable to 
own property, retain custody of their children, or move without the consent of their husband or 
tribal elders.  
Women’s labor was critical to the functioning of the migrant labor system and enabled 
men’s entrance into the polity and retention of their belonging in their kinship system and ethic 
homeland. In the virtual absence of men, women translated men’s wages sent home into care for 
the children and elderly, built houses, produced food, and met the cultural and kinship 
obligations of the umuzi. Though long criticized for fostering marital instability, the migrant 
labor system fostered what some have termed a “patriarchal bargain” where as long as men sent 
home a sufficient proportion of their wages, women were willing to work for the umuzi and both 
could enjoy the heightened status of umnumzana and umakoti (Kandiyoti 1988; Moodie with 
Ndatshe 1994). Men’s familial role was marked not through their physical presence, but through 
the ilobolo they had paid and the remittances they sent home to the family, what Hunter has 
come to call “provider love” in which sentiment is given substance through material care (2010: 
16). 
At democratic transition, black women gained the most in terms of formal political 
belonging. In addition to obtaining the vote, there was widespread recognition of the structural 
forms of gender discrimination that had been built into the country’s working. There was a 
nation-wide commitment to encouraging women’s participation in government and addressing 
 247 
the inequalities of the past from a particularly gendered perspective (Hassim 2005).  
Unfortunately, much of the progress took the form of newly enshrined legal rights and very little 
substantive redistributive gender change (Hassim 2005). Women have remained the primary 
caregivers of children, however, the historical means of supporting those children—waged work, 
husband, or husband's kin—are no longer available, making the security of poor black women 
especially tenuous. Thus, what women can and do expect from their intimate relationships with 
men has dramatically changed.  
Intimacies in an Age of Insecurity 
In 2014, the group of 12 black African women whose experiences frame this chapter, 
stood out from the many other women I met first, because their children shared the same father 
and, second because they had married the father of their children both through customary ilobolo 
and an Islamic Nikah ceremony. Though there are colloquial evaluations of the relative virtues of 
foreign men—Malawian’s are good lovers, Nigerians are rich and powerful, Tanzanians are 
family men—marriage between South Africans and foreigners remains uncommon for all the 
aforementioned reasons. Thus, I was surprised to encounter this tightly-knit group of trans-
national spouses—united because their spouses all came from Burundi and many knew one 
another and because in keeping with both domestic and Burundian custom the women had 
converted to their husband’s religion and attended Madrasa together.  
When I asked the women to describe the origins of their relationship, their stories all 
began with an outpouring of frustration and criticism of the local men they had dated. The 
women both spoke from their own experience and drew upon circulating tropes of the absent 
black father to make their arguments more legible. Many friends and sisters like Zandi’s friend in 
the opening vignette who had children by multiple fathers who did not offer support. One woman 
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summed it up well when she said, “I don't know what kind of men are these [local] men. Because 
I don't understand how can a man be able to take a plate of food and eat and they don't know 
what their child is eating.” To eat for one’s self is a criticism that cuts to the heart of moral 
personhood. This selfishness of men she saw as a violation of the sanctity of fatherhood. She 
went on to complain that men were not only financially absent, but though they were not 
working, they remained physically absent, as they had been during labor migration. She 
bemoaned the embarrassment her daughters felt when their schoolmates teased them for not 
having a father. “You can be responsible and you don't have the money.” She said, “At least he 
should show his children that they have a father.” 
Their husband’s different orientation to family was a key distinction many women cited 
in their decision to pursue the relationship. Thuli was one of the women who had been quite 
reluctant to date a foreigner, due to the derision she felt in the community. However, her 
experiences with local men gave her different terms on which to evaluate the relationship.  
We are able to stay together as a family. What I saw different about him from 
other South African man is that his children always come first. Other South 
African make their children a last priority. With him I know whatever happens his 
children will always be his first priority. 
 
One of the most important priorities was that foreign men chose to put their earnings 
towards the payment of inhlawulo and ilobolo. While the exact amounts of these ritual payments 
are negotiated between families, they are sizeable investments, many times the monthly income 
of even the most successful of the foreigner husbands I knew. For example, monthly rent for a 
flat for the family would cost about R4500 in 2014. The inhlawulo payment for Zandi’s first 
child was R6000. This payment had to be completed before negotiations over ilobolo could 
begin with the final amount totaling somewhere in the range of R50,000-R70,000. As scholars 
over time have noted, this bridewealth payment is not uni-directional but part of a larger 
 249 
exchange between families that takes place over the course of many years (Comaroff 1980). 
However, that exchange was complicated by the cultural differences between the bride and 
groom’s family and the lack of space and accommodation in the Point neighborhood to enable 
the kind of celebratory gathering that would usually take place in the rural areas. This is all to 
say that a primary rationale for women choosing to marry foreigner men is that foreigner men 
had the means to marry them and would use that money for marriage. 
The symbolic import of formalizing marriage for the women I knew cannot be overstated. 
Finding a man who will pay for ilobola is equivalent to winning the social lottery (Hunter 2006 
Rice 2015). The payment of bridewealth is a signal both of the social value of the woman and of 
the good work her family did in raising her. By getting married, women met a primary kin 
obligation as daughter and sister—sister because theoretically, bothers can use their sister’s 
ilobolo to formalize their own marriages.7 Further, she ensured that her children would be a 
legitimate part of a lineage, thereby appeasing her ancestors. Movement into the role of married 
woman gave these women the status of moral adult personhood, though tempered by 
discrimination against their spousal choice. In doing so, it gave them access to a form of 
belonging that had been inaccessible in recent decades. 
Foreign men’s allocation of money was not simply important economically but was also 
critical for its indication of emotional commitment. In South Africa, two competing ideologies 
operate simultaneously in regards to the relationship between love and money (Thomas and Cole 
2009). The first, which is more common to people in this room envisions love and money as 
existing in “hostile worlds” in which the presence of one negates the possibilities of the other 
(Zelizer 2005). This was in operation when Sthembile was concerned about being accused of 
                                               
7 Theoretically, the bridewealth resources for a girl child is to be used by brothers in their own marriage transactions, though this 
rarely happens except among very wealthy families today.  
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being a prostitute for dating a foreigner. In the second, money, or economic support are an 
important constitutive part of love. Using this orientation, though they recognize the barriers 
ilobolo creates for formalizing marriage South African women argue that the practice is 
absolutely critical to the demonstration and creation of love. Unless they paid ilobolo, women 
claimed, how could they know that men truly loved them and how could they be inspired for 
their love to grow (Yarbrough 2016). Using this second set of logics, the women I knew argued 
that how their foreigner husbands spent money—on bridewealth, on food, on the children—
demonstrated the greater love they had for their wives and family and brought about greater love 
from the women in return. 
The good character of their husbands was not just demonstrated through their spending 
habits, but also through their honesty. “Why Touissant?”, I asked Zandi. “Awweeeee,” she 
giggled, “you know mens, they lie. Me, I don’t like someone who thinks he is big and tells 
stories…and Touissant don’t lie. He don’t lie.” Another woman, Maya, regaled a story of a 
previous boyfriend who always left her waiting saying, “I’m coming, I’m coming”, but never 
turned up. She said she came to expect that nothing he said was true. When she first met her 
Burundian husband, he charmed her by being 20 minutes early. 
The most critical form of honesty for all of the women was fidelity. They spoke 
disparagingly about the proclivity of the native men they knew to sleep with multiple women. In 
part, this was an issue of sexual loyalty, of no small import in a country with such a high AIDS 
rate. But also at stake was a division of resources. If men were with other women, it meant some 
of their money was going elsewhere. The women I knew were relieved to not have the conflicts 
that infidelity brought on. “We do fight,” Maya said, “but never one day do we fight about a 
lady. If he is cheating, (she said laughing) he is doing it so nicely that I can’t see anything, ever.” 
 251 
More important than the act of infidelity, for Maya, was that she did not feel the effects of 
divided attention or resources. 
As they talked about their foreign husbands’ fidelity, the women made a fascinating cultural 
shift. They described their husbands’ actions as embodying inhlonipho, or respect (Finlayson 
2002; Soga 1932; Hunter 1961 [1936]). This is a critical concept of moral personhood that sits at 
the heart of what it means to be Zulu or Xhosa (Whooley 1975; Mayer 1972). Historically used 
to indicate acts of deference that upheld social hierarchies, often gendered, this pre-colonial 
concept became linked to specifically female sexual purity through Christian missionary 
influence (Hunter 2010). However, the women I knew used it to indicate a male commitment to 
marital equality in both conduct and communication.  One woman, Maya explained:  
“I went with him because saw his qualities, the way he treated me. Because in 
previous relationships that I was in, the people I was with, either they would cheat 
or did not treat me right. With him I saw that he was not the type that liked 
woman and he respected me. When we had a problem, he knew how to talk with 
me without fighting me. He knew how to humble himself and apologize.” 
 
Here, critically, it was men who demonstrated deference and sensitivity and, notably non-native 
men. In this way, women like Maya took up ideas of conduct befitting a morally upstanding Zulu 
or Xhosa woman and laminated them onto their foreign husbands. I see this as part of a re-
negotiation of marital meaning that has taken place as companionate marriage and spousal 
choice-- important means by which women assert a modern identity—have been knit together 
with so-called ‘traditional’ marriage forms (Abu-Lughod 1990; Burbank 1995; Hirsch 2003; 
Hirsch & Wardlow 2006; Rice 2016; Thomas & Cole 2009).  
Love Talk 
Explanations such as what I have just detailed that justify their marital choice through 
appeals to moral ideas such as fidelity, cultural obligation or respect where themselves political 
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acts for the women I knew. As in the opening vignette, these women were constantly asked to 
explain their justification for such a surprising marriage to a host of questioners, myself included. 
Thus, their answers were well-rehearsed and anticipated the accompanying judgements. When I 
asked Thuli how her family had responded to her relationship, she answered, “They were saying 
the things that most South Africans say about foreigners. That he wants to marry me because he 
wants to get an identity document and he wants to stay in the country, or he could just leave me, 
all those things.” Sthembile noted that her motivations were also questioned, “When people hear 
you are with a foreigner they always assume you with him cause you after his money and also 
that you had no other choice because no other person is interested in you.” In this context where 
arguments about the instrumentality of the marriage choice are seen to undermine the emotional 
sincerity, appeals to affection and attachment become all the more important. Notably, this 
critique of the mercenary African woman also has a long history that has been given academic 
credence (Ferguson 1999). In their choice of a foreign husband women face a complicated 
calculus that includes often a history of failed relationships with local men, the prospects of 
achieving social belonging through marriage and the economic support that came with that 
commitment. It is benefits such as these that allow women to endure the both anticipated and 
surprising hardships they faced due to their marital choice.   
New Forms of Marginalization 
By marrying a foreigner, I contend South African women gained a greater sense of 
belonging in the spheres of kinship and cultural expectation. However, these gains were not 
uncomplicated and they came at the expense of other forms of exclusion and marginalization. As 
Zandi said, “When I go to any office, I have to be prepared to fight. I have to fight because I 
know the treatment I am going to get is not nice.” The everyday forms of discrimination women 
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faced arose from assumptions about the relationship between Islam and racial identity. All of the 
women I knew had converted, usually from Christianity and, wore a hijab and often long tunics 
when they went out in the neighborhood. Muslims in South Africa are a small minority and 
Islam becomes ethicized and in association with the groups in which it is more commonly 
practiced. In Durban, Islam is associated with the city’s large Indian population. The women I 
knew, all of whom were black South Africans, presented an unusual union of black bodies and 
Muslim dress that onlookers were at pains to comprehend. 
    
Figure 7.1: The dress of Muslim respondents as compared to their peers 
 
The first assumption people made was that the women I knew were themselves 
foreigners. When running errands in town they faced sneers on the sidewalk, rude shopkeepers, 
or taxi drivers who would not give them change. Much of the derision came from fellow South 
African women. “I will get in the taxi”, Zodwa said, and the women will be pulling up their face 
and will say to their friend in Zulu “aren’t they hot in all those clothes? Maybe that is why they 
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are so smelly, they are always sweating.” Zodwa, had an arsenal of swift retorts she often used to 
demonstrate her cultural and linguistic comprehension as well as her married status, “My hair is 
so much cleaner than in my isicholo.” She would reply in Zulu, speaking of the circular hat 
exclusively worn by married Zulu women.8 Women with frustration about how quickly after 
their response, such mocking would shift to nervous laughter and exclamations of “ungumngane 
wami, ungusisi wami!” (you are my friend, my sister).” Zandi and Zodwa criticized what they 
saw as the “small mindedness” of their kinswomen, saying ““I am no more your friend than five 
minutes before. You need to know that I am from here for you to treat me better?” 
A second misperception was that the women were poor and had dressed in Islamic 
clothes to come to the city to beg. On Fridays, some black South African women would come to 
town, dressed in hijab for the occasion, to take advantage of the practice of Zakat or alms-giving 
to poor Muslims. Zodwa, who worked in town in a predominantly Indian neighborhood by one 
of the oldest Mosques, hated patronizing local businesses for this reason. One day she had gone 
to buy lunch and as she arrived at the counter to place her order, the Indian shopkeeper took a R2 
coin out of the zakat drawer, brusquely gave it to her and told her to go.  
The insult of such assumptions was threefold. First was the presumption that their 
conversion to Islam was insincere. My respondants spoke at length about their choice to covert 
and cover themselves. They took hours out of their week to attend Madrasa classes and Zodwa 
was proud to be one of the teachers. They took their commitment to Islam very seriously and the 
suggestion that their covering was a mere ploy to gain resources was quite hurtful. Second was 
the insinuation that they were so poor that they would beg, an act they found humiliating. All of 
the women struggled to make ends meet, but found the idea of begging and particularly begging 
                                               
8 Zodwa and Zandi related these stories to me in a mix of Zulu and English, knowing my understanding of both. Here, they spoke 
in English, though the original comment would have been made in Zulu. 
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through the deceptive appropriation of a sacred practice to be disgraceful. The third insult was 
the suggestion by fellow-Muslims, and particularly Indians, that they were somehow lesser than 
sisters-in-faith. There is a longstanding antipathy between black South Africans and Indian South 
Africans.9 Black South Africans often complain that Indians look down upon them and mistreat 
them. That the shopkeeper Zodwa encountered assumed she was a beggar instead of a paying 
customer only fed into larger racial divides. She felt that as a Muslim sister she should have been 
treated with respect, but because of her black skin she was presumed to be a deceitful African 
and was brushed off as an unwanted nuisance. 
The particular conflation of Islam with Indian-ness in Durban also led to problems within 
the women’s own cultural groups. Once they dispelled the assumptions that they were foreigners 
themselves or impersonating believers to attract resources, their decision to convert, even when 
sincere, attracted ridicule. Other black South Africans accused them of being disloyal to their 
culture and to their race by appropriating what they deemed as “Indian culture.” Because of the 
aforementioned racial strife between Indian and black South Africans, practicing “Indian 
culture” was viewed as defecting and seen as implying Zulu or Xhosa culture was not good 
enough for them. 
It is critical to situate the post-apartheid anti-immigrant sentiment in a longer history of 
South African politics wherein the creation of “insiders” and “outsiders” along the lines of race, 
class or geographic residence was a critical part of the functioning of the polity. The violence of 
the last two decades is not simply a moment of zealous nationalism. “The nation” has long been 
a body that could be contaminated by “outsiders”—be they nationally native or foreign and the 
welfare of “insiders” has been premised on the exclusion of a differentially defined “alien.” The 
                                               
9  The scholarship on this is vast. For a sampling see: Bonachich 1973; Edwards and Nuttall 1990; Freund 1995; Hemson 1977; 
and Thiara 1999. 
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present form this “outsider” takes is the African non-national. Thus concerns about marriage 
between non-nationals and South Africans must be understood as part of a much broader 
resistance to mixing—between ethnic groups, across races, across class that pervades South 
Africa. This resistance is not solely an issue of xenophobia—or the construction of the stranger 
as a threat to society per Fourchard and Segatti 2015—but also part of a long discourse of anti-
miscegenation whereby African immigrants are understood to embody differences in culture, 
ethnicity, and at times race that could sully the purity of the host community—akin to the 
pervasive concern about interracial marriage. Finally, also at issue is a class conflict wherein 
foreigners’ economic ability to formalize marriages—and access their symbolic capital—has 
provoked intense jealousy from South African men who feel that their poverty is a reminder that 
they have been left out of the promises that democracy was supposed to bring. 
In addition to the feelings of anger that these accumulated forms of discrimination 
produced, women married to non-nationals also spoke of a deep sense of isolation. In part, this 
arose from friends or kin who did not accept their marriage and broke off ties with them. At 
other times, this was a product of living in the Point neighborhood that, despite its density, 
lacked a cohesive sense of community. Women complained that they did not fully know their 
neighbors or have deep friendships that were possible in the townships. Many of the women I 
knew did not work and stayed at home to care for young children. They often bemoaned what 
they felt were more rigid gender norms held by their husbands that discouraged their working or 
going out where they might interact with other men. 
The social effects of this isolation were varied. At one level, it manifested as a sense 
loneliness. Women complained that nobody came over to drink tea, or that they knew few people 
with whom they could leave their children when they went to the shops. The closeness of the 
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group of women who attended Madrasa together was an attempt to minimize these effects. At 
another level, it manifested as a lack of social support that left these women more vulnerable. 
Though all of their husbands worked, the earnings were unreliable and there were many 
months when income did not cover expenses. In such moments, the economic support of kin or 
loans of money or food from friends and neighbors was the stuff of survival. Further, all of the 
women had experienced some form of physical violence from their husband. For Zandi, who had 
the support of her family and the presence of Touissant’s extended kin in Durban, she could call 
on other family to assist her in creating a livable home situation. Alternatively, Zodwa, whose 
family had disowned her and who lacked affinal kin, felt disempowered by a dearth of advocates 
and trapped within a marriage that had not lived up to her expectations. 
Conclusion 
In April 2017, there was another spate of Xenophobic violence in South Africa this time 
accompanied by a PRO-xenophobia march. It is sadly not a phenomenon particularly unique to 
South Africa, though the history of apartheid does contribute a particular flavor. Yet, the 
repeated imagery of burned shops and angry machete-wielding South African men tells us very 
little about the lived experience of foreigners from Africa and those South Africans who just 
might love them. This chapter reveals that the decision to marry a foreigner that some South 
African women have made is a complicated one with high stakes.  
Today, black South African women have access to a form of citizenship that their 
mothers and grandmothers could only fight for. They can retain custody of their children, own 
property even in the city, take an absentee father to court. They can vote for the highest office in 
the country and expect that a number of their leaders will look like them. None of the women I 
knew denied the import of the many benefits they enjoyed. But, they often bemoaned the 
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hardships that had accompanied them. Without access to marriage or jobs, women felt blocked in 
their ability to meet their obligations to their elders or their children. In short, their membership 
in the nation felt incomplete.  
In this context, I have argued, marriage to a foreign man became a pathway to a fuller 
form of citizenship. These women gained the respected status of umakoti or bride and the 
financial and social partnership of a husband they could build a home with. The women and their 
children became legitimate members of their own and their husband’s lineages. However, these 
marriages, which were the very condition of possibility for these women to enjoy these 
additional forms of belonging, also came at the price of other forms of exclusion. In exchange for 
some membership in some spheres, these women sacrificed ready recognition of themselves as 
South African and suffered accusations that their Islamic conversion was either insincere or a 
form of cultural defecting. These tradeoffs highlight the import of these negotiations for women 
like Zandi, for poor South Africans and for others across the world who are navigating what 
citizenship means in our global age.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
 
The arc of this dissertation arose out of a persistent puzzle I confronted in South Africa in 
the early decades after democratic transition. Though discourses of rights and invocations of the 
constitution pervaded everyday conversations, time and again, poor black South Africans 
complained to me that they did not feel they were citizens of the new South Africa. They 
characterized citizenship as merely symbolic—the stuff of ID books and voting booths—or 
ideological—the content of political discourse—but found the term quite empty in describing 
their lived reality. At one level, I took this as an important critique of the many failures of the 
ruling party to live up to the promises of liberation. However, such an analysis was insufficient. 
There were many terms by which South Africans could and did criticize the ruling party. The 
choice of failed citizenship was clearly doing more for them.  
The people with whom I interacted were overwhelmingly in their 30s or older. Transition 
was not in the distant past. They themselves, or their parents, remembered well what it was like 
to live under apartheid governance. They had experienced the continued efforts to render black 
South Africans citizens of independent bantustans and, subsequently, foreigners within the South 
African nation state. They had witnessed the rise and collapse of the tri-cameral system, the 
strange pseudo-representation offered up by a government floundering in its control. In short, 
they knew well the various forms that citizenship could take. Thus, their use of failed citizenship 
to describe their disappointment in their present condition, contained within it a historic residue 
of past struggles and prior imaginings of a future that never arrived. My own analysis of 
citizenship, then required attention to this history, to the ways in which citizenship was 
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negotiated between state actors and those living within the polity. As such, I turned to the period 
of the late 1950s and 1960s when the bureaucratic contours of apartheid citizenship—especially 
as they related to families—were being outlined and, summarily, contested. 
Notably, my respondent’s lamentations about their citizenship status centered around 
economics. But these were not mere objections to the rise in unemployment and consumer need 
that had been democracy’s unfortunate sidekicks. Instead, these were concerns about how the 
economic situation rendered meeting family obligations challenging and oftentimes untenable. 
Instead of caring for their aging parents, people found themselves reliant on their pensions. 
Monies for school fees, uniforms, and stationary was hard to come by for one’s own children, let 
alone for a niece or a nephew. Most critical for my friends was that marriages were all but 
impossible. The foundational process by which families solidified relationships of debt and 
dependency for multiple generations was unavailable.  
This dissertation seeks to make sense of these concerns through an attention to the 
interrelatedness of citizenship, economy, and kinship. In each of these three areas, it takes a 
processual approach. Citizenship is not a singular status that is conferred by a nation state. 
Instead, it is layered and multifaceted. Citizenship involves the negotiation of multiple spheres of 
belonging that are frequently in flux. So, too is the economy. Here I have shown that economic 
relationships are not structured by a singular dominant logic. Instead, they are situated, mediated, 
and worked out in a dense clustering of everyday interactions. These most often take the form of 
negotiations of debt and dependency. Thus, at the heart of both citizenship and economy lie 
relations of kinship. These, too, are not possessed, but achieved, built, and maintained. I have 
used the term kinshipping to capture this sense of motion, and, most important, the labor 
required.  
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While the intertwining of citizenship, economy, and kinship impact many concerns of 
daily life, this dissertation has used the lens of child support as a means of revealing the ways in 
which politics and economy are built up through intimate interpersonal relationships. It has done 
so through an analysis of child support claims in the periods of the late 1950s and 1960s and the 
2010s during which time South Africa experienced a dramatic political economic shift that 
altered intimate relationships, the availability of waged labor, and the category of citizenship. I 
have demonstrated that poor women’s labors to secure resources for their families and 
themselves not only respond to, but actively construct livelihoods, economy, and the very 
meaning of citizenship. The previous chapters have revealed that through their kinshipping labor 
to press claims for support, women redefined obligations between men and women, persons and 
communities, citizens and the state. 
The first chapter, “We have done everything right by our children,” considered how 
women within three different race groups used the kinshipping process of public motherhood to 
shape their interactions with the 1960s welfare state. It revealed how welfare entitlements, 
economic position, and citizenship were closely tied to gendered and racial categories. However, 
the category of public motherhood at once capacious and particular offered a morally and 
politically potent means for poor women to negotiate their position.  
Considering a very similar issue in the quite altered political economic landscape of the 
2010s, the “Multiple Maternities” chapter focused on the slightly different kinshipping strategy 
of performances of motherhood. In this latter era, public motherhood as an identity no longer 
garnered political recognition or economic support. Instead it was the needs of children that 
attracted such resources. The chapter shows that in response, poor women had to reorient 
themselves to their deserving children through performances of motherhood that attended to the 
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very different maternal expectations of the various audiences upon which they pressed claims. It 
reveals that these performances of motherhood are the tenuous means by which poor women 
secured a livelihood and attained a neutered form of state recognition through the widespread 
child support grant.  
The following chapter, “Problematic Paters,” reveals the ways in which the efficacy of 
kinshipping as a strategy for securing a livelihood and political positioning was always crosscut 
by ideologies of gender and race. Bringing the 1960s and 2010s into a single frame, the chapter 
shows the historical persistence of anxieties about the future of the South African nation that 
manifested as moral panics over purportedly deviant fathers. These moral panics had very 
different, though nevertheless profound, effects on poor father’s efforts to raise their children in 
these eras.  
The “‘Maintenance’ of Family” chapter focuses on the Maintenance Court, a primary 
state mechanism for disciplining deviant fathers. In the 2010s, the Court was re-envisioned as a 
critical apparatus to lessen the state’s welfare expenditure on the many children who received the 
child support grant. In the process, court mandates would imbue absent fathers with financial and 
moral responsibility that were seen as the cornerstones of proper citizenship. The transformative 
potential of the court relied on the labor of mothers to initiate and continue a case. Yet, the 
chapter reveals that many women were either disappointed in or avoided the Court altogether 
because its processes thwarted the kinshipping projects they valued. Instead of making citizens 
or stable families, the court instead fostered discord and unstable forms of dependence that 
stymied women’s efforts to build new relationships. 
The final chapter, “They come to take our women and our jobs,” reveals the critical role 
that marriage plays in achieving economic security and national belonging. Since democratic 
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transition, immigrants from the African continent have become the new category of reviled 
foreigner on which to pin the blame for economic scarcity. However, by marrying immigrant 
men, the chapter shows, South African women achieve economic support and full social 
citizenship within their own nation.  
The arc of these chapters tracks the linkages between livelihoods, kinship, and citizenship 
as part of a contested field of political signification in South African history. The result is an 
important scholarly intervention. For as much as kinship scholars and feminist theorists have 
argued for the analytic integration of the domestic, economic, and political domains, their 
separation remains stubbornly persistent. Much of this arises out of the mid-twentieth century 
separation of scholarly subfields (kinship anthropology, economic anthropology, and political 
anthropology; family sociology, economic sociology, and political sociology) (Thelen and Alber 
2018). This dissertation is part of the most recent wave of scholars to push for a re-integration 
(e.g. Schuster 2015 on economy; Thelen and Alber 2018 on politics). In contrast to these other 
scholars who focus on either, economics or politics, this dissertation integrates all three.  
However, my goal was not merely to demonstrate their interrelationship. Instead, this 
dissertation revealed the related processes by which each are brought into being. I have shown 
how through their kinshipping labors, women refigured the political economy and remade the 
meaning of citizenship.  
The stakes of this intervention are not simply theoretical. As the puzzle that prompted 
this research reveals not only poor South Africans, but numerous others across the world are 
struggling to define what citizenship means in our global age. The import of its meaning is not 
small. In their Annual review of Anthropology article, Petryna and Follis propose that citizenship 
be understood as containing the “fault lines of survival” (2015). This dissertation sits at the heart 
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of such a project. I propose an understanding of citizenship that accounts for both 
intersectionality and relationality. We must attend to the forms of layered belonging negotiated 
through one’s embodied and lived social location. Such a robust definition of citizenship must 
also attend to the ways in which spheres of belonging affect and are affected by their 
membership in other layers with differential political powers and often differential hegemonic 
political projects. Furthermore, we must not only understand these form of belonging as 
relational to one another but as social relationships that require work and reproduction to 
maintain. This dissertation shows how projects of social reproduction constitute contingent 
economic and political relationships that structure people’s lives far more than any totalizing 
logic. In this way, citizenship cannot be understood as a binary of something that one does or 
does not have, but as a spectrum of statuses that are emergent and negotiated, but nonetheless 
critical to survival. 
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Chapter 9 - Epilogue 
 
It was late afternoon and Odette was refusing to answer her mother’s repeated phone 
calls. To be accurate, these were not phone calls that Odette could have picked up her phone to 
answer. They were missed call messages that a caller can send for free, without using cell phone 
air time, to ask the receiver to call them back. But Odette had no plan to call back. It was her 
birthday and she was embittered not only that her mother had taken so long to contact her, but 
that she made no monetary investment—be it a phone call, a gift, or a visit—to acknowledge 
Odette’s special day. We sat on a makeshift couch assembled from stacked boxes and tucked 
blankets that dominated the single-room unit that was home to her, her five children and her 
long-term partner.  
Odette leaned back against the wall and sighed audibly. She complained that life had 
been better before she re-encountered her mother at age 17. She had lived in a children’s home 
since the time she was 6 and developed what she described as an independent, self-sufficient life. 
“People who grow up with their mothers and fathers don’t know how to do things,” she said. By 
17 Odette had developed strong ties to a wealthy foster family who supported her schooling and 
she was poised to receive a volleyball scholarship to university. With her mother’s arrival, Odette 
lost much of that support and instead was asked orient her life to maintaining her impoverished 
mother, a responsibility she never appreciated nor embraced. 
As we talked, we heard running footsteps in the hall and calls of “Jamilla, Jamilla” the 
name of the pseudo-social worker who worked for a well-endowed historically white church that 
distributed resources such as groceries, clothes, or school supplies to neighborhood families. 
 266 
That day she was handing out 30kg grocery parcels, which I helped Odette carry back up the 
rickety stairs to her room. With precision Odette stashed away the cans of fish and meat into 
back cupboards, out of sight from the hallway. To my surprise, she filled her empty tubs only 
part of the way with dried beans and rice and then set the remaining food aside. She laughed at 
my raised eyebrows and said that she would give the rest to Sheila, her next-door neighbor. 
Puzzled, I noted that Sheila, too, had received a grocery parcel, calculating in my head that 
Sheila had no more mouths to feed than Odette. “Yes,” Odette concurred, “but she needs the 
help, and, besides, she is family.” 
Starting from the premise that kinship is something that one does, not something that one 
has, Odette’s decision to resist the literal and figurative calls of obligation from her birth mother 
while meeting obligations to her next-door neighbor revealed how, that day, Sheila was more of a 
family to Odette. This dissertation has explored the political economy of kinship in a context 
where high unemployment and economic insecurity has made marriage—one of the most 
formalized of kinship bonds—all but inaccessible for the majority of South Africans. 
Childbearing—another key kinshipping mechanism—is still available and oftentimes quite 
prized. While childrearing comes with great costs and labor, the woman without children remains 
pitied by her peers.  
In this context of economic scarcity, to which South Africans are not newcomers, it is 
women who procure food when none is readily available, who assemble appropriate wardrobes 
out of hand-me downs or trades, or who secure the cash to pay school fees when nobody in the 
household is working. At the same time, the claims that women can make—and expect to be 
honored with any reliability—upon the fathers of their children are increasingly up for 
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negotiation. In response, the women with whom I worked assembled networks of support upon 
whom they could rely. 
Odette and Sheila are notable because over the past decade they have formed a long 
association amidst a culture of disconnection. Another mixed-race woman like herself, Sheila’s 
daughter was Odette’s best friend back in her “wild days” of night clubbing and drug-dealing 
boyfriends. Sheila’s daughter was killed in a robbery a few years ago around the same time 
Odette’s eldest daughter was hit by a taxi. Ever since, the two women and their numerous 
dependents have “shifted together” moving from building to building, often living in proximate 
rooms.  
Despite their shared experienced, there is little that would bond Sheila and Odette 
together at face value. Sheila’s sons were still active in the drug trade and Odette sought to 
distance herself and her children from association with such activities. Though the sons 
occasionally brought in much needed money, Odette was critical of Sheila’s “soft hearted” 
tolerance of their abusive behavior. Conversely, Sheila often called Odette a “lazy mother” and 
accused her of being negligent of her children’s health needs. I mention these examples to 
highlight the ways in which the trust that Sheila and Odette cultivated in their relationship was 
fragile and not necessarily based in some form of enduring amity. Instead it took a great deal of 
work.  
In addition to sharing her dry goods, Odette was the one of the pair who usually found 
their next living place, often sacrificing choice spots if there weren’t two rooms. When she 
attended an aid society with her gaggle of children, the extra blankets and pillows she often 
garnered, she passed on to Sheila. In so doing, Odette positioned herself as a dutiful daughter to 
Sheila, both dependable and generous with her spoils. Twenty years Odette’s senior, Sheila’s 
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labors took a different form. If a social worker or police officer paid an unanticipated visit to the 
building and found Odette’s children unattended, Sheila would claim responsibility for them. 
When the Muslim Aid society that supported Odette “caught” her in line at the Episcopal 
church’s soup kitchen, Sheila told them that Odette had gone for her benefit. These labors, often 
discursive, she framed as a kind of maternal care through which she managed Odette’s reputation 
in the neighborhood and re-established herself as a trustworthy custodian of knowledge about 
Odette’s intimate domestic life. 
Odette and Sheila’s kinshipping work, essential to their survival in this relational 
economy, reveals the imbrication of intimate relationships and economic processes that 
anthropologists have long pondered. The assembly of these networks involved the cultivation of 
relationships of dependence in which women would be able to make claims upon others for 
resources. Such relationships were the result of persistent efforts of women to build social ties 
and to position themselves as particular kinds of persons, as well as to manage the claims made 
upon them. I have argued that this kinshipping labor can neither be understood as an economic 
appropriation of the family nor as the domestication of economic logic. Instead, I see both 
livelihoods and kin relations as being simultaneously produced through the work of becoming 
and enacting social personhood.  
Further, in a context in South Africa where the security of one’s social reproduction mark 
the contours of national belonging, this kinshipping labor takes on meaning at another scale. 
Though they gained formalized inclusion into the polity at democratic transition, poor black 
women and men, feel blocked from realizing the freedoms that liberation was supposed to bring. 
In response to a government that may acknowledge their challenges on paper, but has done little 
to address them in substance, South African women are making claims upon persons more likely 
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to heed their requests. In so doing, they are reshaping their place in the new nation and the very 
meaning of citizenship itself.  
However, it is important to remember that relationships such as Odette and Sheila’s are in 
motion, they are kinship in process. Such efforts must constantly be reinvigorated and refreshed. 
Obligations have varying timetables for their satisfaction. Further, though kinship entails 
obligation, these obligations can also be ignored. On the eve of my departure from South Africa, 
Odette and Sheila’s building was closed and they were forced to once again “shift”. This time, 
Odette leaped at the chance to occupy a large room with its own toilet and left Sheila to fend for 
herself. Soon after Odette when to visit her mother for the Easter holidays. When the phone rang 
this time, it was Sheila whose call went unanswered. 
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